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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and 












STATE INSURANCE FUND, JAMES M. ) 
ALCORN, in his official capacity as its ) 
manager, and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE) 
MEYER, GERALD GEDDES, JOHN ) 
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN, MARK ) 
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. HIGGINS, ) 
TERRY GESTRIN, and MAX BLACK, and ) 
STEVE LANDON, in their capacity as ) 






ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO AUGMENT THE 
RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38492-2011 
Canyon County Docket No. 2009-13607 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD was filed by counsel for 
Appellants on May 11,2011. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD 
be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below, 
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
I. Amended Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
file-Sllmped October 12,2010; 
2. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. file-stamped 
October 26, 2010; 
3. Defendants' Notice of Erratum Re: Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. file-stamped October 29, 2010; · 
4. Memormdum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped 
November 30. 2010; 
5. Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, file-stamped November 
22,2010; 
ORDER ORANTING PLAINTlFFS' MonON TO AUOMENT THE RECORD - Docket No. 
38492-2011 
6. Defendants' Notice ofEmta Re: Peodina Motions.lile-sumped December 8. 2010; and 
7. Motion to Strike the Affidavit of James M. Alcorn and Selected Exhibits Attadled 10 the 
Affidavit of Counsel Both of Which Were Filed In Support of Defendants' Molion for 
Summary Judgment, 1iJe-st.amped November 22, 2010 
1'2 -t' DATED this ..w..:-day of May, 2011. 




For the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerlt 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD - Docket No. 
38492-2011 
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IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD 
be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below, 
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Amended Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
file-stamped October 12,2010; 
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DATED this 13 -t'day of May, 2011. 
For the Supreme Court 
7?l-ceh?-VI /4nrr=-
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
cc: Counsel of Record 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD Docket No. 
38492-2011 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and DISCOVERY 
CARE CENTRE LLC OF SALMON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
JAMES M. ALCORN, in his official capacity as 
its Manager, and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE 
MEYER, GERALD GEDDES, JOHN 
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN, MARK 
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. HIGGINS, 
TERRY GESTRIN AND MAX BLACK AND 
STEVE LANDON in their capacity as 
member's of the Board of Directors of the State 
Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV 09-13607-C 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Amended Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs , Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Page - 1 
COME NOW THE PLAINTIFFS, and the members of the class, by and through 
undersigned counsel, and hereby provide the Court with the following Memorandum in Support 
of their Motion for Pariial Summary Judgment. The basis and grounds for this Motion is the 
contention that making the 2009 repeal ofIdaho Code §72-915 retroactive to January 1 st, 2003 is 
clear-ly unconstitutional because it unquestionably impairs the obligations of a contract. In so 
doing it violates Article I, Section 16 of the Constitution ofIdaho. ("No bill of attainder, ex post 
facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts shall ever be passed.") 
PART I.: STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. INTRODUCTION: 
The Idaho State Insurance Fund (hereafter "the Fund") was established by the Idaho 
Legislature in 1917. See, Idaho Code, Title 72, Chapter 9. For the first 92 year-s of the Fund's 
existence, its sole authority to pay dividends derived from a single statute, namely I.C. § 72-915, 
which read as follows: 
72-915. Dividends. - At the end of every year, and as such other times as the manager 
in his discretion may determine, a readjustment of the rate shall be made for each of the 
several classes of employments or industries. If at any time there is an aggregate balance 
remaining to the credit of any class of employment or industry which the manager deems 
may be safely and properly divided, he may in his discretion, credit to each individual 
member of such class who shall have been a subscriber to the state insurance fund for a 
period of six (6) months or more, prior to the time of such readjustment, such proportion 
of such balance as he is properly entitled to, having regar-d to his prior paid premiums 
since the last readjustment ofrates. 
This statute allowed the Fund's Manager the discretion to determine whether to declare a 
dividend and to determine the total amount of the dividend corpus to be distributed among the 
Fund's policyholders. Thereafter, the manner of distributing the dividend corpus among the 
Fund's policyholders is outside of the Manager's discretion. As will be demonstrated below, the 
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express provisions of the Fund's contract with its policyholders mandates that the dividend corpus 
will be distributed on a pro rata basis. The Fund did not adhere to the provisions of the contract 
requiring it to distribute any relevant dividend corpus on a pro rata basis and it is this failure 
which underlies the damage claims made in this case. 
B. THE mSTORICAL SETTING: 
In 1998, the Idaho Legislature passed House Bill 774, which contained a series of changes 
to Title 72, Chapter 9. Specifically, that legislation amended I.e. §§ 72-901; 902 and 906, and 
repealed I.C. § 72-911. No mention ofLC. § 72-915 was then made, either by the Bill's sponsor, 
or by any member of the House or Senate State Affairs Committees, and no version of this 
legislation contained fuly reference to I.e. § 72-915. See Doc # 000001 to Doc # 000077, Affidavit 
of Philip Gordon In Support of Plaintifft' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ~ 2 (hereinafter 
"Aff. Gordon"). 
For the first two policy years following the passage ofHB 774 (July 1, 1998 to June 30, 
1999,-and July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2000 I) the State Insurance Fund, acting through its manager 
and Board of Directors paid dividends using a formula which did not make a pro rata allocation 
of the dividend corpus but which did allow for a distribution of dividend to even its smallest 
policyholders. See Doc # 000088 to Doc# 000099 ~ 3 Aff. Gordon. In allocating dividends, the 
formula used the amount of "billed premiums" as a starting point. This amount was then reduced 
1. Each of the Fund's dividend distributions is made in respect to a policy period commencing 
on the July 15t approximately 30 months prior to such distribution, and ending on the following June 30th, 
i.e. approximately 18 months in advance of such distribution. Thus, the dividends allocated in December 
2000, and distributed in January, 2001 pertained to the policies with inception dates falling on or before 
July 15t 1998 and on or before June 30th 1999. Similarly, the dividends allocated in December 2002, and 
distributed in January, 2003 -the first distribution to exclude the smaller policyholders- were made in 
reference to the policy year July 15t 2000 to June 30th 2001. 
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for retention (to cover underwriting expenses) based upon a percentage of the billed premium paid 
which percentage was decreased as the amount of billed premium increased. The remaining 
amount was then reduced by a "loss factor" (1.18 times any losses on the policy). The remaining 
amount, if any, was multiplied by a "rate of retum" (dividend rate) which increased as the amount 
of billed premium increased. See Doc # 000088 to Doc# 000099 and Doc # 0000 91 ~3 & ~4 Aff 
Gordon. 
At its regularly scheduled Board meeting in November, 2002, the Manager and the Board 
made the decision that, commencing with the dividend corpus which the Fund would distribute in 
January, 2003, it would no longer pay any dividends to a class of policyholders which had 
historically been receiving dividends. Specifically, the Board and Manager determined that no 
dividends whatsoever would be paid to any policyholder whose premium for the applicable period 
was $2,500.00 or less (hereafter "the smaller policyholders"), and that the entirety of the dividend 
corpus would be divided only among employers whose annual premiums exceeded $2,500.00 
(hereafter "the larger policy holders"). See Docs #000092 to #000099, ~ 6 Aff Gordon. 
In July, 2006, in response to the Fund's decision to deny dividends to those of its 
policyholders whose premiums were at or under $2,500.00, a class action lawsuit was filed in this 
Court against the Fund by three named businesses, each of whom was a policyholder of the Fund 
for one or more years of the designated class period. See, Farber v. The Idaho State Insurance 
Fund, Third Judicial District Court, Canyon County, CV06-7877. The gravamen of that action 
was a claim that since the named Plaintiffs had not received any dividends for the years of the 
class period the Fund was in violation ofI.C. § 72-915. See, Farber v. Idaho State Insurance 
Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 208 P. 3d 289 (2009) (initial opinion issued 3/5/2009, replacement opinion 
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following petition for rehearing filed 5/5/2009). In both of its decisions, the Supreme COUli 
detennined that Idaho Code § 72-915 clearly and unambiguously required that, for any policy 
period in respect to which the Fund elected to pay a dividend, the dividend corpus had to be 
divided among all time-qualified policyholders (those who held their policy for at least six 
months) pro rata based solely upon the amount of the premium which they had paid. Id.147 
Idaho 311-312, 208 P. 3d 293-294. 
In the two-month interval between the issuance of the two Farber opinions, a Bill which 
attempted to legislatively reverse the decision in Farber was introduced in the Idaho Legislature. 
State Senator John Goedde, a member of the Fund's Board and also a named Defendant in the 
Farber case, presented SB 1166 to the Senate Conm1erce and Human Resources Committee with 
the explanation that it would "serve to offset an adverse decision of the Idaho Supreme Court 
regarding the interpretation of Idaho Code, Section 72-915 ... " See Doc #000102 to Doc #000109, 
~7 AffGordon. Senate Bill 1 ]66, in its original fonn, acknowledged the Supreme Court's 
decision, set out the purported legislative intention in amending the laws relating to the Fund in 
1998 and, on the basis that an emergency existed, provided for a repeal Idaho Code 72-915 
retroactive to April, 1998. Doc # 000100 ~7 AffGordon. When the SB 1166 was presented to 
the Senate Commerce and Human Resources Committee on April 7, 2010, testimony challenged it 
as an attempt to impair the rights of contract and a majority of the members voted to hold the Bill 
in Committee. Doc #000102 to #000109 ~7 AffGordon. On April 14, 2010, the Bill came back 
before the Committee with representations that agreements had been reached to amend the Bill 
and at that time it was sent to the Senate Amending Order. Doc #000110 to #000113 ~7 Aff 
Gordon After SB 1166 was amended to be 1) retroactive to January 1,2003, and 2) to specifically 
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provide that the Bill was not in any way intended to apply to any claims made in Farber v. State 
Insurance Fund, the Bill (thereafter SB 1166aa. See Doc #000119 Aff. Philip Gordon) passed 
through both the Senate and the House and was signed by the Governor on May 6th, 2009. 
Since May, 2009, the Fund issued its Annual Statement for the year ended December 31, 
2009. In pertinent part, this Statement showed the following: 
a. The "Net Admitted Assets" of the Fund rose by more than 2.5 million dollars from the 
prior year (Doc # 000117 ; line 26). 
b. The unallocated surplus of the Fund ["Unassigned funds (surplus)] grew by more than 
seven million dollars from that on hand at the end of the prior year (Doc # 000118, lines 
33 atld 34.2). 
c. The amount of "dec1ared and lmpaid" dividends to policyholders was the sum of 
$14,045,136 (Doc #000118, lines 11 and 1l.2). 
See Doc #000114 to #000 118, ~ 8 Aff Gordon. 
C. BACKDROP TO THE INSTANT ACTION: 
In the course of pre-trial discovery proceedings in the Farber case, it became clear that the 
Fund had, at least since 2002, violated the terms and conditions ofIdaho Code § 72-915 in not 
simply one, but in three ways. First, the Fund totally excluded from any share of the dividend pool 
any and all policyholders whose billed premium was $2,500.00 or less (i.e. the Plaintiff class in 
Farber). 2 Second, the Fund computed the dividends to be paid to the larger policy holders (i.e. 
2. During the pendency of the Farber case, the Fund lowered its threshold minimum premium 
for the receipt of some portion of the dividend from $2,500.00 to $1,500.00. Commencing with the first 
dividend distributed thereafter, policyholders whose premiums exceeded that lower number received 
some dividend. Thus, there may be some members of the class who were members ofthe class in 
Farber, as to those years in respect to which they received no dividend whatsoever, who will also be 
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those whose billed premiums exceeded $2,500.00 -Of, for some years in the class peliod, 
$1,500.00- and who therefore shared in the dividend corpus) not on a flat percentage basis, 
whereby each qualifYing policyholder would receive a pro rata share of the total dividend based 
solely on the size of their billed premium but, instead, using two sliding scales (one for percentage 
of premium "retained" and one for "return percentage"). The effect of these adjustments was 
that a policy issued between July 1, 2001 and June 30, 2002 with a billed premium of$5000 (and 
no losses) would have received a dividend of $187.50 ($0.0375/dollar) and a policy issued during 
the same period with a $200,000 billed premium (and no losses) would have received a dividend 
of $40,500 ($.20/dollar) See e.g. Doc #000097. Third, as to all policyholders who had losses due 
to injured employees, the Fund first reduced their billed premiums based upon the amount to be 
"retained", then the remainder was further reduced by a mUltiple of 1.18 of the losses paid and 
then paid them a dividend based upon any portion of the billed premium that was left after these 
reductions. See Doc #000091. All three ofthese practices violated Idaho Code § 72-915, as 
interpreted by our Supreme Court in Farber, supra. 
Each of the named Plaintiffs and all of the members of the class in this cause are Idaho 
employers who purchased contracts of workers compensation insurance with the Flmd for one or 
more years commencing on July 1 S\ 2002, and continuing up to January 1 S\ 2009, i.e. six months 
prior to the effective date of the act repealing Idaho Code 72-915. First Amended Complaint ~~ 7 
and 8. The Plaintiffs and the members of the class, as a result of the fonnula used by the Fund, 
received less than a pro rata share of the dividend which the Fund allocated and distributed in one 
members ofthe Plaintiff class in the instant action, for any year in which they received a dividend, albeit 
one which was less than their pro rata share. In no instance will any person or entity be a member of 
both classes for the same premium period. 
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or more of the years during the Class Period. First Amended Complaint ~13. 
In consequence of the fact that the dividends which are paid by the Fund relate back to a 
policy period commencing 30 months prior to payment and concluding 18 months prior to 
payment (see FN 1, supra), each and every dividend which the Fund has paid during the class 
period, including the dividend of approximately $14 million dollars paid in January, 2010 (on 
policies issued on or after July 1,2007 and on or before June 30,2008), related to contracts of 
insurance which were written and had remained in force for more than six months prior to May 
6th, 2009, the date on which the Governor signed the enactment repealing Idaho Code § 72-915.3 
In other words, the rights of the Plaintiffs and the members of the class to receive their pro rata 
share of these dividends, and the obligation of the Fund to pay those dividends in accordance with 
the clear and unambiguous language ofLC.§ 72-915, for each year of the class period, had fully 
vested prior to the effective date of the repeal of this statute. 
Furthermore, another full batch of premiums have been billed for policies issued July 1, 
2008 to June 30, 2009. It is reasonable to expect based upon history~in late 2010 or early 2011 the 
Fund will declare, allocate and distribute a dividend relative to these policies. Many of these 
policyholders will have a claim that their right to a dividend vested before the repeal became 
effective and others will have a claim that their contractual right to share in the dividend was 
agreed upon before the Bill became effective.4 These claims while they may arise and have to be 
3 Indeed, policies which were issued between July 1,2008, and November 26,2010 ,(which will 
receive a dividend in January 2011, if one is distributed) will also all have been in force for more than 6 
months by the time that I.C. 72-915 was repealed (assume the law is effective at all or on May 26,2010). 
4 If the emergency driven retroactive repeal ofLC. 72-915 is not effective the Court will be later 
called upon to determine if the repeal is wholly ineffective, if the repeal is effective but that the effective date 
is July 1,2009, or if the repeal is effective when the Governor signed the Bill on May 6,2009. These 
questions are not, however relevant, to the issues raised in this motion. 
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addressed in the future do not need to be addressed at this time and are mentioned only so that it 
will not appear that Plaintiffs' have intended to waive them. 
It is clear therefore that the Plaintiffs, and the Class they seek to represent: 
1. Had contracts of insurance with the Fund; 
2. Were entitled pursuant to the terms of those contracts to receive a pro rata share of any 
dividend corpus that the Fund elected to distribute among policyholders; 
3 Have the benefit of a Idaho Supreme COUli decision requiring that they be paid a pro rata 
share of any dividend corpus that the Fund elected to distribute, Farber v. The Idaho State 
Insurance Fund, supra.; 
4 Will recover a pro rata share of the dividend corpus that was distributed only if the 
legislative repeal ofLC. ,-r72-915 is held to be unconstitutional. 
PART II.: THE APPLIC)'..BLE LAW 
A. INTRODUCTION: 
The Plaintiffs have moved for Partial Summary Judgment on the limited question of 
whether or not the Idaho Legislature could make the repeal Idaho Code § 72-915 retroactive to 
January rt, 2003, without running afoul of Article 1, § 16 of the Constitution ofIdaho. Plaintiffs 
contend that the retroactivity aspect of the statute. See, Engrossed SB 1166aa, Doc #000119 AjJ. 
Philip Gordon, is unconstitutional as a matter of law, given that the Idaho Legislature is expressly 
forbidden by Article 1, § 16 of the Idaho Constitution from passing any law which, inter alia, 
impairs the obligations of contracts. That model of categorical brevity reads in full as follows: 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall 
ever be passed. 
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The repeal ofIdaho Code § 72-915, insofar as it affects, or purportedly affects, any 
contract of insurance which was entered into on or prior to January P\ 2009, and held for at least 
180 days, impairs the obligations of those insurance contracts in violation of this very succinct 
Constitutional provision. 
B. The Idaho Statutes creating the Fund and governing its actions, which are in 
force at the time the Fund issues any policy of insurance, constitute terms and 
conditions of such policy. A violation of any of these statutes is, therefore, a breach 
of the Fund's contract of insurance. 
The policies of workers' compensation insurance which the Plaintiffs and the members of 
the Class purchased from the Defendant Fund are contracts for the provision of insurance 
coverage. Indeed, Paragraph A of the contract which the Fund supplied to its insureds (see 
Exhibit "A" Affidavit of Donald W Lojek in Support of Plaintiffs ' Motionfor Partial Summary 
Judgment, hereinafter AjJ Lojek). The Fund is specifically empowered by statute to enter into 
contracts to provide insurance and services related to that insurance. Idaho Code § 72-905. 
At all times during the class peliod, the terms and conditions of the contracts between the 
Fund and its policyholders included not only the provisions of its written policy (Exhibit "A ", AjJ 
Lojek) but also the Idaho Statutes creating and governing the Fund which are in effect during the 
policy period. 
In 2000, the Idaho Supreme Court decided the case of Kelso & Irwin, PA. v. State 
Insurance Fund; and Drew Forney, Manager o/the State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130; 997 P. 
2d 591. Among the various rulings made by the Kelso Court was this seminal formulation: 
It is undisputed that Kelso has a contract for worker's compensation insurance with 
the SIF. Any violation of the provisions of that contract would constitute a breach 
of contract by the SIF. Additionally, the contract necessarily incorporates the 
statutory framework which both created the SIF and governs the actions that 
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can be taken by the SIF with regard to the SIF's funds. When Kelso contracted 
with the SIF it was entitled to rely on the statutes creating and regulating the 
SIF .... Consequently, any act taken by the SIF beyond its statutory authority would 
also be a breach of the SIF's contract with Kelso. 134 Idaho 130 at 138, 997 P. 2d 
591 at 599. (emphasis added). 
Our Supreme Court in Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho, 388, 
III P. 3d 73 (2005), reiterated this principle and specifically extended it to the statute governing 
the declaring and distribution of dividends: 
In Kelso this Court held that the SIF's governing statutes were incorporated in its 
contracts with its policyholders. [citation omitted]. Kelso also held that 
policyholders "had a right to rely on the statutes creating and regulating the SIF, 
and the limits those statutes place on how the SIP can invest its policyholders" 
premiums.[citation omitted] This covenant reaches to the SIF's statutory 
obligations that are incorporated into its contracts. The SIF has duties to its 
policyhoiders regarding surpius and dividends by virtue of the fact that the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing extends the statutes that are 
incorporated in the policyholders' contracts. 141 Idaho, 388,399; 111 P. 3d 73, 
84 (emphasis added). 
At all times material and relevant to this class action, Idaho Code § 72-915 was one of the 
statutes governing the actions of the Fund. A breach by the Fund of its duty to distribute the 
dividend corpus according to the statutory method set forth in Idaho Code § 72-915 thus 
constituted a breach of the contracts of insurance which the Fund entered into with the Plaintiffs 
and the members of the Class. 
The concept that the laws which create and govern an entity which is a creature of statute 
(and the Fund is of course such an entity; See, Kelso, supra) comprise terms and conditions of the 
contracts entered into by that entity is not limited to the Fund. Rather, it has been applied by our 
Idaho Appellate Courts to a variety of governmental and quasi-governmental entities which trace 
their existence to specific statutes. Thus, in the context of a drainage district (" .... we feel celiain 
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that a drainage district is a local improvement districL." Straus and Nicholson v. Ketchen, 54 
Idaho 56 at 67; 28 P.2d 824 at 828 [Idaho Supreme Court 1933]), our Supreme Court, drawing on 
precedent from Federal law, concluded that: 
The law is so well settled that the statutes of this state and decisions of the courts, 
that were in force at the time of the issuance of the bonds in question, became a 
part of the contract, as between the bondholders and the propeliy owners, that 
citation of authority is deemed hardly necessary. 
C. There is no question that the Idaho Legislature intended the repeal of Idaho Code 
§ 72-915 to have retroactive effect and be applied retroactively. 
The very wording of the Bill repealing Idaho Code § 72-915 pennits no doubt that the 
Idaho Legislature intended the repeal to have retroactive effect and be applied retroactively so that 
certain of the Fund's contractual obligations would be impaired. Making the repeal retroactive to 
January 1, 2003, as the enactment states, would, were it constitutional, affect the rights of all 
persons who purchased policies of insurance from the Fund at any time on or after July 151 of the 
year 2000,5 up to and including six months prior to the purported effective date of the repea1.6 
D. The attempt to make the repeal of Idaho Code § 72-915 apply retroactively 
would operate to eliminate the obligations of the Fund to pay dividends in the 
manner mandated by the Farber Court in respect to the contracts of 
insurance which the Plaintiffs and the Members of the Class purchased from 
the fund prior to six months before the purported effective date of the repeal. 
Absent retroactive application of the repeal ofIdaho Code § 72-915, and given the Idaho 
5 See FN 1., supra, wherein it is explained that dividends are paid for a policy period commencing 
approximately 30 months and ending approximately 18 months prior to the payment date of such dividends. 
6 This date represents the last date on which an employer could purchase a policy of worker's 
compensation insurance from the Fund, and have it be in effect for the six months needed to qualifY for a 
dividend prior to the effective date of the repeal. Since their rights to a dividend would have vested prior 
to the repeal of the dividend statute, this would represent the last day on which persons who purchased 
policies with the Fund would have their rights compromised by the attempt to repeal the statute retroactively. 
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Supreme Court's holding in Farber, supra, the Plaintiffs and the Members of the Class, once they 
held their policies of workers compensation insurance with the Fund for six months prior to the 
effect date of the repeal, would have a vested right to receive, and the Fund would have an 
obligation to pay to them, for each year in the class period, a pro rata share of the total dividend 
corpus paid out, based solely on the amount of the premiums they paid.7 
As the Farber Court explained the obligatory method of allocating the dividend corpus: 
The statute contemplates dividing the aggregate balance proportionately according to the 
policyholder's prior paid premiums relative to all paid premiums. To argue that this 
language could be construed to somehow grant discretion regarding how to calculate the 
distribution makes no sense, and would require this Court to stretch the plain language 
beyond its obvious meaning. 208 P. 3d 294. 
Implementation of Farber with respect to the Plaintiffs and the Class in the instant matter 
would thus unquestionably result in the Fund having to meet its financial obligations to the Plaintiffs 
and the members of the Class. Should, however, the repeal of § 72-915 be allowed to be applied 
retroactively to one or more of the years in the class period, the first and most crucial corollary to such 
a ruling would be that the Plaintiffs and the members of the Class would have no contractual basis 
on which to claim their pro rata share of the dividends distributed in each of the years in the class 
period. Rather, they would have to content themselves with the receipt of a dividend less than they 
would have been entitled to had the Fund properly applied I.C. § 72-915, or, in some cases, no 
dividend whatsoever. Therefore, by definition, the obligation of the Fund to pay dividends to the 
7 This Memorandum does not intend to adopt any position with regard to what might be the 
effective date of the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 if, as is argued here, the Court finds that making that repeal 
retroactive is unconstitutional. Should the Court adopt Plaintiffs' position regarding the constitutionality of 
retroactive application, the repeal may well only become effective on July 1, 2009, along with all other 
legislative enactments from the 2009 legislature, which have not been defined by the legislature as having 
some other or different effective date. 
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Plaintiffs and the members of the Class,pro rata, as spelled out in Farber, supra, and the vested right 
of the Plaintiffs and the members of the Class to receive such dividends would, for each year of the 
class period, be impaired by this unconstitutional exercise of legislative power. 
E. The attempt to make the repeal of Idaho Code § 72-915 retroactive violates 
Article 1, § 16 of the Idaho Constitution. 
Article 1, Section 16 of the Idaho Constitution, quoted above, has been uniformly and 
consistently construed by the Idaho Supreme Court in a manner which supports Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment. By making the 2009 repeal ofIdaho Code § 72-915 retroactive to 
January 1 st, 2003, the vested contractual entitlement of the Plaintiffs (and the Class which they 
represent) to receive apro rata share of the dividend corpus distributed by the State Insurance Fund 
during each year of the class period has been totally eliminated. If this is not an "impairment" of a 
contractual right, then it beggars the imagination to construct a more egregious example. Because the 
policies of insurance written by the Fund have, over the years involved in this litigation, incorporated 
the terms ofLC. § 72-915 mid made those terms a part of each contract, the retroactive repeal of the 
statute will clearly operate to deprive Plaintiffs of property to which they would have otherwise been 
entitled. This attempt by the legislature is plainly a violation of Idaho's constitutional ban on 
legislation which impairs the obligations of contracts. 
Plaintiffs are not taking any position on the prospective effect of the repeal ofLC. § 72-915. 
However, the retroactive effect unquestionably deprives them of their vested contractual rights to the 
receipt of certain additional dividend payments and eliminates the Funds' obligations to make those 
payments, and thus violates the Idaho Constitution. 
InFidelity State Bankv. North Fork Highway District, 35 Idaho 797, 209 P. 449 (1922), the 
Amended Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Page - 14 
Highway District brought suit to enforce a trust on the general funds and estate of the insolvent Ban1e 
The case was tried on a set of stipulated facts, which are set f011h in great detail at 35 Idaho 803-805. 
In essence, the District kept a portion of its money on deposit in the Bank. The money had been 
deposited in the Bank by the Highway District's Treasurer, as a "general deposit", with the result that 
the District's funds were in danger of being regarding as commingled with the bank's general funds. 
At the time all of the deposits were made by the District Treasurer, an Idaho law forbade such 
officials "from depositing the funds of a highway district in banks other than upon special deposit." 
35 Idaho 807. Prior to the enactment of that law, the Idaho Supreme Court: 
held that although public moneys were deposited other than upon special deposit, they 
remained nevertheless a tmst fund, and in case ofthe insolvency of the bank it was the 
duty of the receiver to treat such funds as a trust fund and the property of the tme 
owner, and that creditors of such bank were not to share pro rata in the public money. 
(Citation omitted.) And again in the case of First National Bank v. C. Bunting & Co., 
7 Idaho 27, 59 P. 929, it was held that public monies deposited in a bank in violation 
of law are trust funds and do not become the property or assets of such ba.'1k, and 
remain trust funds, with the title in the true owner after the appointment of a receiver 
of the insolvent bank, and that a county whose funds have been unlawfully deposited 
in a bank is not estopped from claiming such funds ..... Prior to the enactment of [the 
new statute] the moneys of the district, illegally deposited in the bank upon general 
deposit, remained the property of the district, and the title did not pass to the bank, 
neither did the relationship of debtor and creditor arise between the bank and the 
district. 35 Idaho 807-8. 
After all of the District's deposits were made, and before the Bank was taken over on April 
8th, 1921, Chapter 42 of the Session Laws of 1921 went into effect. 35 Idaho 806. This law, quoted 
in full at 35 Idaho 810, would have had the effect of abrogating the de jure contract of special deposit 
between the Highway District and the Bank, by lumping the deposited funds of the Highway District 
together with all of the Bank's general deposits. This would have meant that the debt owing to the 
District had the same priority as debts due all other depositors. Ibid. The new law had a retroactive 
Amended Memorandum in SuppOli of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Page - 15 
effect. If the COUli permitted the law to be applied retroactively, the District would have lost its 
deposited funds because they would have lost their "trust fund" character, and would instead have 
been treated as general deposits. 
The COUlt found that allowing the new enactment to control the nature, character and priority 
of the District's funds would impair the obligation of the contracts made when the District deposited 
its money in the Banle The holding was that the law in existence when the deposits were made, as 
quoted above, would control the characterization of these public funds, with the result that the 
Highway District would be in a first position to get its money back. The Court's ruling prevented the 
de jure status of these public funds from being altered retroactively. 
Our Supreme Court then cited with approval a U.S. Supreme Court case Von Hoffman v. 
Quincy, 4 Wall (U.S.) 535, 18 L.Ed. 403 which stated "it is also settled that the laws which subsist 
at the time and place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form 
a part of it, as if they were expressly refened to or incorporated in its terms. This principle embraces 
alike those which affect its validity, constructions, discharge, and enforcement." 
The Fidelity opinion goes on to address the constitutional implications involved in attempting 
to apply the new statute retroactively in the following terms: 
Any enactment of a legislative character is said to "impair" the 
obligation of a contract which attempts to take from a party a right to 
which he is entitled by its terms or which deprives him of the means 
of enforcing such a right. 35 Idaho 797, 810. 
A law enacted subsequent to a contract which, if valid, will have the 
effect of annulling the contract constitutes the most palpable form of 
legislative impairment, and such an enactment is clearly 
unconstitutional. Id. 
Legislation that attempts to make material alterations in the character, 
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terms, or legal effect of existing contracts is clearly void. Of this 
character are statutes which attempt to add a material condition or 
provision to a contract, and those which attempt to release material 
stipulations contained therein. Id. 
The Supreme Court then concluded that the legislation in question "interfered" with the 
contract between the Bank and the Highway District and was therefore unconstitutional, stating: 
It is a well-known fundamental rule of law that a state by the act of its 
legislature cannot alter the nature or legal effect of an existing contract 
to the prejudice of either party, nor can the legislature make a law for 
a particular case between two contracting parties contrary to the 
existing law and require the courts to enforce it. This rule is founded 
on two distinct principles of constitutional law, one prohibiting the 
assumption of judicial power by the legislative department, and the 
other inhibiting the impairment by a state of the obligation of 
contracts. The obligation of a contract is impaired by a statute which 
alters its terms, by imposing new conditions or dispensing with 
conditions, or which adds new duties or releases or lessens any part of 
the contract obligation or substantially defeats its ends .. .35ldaho 797 
at 812-813. 
This reading of the Idaho Constitution and the "fundamental rule oflaw" announced therein 
ha"e remained intact from 1922 to the present day. 
Penrose v. Commercial Traveler's Insurance Co., 75 Idaho 524,275 P.2d 969 (1954), was 
an insurance case which directly implicated Article 1, Section 16. The Idaho Supreme Court once 
again found that legislation retroactively affecting existing contracts was in violation of the 
"impairment of the obligations of contracts" provision of the Idaho Constitution. There, the 
offending statute provided that if an insurance company failed to pay an insured whatever was 
justly due under the policy then attorney's fees could be awarded by the court. In the case, a fanner 
obtained a policy of disability insurance with the defendant insurance company and, after a period 
of time, he became ill. The insurance company questioned whether or not he was totally disabled 
and therefore eligible for benefits under the policy. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court 
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and allowed coverage. Because the new attorneys fees law passed while the contract was in force, 
the district cOUli also awarded attorney's fees against the insurer. The Supreme Court reversed that 
p81i of the District COUli's decision allowing attorney's fees. Three separate opinions were written. 
While the majority opinion on the issue of retroactive legislation and its unconstitutionality 
when affecting contracts in existence is remarkably short, the three justices comprising the majority 
buttress their opinion that the retrospective application of attorneys' fee statutes is unconstitutional 
by refening to the plethora of cases cited in the lead opinion at 75 Idaho 538, which support their 
holding. In reliance on those cases, they conclude: " ... to apply the statute enacted after the 
insurance policy was written impairs the obligation of contract." 75 Idaho 540. So, too, here. 
The lead opinion on the coverage issue also addressed the retroactive effect of attorney's 
fees, and its author observed that a retroactive statute "is not unconstitutional merely because it is 
retrospective .... It is rendered unconstitutional if it impairs contractual obligations, violates due 
process or disturbs vested rights." 75 Idaho 524, 537. 
The majority concluded that the new law contravened Article 1, § 16 of the Constitution of -
Idaho insofar as it acted on or affected an existing contract of insurance. 
Other cases decided in Idaho similarly lend support to the position taken by the Plaintiffs in 
their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See, e.g., Agricultu~al Products Corp. v. Utah Power 
and Light, 98 Idaho 23, 557 P.2d 617 (1976), City a/Hayden v. Washington Water Power, 108 
Idaho 467 (Ct. App. 1985) and Steward v. Nelson, 54 Idaho 437 (1934). In the latter case, the 
legislature passed a law stating that a mortgage could not be effective as a secured interest more 
than ten years after the due date of the underlying debt. The Supreme Court did not uphold the 
statute in the face of a "contracts clause" challenge, because it operated to deprive the mortgagor of 
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a remedy which had been available to them when they accepted the mOligage as security for money 
owed to them. The Court stated simply: "Any law which in its operation amounts to a denial or 
obstruction of the rights accruing by a contract, though professing to act only on the remedy, is 
directly obnoxious to the prohibition of the Constitution." (citing Brine v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 
96 U.S. 627.) 54 Idaho 437, 443. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Steward then cites from the Fidelity Bank case and 
repeats "any enactment of a legislative character is said to 'impair' the obligation of a 
contract which attempts to take from a party a right to which he is entitled by its terms, 
or which deprives him ofthe means of enforcing such a right.. .. " Id. 
Although Steward addresses itself to a remedy, it is very clear that the Idaho Supreme Court 
still found this to constitute an impairment of the obligation of the contracts involved, thus 
violative of the categorical ban on enactments "impairing the obligation of contracts" found in our 
state constitution. 
In Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 850o P. 2d 749 (1993), the Supreme Court struck down 
and refused to give application to a statute which affected a trust deed entered into before the 
statute was enacted. Steward v. Nelson, supra, was cited here with approval. "The Court noted that 
'[i]t is well settled that the law existing when a mortgage is made enters into and becomes a part of 
the contract.' 54 Idaho 441,32 P. 2d at 845. Further, a law which in its operation denies or 
obstructs any rights accruing under a contract is a violation of the Idaho's constitutional provision 
prohibiting any laws which impair the "obligation of contract." Id. at 444, 32 P. 2d at 846, quoted 
at 123 1daho 598, 610. 
Tanner v. Shearmire, is another trust deed case where Steward v. Nelson, supra, is cited 
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with approval. "However, a trust deed is governed by the law in existence at the time of its 
execution, and the parties' rights thereunder are not affected by subsequent legislative enactments." 
115 Idaho 1060, 1063, fn. 3 (Ct App. 1989). 
Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686 (1993) is yet another case applying the constitutional 
prohibition regarding laws or rules which by seeking retroactive application operate to impair the 
obligations of contracts. It involved attorneys who were shorted as to their attorneys' fees by virtue 
of a clumsy amendment which the Industrial Commission made to its rules, and sought to apply 
retroactively. The Supreme Court took a dim view of this stating that the "Commission has waded 
into regulatory conduct with an indifference to constitutional requirements that adhere to rights 
fixed by a private contract. .. It is clear that, in Idaho, parties to a contract have a property interest 
in the subject matter of the contract that is protectable both under the contract clause and the due 
process clause of the United States Constitution." 124 Idaho 686, 691-2. In Footnote 3, Steward v. 
Nelson, supra, is again cited with approval, as is the Idaho Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 16.1d. 
The foregoing cases indicate that the application of the Idalio Constitution's certain and > 
unconditional prohibition against laws of the type struck down in Steward and in the Fidelity Bank 
case has remained unchanged. 
The attempted repeal of I.C. § 72-915 on a retroactive basis is clearly unconstitutional, as 
being in violation of Art. 1, Sec. 16 of the Constitution ofIdaho. It not only impairs but absolutely 
destroys a vested contractual right which existed prior to the attempted legislative frustration of the 
Supreme Court's final opinion in Farber. Whether the legislature can destroy I.C. § 72-915 
prospectively from May 6, 2009 forward or whether the statute has prospective application 
commencing May 6th, 2009 or July 1,2009 are not issues brought before the Court. However, the 
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retroactive application of this statute cannot be allowed and Plaintiffs have asked for partial 
summary judgment on this point. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The provision of Section 1 of S.L. 2009, chapter 294 (which is the number assigned to the 
enacted law repealing Idaho Code § 72-915 retroactively) violates the Contract Clause of the 
Idaho Constitution. There can be no doubt that, under Farber, supra, the Plaintiffs and the 
members of the Class have vested rights to receive a pro rata share of the total dividend paid by 
the Fund in each year of the class period. Nor can it seriously be doubted that, absent the 
retroactivity provision ofthe legislation, the Fund would have been obligated to pay to the 
Plaintiffs and the members oftlle Class such sums as would result in their receiving their pro rata 
share of the total dividends paid. It therefore follows inexorably that the retroactive repeal of I.C. § 
72-915 impairs the Fund's obligation to allocate such dividends as the Manager declares to all 
time-qualified policyholders pro rata, based solely on the size of their premium, for all policies 
purchased up to six months prior to the effective date of the repeal. 
For all of the reasons set forth above, this Court should grant Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment, and enter an order declaring that the repeal of Idaho Code § 72-915 is 
unconstitutional insofar as it is declared to be retroactive for the simple reason that it impairs the 
Fund's obligation to honor the vested rights of the Plaintiffs and the members of the Class to the 
receipt of a pro rata portion of the dividend corpus. 
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Respectfully submitted this 8th day of October, 2010. 
GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
Donald W. Loj ek 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW defendants, The Idaho State Insurance Fund, James M. Alcorn in his 
official capacity as its Manager, and William Deal, Wayne Meyer, Gerald Geddes, John Goedde, 
Elaine Martin, Mark Snodgrass, Rodney A. Higgins, Terry Gestrin, Max Black, and Steve 
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Landon in their capacity as members of the Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund 
(collectively, "SIF"), by and through their counsel of record Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, 
P.A., and hereby submit their Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Motion should be granted. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The dispute in this action generally regards Plaintiffs' allegation that the SIF failed to pay 
them certain dividend payments for prior years in which Plaintiffs paid premiums as 
policyholders of workers' compensation policies issued by SIF. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege 
I.e. § 72~915 requires payment of dividends according to a specific mathematical formula based 
upon a premium surplus declared by SIF. 
However, the Idaho Legislature voted to repeal I.e. § 72-915 the statute under which 
Plaintiffs seek to enforce their claim for dividends - on April 29, 2009, as S.L. 2009, ch. 294, § 
2. It was then signed by the Governor on May 6, 2009. Such repeal was expressly made 
retroactive to January 1,2003. 
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial seeks, in relevant part, a declaration: "That the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 by the 2009 
legislature be deemed to be unconstitutional, void and of no effect as to all policies issued prior 
to July 1, 2009. ld. at p. 15. The request for such declaration reflects Plaintiffs' need to first 
bypass the repeal by the Idaho Legislature that, at present, leaves them no right of action. 
There is no issue of material fact precluding summary judgment as a matter of law in 
favor of Defendants on this issue. The repeal of I.C. § 72-915 bars Plaintiffs' action because 
legislation is effective when the Legislature so defines, and the emergency repeal of I.e. § 72-
915 was signed May 6, 2009, and was made retroactive to January 1, 2003, thereby barring 
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Plaintiffs' action. Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiffs' position, the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is 
constitutional under both the U.8. and Idaho constitutions. 
Plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the repeal is unconstitutional, and the test of 
whether the repeal violates the Contract Clause is a demanding one. According to RUI One 
Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 FJd 1137, 1147 (9th Cir. 2004), in order to prevail on their claim 
that the repeal violates the Contract Clause, Plaintiffs must show that: 
• the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a 
contractual relationship; 
• the State does not have a significant and legitimate public purpose behind 
the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or 
economic problem; and 
• the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties is 
not based upon reasonable conditions and is not of a character appropriate 
to the public purpose justifying the legislation's adoption. 
As a matter of law, plaintiffs are unable to meet their burden under this test. 
First, the Idaho Legislature has not operated a substantial impairment of a contractual 
relationship because there is no contractual right to dividends in the SIF workers' compensation 
policies. In addition, even assuming a right of contract existed, the repeal cannot be considered 
to have substantially impaired it. The purpose behind the Legislature's creation of SIF was to 
ensure the well-being of the public's wage-earners through insurance for employers who may 
have to pay workers' compensation, and this core function of the policies held by Plaintiffs 
remains unchanged by application of the repeal. What is more, reading the repeal as 
unconstitutional would enhance, rather than impair, the rights of some policyholders. 
Second, the SIF and the workers' compensation coverage it provides are creatures of 
statute and, when the Legislature created them, it did not prevent itself from using its police 
powers to shepherd the SIF, a quasi-public entity, and run it efficiently. 
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Third, the repeal merely conforms to the law to the way the Manager has paid dividends 
for years. Therefore, the only expectations the policyholders may have had for dividends to be 
paid otherwise would have been attributable to the Farber litigation and would have been 
uncertain and quickly quashed by the Legislature's repeal. 
Fourth, the Legislature, recognizing the vitality of the SIF is necessary to the vitality of 
the public welfare, repealed I.e. § 72-915 so the Manager would have the authority to make the 
decisions necessary to the economic health and competitiveness of the entity in today's market. 
Finally, the repeal is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate 
to the public purpose justifying the action. 
In short, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this issue because there is no 
factual question preventing the Court from determining that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs have 
failed to meet their burden of showing that the repeal ofI.C. § 72-915 was unconstitutional. 
BACKGROUND 
A. The SIF. 
By way of background to understand the creation, purpose, and governance of the SIF, a 
brief summary of the SIF is appropriate. 
1. The Purpose of the SIF is to Provide Worker's Compensation Insurance to Idaho 
Employers and to Ensure the Existence ofa Solvent Source From Which Workers 
Entitled to Compensation May Collect. 
In 1917, the Idaho legislature enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme, now codified as 
Idaho Code §§ 72-901 et seq., creating the SIF "for the purpose of insuring employers against 
liability for compensation under this worker's compensation law ... and of securing to the 
persons entitled thereto the compensation provided by said laws." Idaho Code § 72-901(1). 
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Since its enactment, the SIF has fulfilled its public purpose by providing worker's compensation 
coverage to thousands of Idaho employers who have relied on such service being available. I 
While Idaho employers are not required to procure insurance with the SIF, if an employer 
is declined coverage by two private carriers and the SIF, then coverage may be obtained through 
the assigned risk pool. 2 In an effort to fulfill one of its principal purposes-providing worker's 
compensation insurance to Idaho employers-the SIF maintains an underwriting policy that 
seeks to insure all Idaho employers, regardless of size, so the majority of Idaho employers who 
could not otherwise obtain coverage through a private carrier could obtain coverage with the SIF, 
and therefore avoid the extra costs associated with acquiring an insurance contract through the 
assigned risk pool. 3 
In structuring the SIF, the Legislature determined it should be "created as an independent 
body corporate politic" and derive its financial well-being from "premiums and penalties 
received," "property and securities acquired," and "of interest earned" thereon. Idaho 
Code § 72-901 (1). The money generated is deposited with the state treasurer, who acts as 
custodian for the SIF; however, "[t]he money in the fund does not belong to the state ... [the 
money is held by the treasurer] ... for the contributing employers and the beneficiaries of the 
compensation law, and for the payment of the costs of the operation of the fund." State ex reI. 
Williams v. Musgrave, 84 Idaho 77, 84, 370 P.2d 778, 782 (1962). 
Moreover, the SIF is to "be administered without liability on the part of the state." Idaho 
Code § 72-901(1). Yet, per I.C. §72-901(4), the SIF is subject to the provisions of the Idaho 
insurance code, but is not allowed to be a member of the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association 
I See Affidavit of Jim Alcorn in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, at, 13.{"Alcorn Aff."). 
2 See Alcorn Aff., ~ 12. The assigned risk pool insures Idaho employers who cannot otherwise secure worker's 
compensation coverage, but they are generally required to pay a fifty percent (50%) higher premium than if they 
were insured through the SIF or a private carrier. See Alcorn Aff., ,. II. 
3 See Alcorn Aff." 13. 
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("lIOA"). The IIOA offers security for those insurers who are unable to make payments on a 
claim, and guarantees the payment of insurance benefits if an insurance carrier becomes 
insolvent.4 Likewise, the IIGA offers security for those individuals insured by insurers unable to 
pay; however, by statute, this protection does not extend to the SIF. 5 
Unlike other insurance carriers which rely on the IIGA to pay benefits in the event of 
insolvency, the SIF must be managed such that is maintains sufficient surplus and reserve totals 
to provide a stable and ongoing source of worker's compensation insurance to protect Idaho 
workers.6 As a result, it remains even more critical that the SIP's financial integrity remain 
intact, for if it is compromised, the availability of worker's compensation insurance in Idaho 
would be critically jeopardized; this is especially true in light of the fact that the SIF insures 
approximately 70% of the market, including policyholders unable to obtain coverage from other 
private insurers. 7 
2. The Idaho Legislature Charged the Manager with the Primary Responsibility of 
Conducting the Business and Administration of the SIF. 
The duty to ensure the SIF maintains its financial integrity is left to the Board of 
Directors and the Manager. Idaho Code §§ 72-901(3), 72-902. In many ways they share a 
symbiotic relationship in that their collective decisions determine whether the SIP is able to 
fulfill its public purpose.s For the majority of its existence, the SIF has been directed by a 
Manager, charged with the duty of conducting the business and administration of the SIF.9 To 
accomplish these demanding tasks, the Manager, by statute, has been granted full power and/or 
discretion over a number of critical business and administrative decisions involving the operation 
4 See Alcorn Aft'., ,. 16. 
5 Idaho Code § 72-901(4); see also Alcorn Aff.,,. 15. 
6 See Alcorn Aft'., , 18. 
1 See Alcorn Aft'., ,19. 
S See Alcorn Aft'., , 19. 
9 See Alcorn Aft'., 1 20. 
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of the SIF, including, but not limited to, directing the investment of surplus funds generated from 
premiums and interest, the power to sue and to enter into insurance contracts, setting appropriate 
reserve totals to meet unexpected losses, and declaring a dividend should the proper conditions 
be present. See generally Idaho Code § 72-901 et seq. 
Despite the extent of power and discretion invested in the Manager, the Board of 
Directors plays an integral role through its duty to "direct the policies and operations of the state 
insurance fund to assure that [it} is run as an efficient insurance company, remains actuarially 
sound and maintains the public purposes for which [it] was created." Idaho Code § 72-901(3). 
Although this duty is enacted through the decisions and guidance of the Manager, the two 
entities work in conjunction to satisfY the SIF's purpose as mandated by statute. lO 
3. As Part of His Duties, the Manager Has Been Charged With the Discretion of 
Determining Whether a Dividend Will Be Paid Each Year. 
The SIF surplus fund is considered an asset of the fund and dividends, if any, are paid 
from what the Manager determines to be surplus available for a dividend distribution after 
evaluating a myriad of factors, including, but not limited to, present and future SIF operating 
expenses, the required reserves, investment income, market forces, and industry trends. I 1 The. 
declaration of a dividend is a multi-step process that ultimately boils down to determining how 
much surplus is available to declare as a dividend, followed by determining how it is to be 
divided, taking into account such factors as the costs associated with writing the insurance 
contract, and any losses that may have been incurred on the insurance contract. 12 
10 See Alcorn Aff., 119. 
11 See Alcorn Aff., 1 21. 
12 See Alcorn Aff., 1 24. 
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4. Policyholders Are Not Entitled to the Payment of a Dividend Each Year. 
Idaho employers who purchase their worker's compensation insurance from the SIF 
receive a contract of insurance which sets forth the parameters of their coverage.13 The contract 
of insurance does not provide for the payment of a dividend to the policyholders. 14 The 
governing statutes for the SIF do not guaranty payments of dividends to policyholders, nor do 
they set forth that the policyholders have a property interest in the surplus or assets of the SIF. 
See generally Idaho Code §72~901 et seq. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court previously 
concluded the SIF's statutory framework does not create any property rights in the SIF's 
policyholders. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 135, 997 P.2d 591, 
596 (2000). An SIF policyholder has no vested right in the surplus and assets of the SIF; rather, 
the assets and surplus belong to the SIF in order to meet its statutory purpose provided in I.C. 
§72-901(1). Id. 
B. The prior Farber litigation and Idaho Supreme Court's decision therein. 
Prior to this litigation, a group of plaintiffs filed a lawsuit, entitled Randolph E. Farber, 
et af. v. The Idaho State Insurance Fund, in the District Court for the Third District of Idaho, 
Canyon County, Case No. CV06-7877 (Judge Morfitt and Judge Ryan, presiding)("Farber"). In 
the Farber action, the plaintiffs contended that they, as policyholders paying annual premiums of 
$2,500 or less, were improperly denied a pro rata share of dividends declared by the SIF for 
certain years at issue, relying upon the now-repealed Idaho Code §72-915. In response thereto, 
the SIF argued that, per the language ofI.C. §72-915, the Manager exercised the authority given 
to him by the Legislature in determining that during such certain policy years, dividends would 
13 See Alcorn Aff., ~ 25. 
14 See Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek filed on January 6, 2007, Ex. I (State Insurance Fund Workers Compensation 
and Employers Liability Insurance Policy). 
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not be issued to SIF policyholders who paid premiums of $2,500 or Jess during the respective 
dividend year. 
The statute at issue in the Farber litigation and which forms the basis for this action, I.C. 
§ 72-915, stated: 
At the end of every year, and at such other times as the manager in his discretion may 
determine, a readjustment of the rate shall be made for each of the several classes of 
employments or industries. If at any time there is an aggregate balance remaining to the 
credit of any class of employment or industry which the manager deems may be safely 
and properly divided, he may in his discretion, credit to each individual member of such 
class who shall have been a subscriber to the state insurance fund for a period of six (6) 
months or more, prior to the time of such readjustment, such proportion of such balance 
as he is properly entitled to, having regard to his prior paid premiums since the last 
readjustment of rates. 
Particularly at issue in the Farber litigation was the questio,n of whether Idaho Code §72-915 
mandated that, if the SIF Manager made a dividend declaration as is his discretion to do, the 
dividend would require distribution of the dividend on a strictly pro-rata basis to eligible 
policyholders who paid less than $2,500 in annual premiums. 
Presented the question on motion for summary judgment, the District Court sided with the 
SIF. In analyzing I.C. §72-915, the District Court held that I.C. § 72-915 was ambiguous. 
(Counsel Af£., Exh. A.) In so holding, the District Court stated that: 
The use of the term "class of employment" in 72-915 by its phrasing "any class of 
employment or industry" is ambiguous. By the use of "or", this Court is not convinced 
that plaintiffs' proposed interpretation that it refers to grouping classes based solely on 
type of industry is the only reasonable interpretation. That phrase could reasonably be 
interpreted to mean that the classes could be determined by industry, by size of 
employer, by premium amounts paid by employer, etc. As the term is ambiguous, this 
Court is free to examine not only the literal words of the statute, but the reasonableness 
of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and the legislative history. 
(Id, at pp. 11-12.) The District Court, in amending its concluding paragraph, later added the 
following: 
[I]t is this Court's conclusion that, as a matter of law, the language of I.C. §72-915, in 
context with the directives of other statutes set forth in the Act, the laws of our sister 
states, and the decisions of our Supreme Court, allows the fimd manager, with the 
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approval of the board of directors, to use his discretion to distribute dividends to 
policyholders in a manner that is consistent with the legislative purpose and directives 
set forth in Article 72, Chapter 9, Idaho Code, which establishes the State Insurance 
Fund. Specifically, to assure that the State Insurance Fund is run as an efficient 
insurance company, remains actuarially sound, and maintains the public purposes for 
which the Fund was created. 
(Counsel Aff., Exh. B, at p. 2.) 
However~ on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its Opinion in the Farber matter, 
reversing the District Court's grant of summary judgment to SIF.15 In particular, the Court found 
that the statute at issue on appeal, I.C. §72-915, was unambiguous and that "the distribution of 
dividends must be done on a pro rata basis." Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307,311, 
208 P.3d 289, 293 (2009). However, in rejecting the SIF's arguments regarding the basis of 
SIF's dividend methodology - to wit, its efforts to distribute dividends in a fashion to comply 
with the statutorily-obligated mandate that SIF "is run as an efficient insurance company, 
remains actuarially sound and maintains the public purposes for which the state insurance fund 
was created" (Idaho Code §72-901 (3)) - the Farber Court recognized the authority of the 
Legislature to change the law: 
Because the statute is unambiguous, there is no need to consider the plethora of 
evidence and testimony provided by the Fund to support its argument that the 
Manager acted reasonably in choosing to distribute a dividend only to those 
policyholders who paid more than $2,500.00 in annual premiums. The arguments, 
evidence,and testimony provided to this Court would be better targeted at the 
Legislature, which is empowered to change existing law .... If, in the intervening 
time, it has become prudent to alter the statutory language related to the 
requirements for distribution of dividends, the proper remedy is to approach 
the Legislature to change the law. 
Id at 313 (emphasis added). 
15 The Idaho Supreme Court's initial opinion was issued on March 5, 2009, which was later withdrawn and replaced 
by a Substitute Opinion on May 5, 2009. 
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C. The repeal of I.C. §72-915. 
While the Farber litigation was still pending before the Idaho Supreme Court, the Idaho 
Legislature voted to repeal I.C. §72-915. (Counsel Aff., Exh. C.) The repeal specifically 
provided that: "An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby declared to exist, 
Section 1 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and after passage and approval, and 
Section 2 of this act shall be in full force and effect retroactively to January 1, 2003." (Id. at 
§3.). The repeal was approved in the Legislature, and advanced to the Governor, who signed it 
on May 6,2009. Id. 
Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Respondent's Petition for Rehearing on May 
12,2009, and issued its Remittitur to the District Court on May 27, 2009. (Counsel Aff., Exh. 
D.) 
D. Summary of this action. 
Later that year, on December 24, 2009, the plaintiffs in this action filed their Class Action 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial; plaintiffs later filed, on June to, 20 to, their First 
Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Amended Complaint"). 
Plaintiffs generally allege: 
13. 
For some or all of the Dividend Periods falling within the Class Period, the 
Plaintiffs and the members of the Class purchased a worker's compensation 
insurance policy from the Fund, were billed annual premiums which were in 
excess of $2,500.00, retained each such policy for at least 6 months, and, for each 
such Dividend Period, did not receive an amount which was equal to or greater 
than a pro rata share of the dividend distributed by the Fund. In each· such 
instance, the Plaintiffs and the members of the Class did not receive a dividend 
because the Manager and/or the Board arbitrarily, capriciously. and without any 
lawful authority, violated the terms of the contract and the law by determining 
that such amounts which were distributed as dividends would not be allocated 
among policyholders on a pro rata basis. 
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Amended Complaint, p. 8. 16 This alleged failure by SIF to pay dividends was based upon I.C. 
§72-915: 
10. 
As of June 30, 2009, Idaho Code § 72-915 provided as follows: 
At the end of every year, and at such other times as the manager in his 
discretion may determine, a readjustment of the rate shall be made for 
each of the several classes of employments or industries. If at any time 
there is an aggregate balance remaining to the credit of any class of 
employment or industry which the manager deems may be safely and 
properly divided, he may in his discretion, credit to each individual 
member of such class who shall have been a subscriber to the state 
insurance fund for a period of six (6) months or more, prior to the time of 
such readjustment, such proportion of such balance as he is properly 
entitled to, having regard to his prior paid premiums since the last 
readjustment of rates. 
This term of contract between the parties requires that any dividend which the 
Fund elects to distribute must be distributed among all "Qualified Policyholders" 
(those who had entered into a contract for a policy during the period covered by 
any dividend being distributed and who held that policy in effect for at least six 
months). The term of the contract requires that total amount of the dividend be 
allocated into shares based upon the ratio between the amount of annual 
premiums billed to each Qualified Policyholder during the Dividend Period and 
the total annual premiums billed to all Qualified Policyholders during the same 
period. Neither this term of the contract nor any other term of the contract or any 
applicable law provides the Manager any authority whatsoever to distribute the 
dividend based upon any other allocation formula. 
Amended Complaint, p. 6. However, plaintiffs recognized the repeal ofI.C. §72-915 presented a 
bar to their entire action; thus, plaintiffs seek, in conjunction with declaratory, injunctive, and 
breach of contract relief, a ruling from the Court that the repeal of I.C. §72-915 was 
unconstitutional which declares: 
16 The Amended Complaint defmes "Dividend Period" as "a twelve month period ... between the July 1 which falls 
about 30 months prior to the distribution and the June 30 which falls about 18 months prior to the distribution." 
(Amended Complaint at p. 7.) In tum, the "Class Period" is defmed as "some or all of the Dividend Periods 
beginning on July 1, 2002 and including aU Dividend Periods ending on or before June 30, 2009[.]" (Jd) More 
simply, plaintiffs also state that "this action pertains to any dividends distributed after December 24.2004[.]" (Jd.) 
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That the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 by the 2009 legislature be deemed to be 
unconstitutional, void and of no effect as to all policies issued prior to July 1, 
2009. 
Id at p. 15. The basis for such is stated to be that 
such attempted repeal is, pursuant to Article I, Section 16 of the Idaho 
Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution, 
unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect as to contracts of insurance in 
existence prior to the effective date of the repeal. 
Id. atp. 8. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. The Summary Judgment Standard. 
Rule 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows that summary judgment "shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Smith v. Meridian Joint School District No. 
2., 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c»; see also Idaho 
Building Contractors Association v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995); 
Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 890 P.2d 331 (1995). If the evidence reveals no disputed 
issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Id at 718-19, 918 P.2d at 
587-88 (citing Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991». If the 
moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no genuine 
issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with 
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue offact. Id at 719,918 P.2d at 588 (citing Tingley v. 
Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994». 
Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when the nonmoving 
party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case upon which that 
party bears the burden of proof at trial. Id (citing Thomson v~ Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 
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Idaho 527,530-31,887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994), and Baden v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 
765 P.2d 126 (1988». The party opposing the summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial." Id. (quoting LR.C.P. 56(c». The nonmoving party's case must be anchored in 
something more than speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a 
genuine issue of fact. Tuttle v. Sudenga Industries, Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 868 P.2d 473 (1994) 
(plaintiff who produces mere scintilla of evidence, or otherwise raises only slight doubt as to 
facts, will not withstand summary judgment); Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 797 P.2d 117 
(1990). If the nonmoving party does not come forward as provided in the rule, then summary 
judgment should be entered against that party. State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 
Idaho 267, 270,899 P.2d 977, 980 (1995). 
B. The Standard Applicable to Declaring a Statute Unconstitutional. 
Idaho law is clear that legislative acts are presumed to be constitutional: "[a] legislative 
act is presumed to be constitutional and all reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality must be 
resolved in favor of its validity." Oneida County Fair Bd. v. Smylie, 86 Idaho 341, 346, 386 
P.2d 374, 376 (1963). The burden of proving that a legislative act rests squarely on the 
challenger: 
There is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of the challenged statute or 
regulation, and the burden of establishing that the statute or regulation is 
unconstitutional rests upon the challengers. An appellate court is obligated to 
seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds it [sic] constitutionality. The 
judicial power to declare legislative action unconstitutional should be exercised 
only in clear cases. 
Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, _, 232 P.3d 813, 818 (2010)(quoting Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. 
No.2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 154 P.3d 443 (2007)(emphasis added). 
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ARGUMENT 
A. The repeal of I.C. § 72-915 bars Plaintiffs' action. 
1. Legislation is effective when the Legislature so defines. 
Article III, §22 of the Idaho State Constitution provides that: 
When acts take effect.-No act shall take effect until sixty days from the end of the 
session at which the same shall have been passed, except in the case of 
emergency, which emergency shall be declared in the preamble or in the body of 
the law. 
In tum, Article IV, § 1 0 of the Idaho State Constitution provides, in relevant part, that: 
Veto power. -Every bill passed by the legislature shall, before it becomes a law, 
be presented to the governor. If he approves, he shall sign it, and thereupon it 
shall become a law[.] 
The Idaho Supreme Court has further explained it is solely within the province of the Legislature 
to determine the effective date oflegislation, including in the context of declaring an emergency: 
Legislative discretion in declaring emergencies was recognized in Johnson v. 
Diefendorf, 56 Idaho 620,635,57 P.2d 1068, 1083 (1936), which stated, "it is left 
to the discretion of the legislature to fix the time when [the act] shall go into 
effect." Johnson did not raise the issue of whether a court could review the 
legislature's declaration that an emergency existed. That issue was resolved in 
Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691, 718 P.2d 1129 (1986). The Court 
stated: "we hold that the legislature's determination of an emergency in an act is a 
policy decision exclusively within the ambit of legislative authority and the 
judiciary cannot second-guess that decision." Id at 698, 718 P.2d at 1136 
(emphasis added). The Petitioners argue that this statement is inapplicable if the 
repeal infringes a constitutional right but they do not identify a constitutional right 
that is infringed by the declaration of an emergency in this case. 
In Leroy, this Court concluded that Johnson must be read in conjunction 
with Diefendorfv. Gallet, 51 Idaho 619, 10 P.2d 307 (1932). In Gallet this Court 
held that the judiciary could not review the governor's determination that an 
emergency existed to justify calling an extraordinary session of the legislature, 
and that the Court could not review the legislature'S determination that an 
emergency existed to justify dispensing with the constitutional requirement that 
before an act could be passed, it must be printed and read on three separate days 
in each house. 51 Idaho at 638-39, 10 P.2d at 314-15. The Court stated, "[t]he 
determination as to whether facts exist such as to constitute 'an extraordinary 
occaSion' is for him [the governor] alone to determine." Id 
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The justification for legislative discretion in this area is that the decision to 
declare an emergency is "a decision-making function that is uniquely legislative. 
The courts are ill equipped to make such policy decisions." Leroy, 110 Idaho at 
695, 718 P.2d at 1133. "The respect due to the co-equal and independent 
legislative branch of state government and the need for finality and certainty 
about the status of a duly enacted statute contribute to the reluctance of the courts 
to inquire into whether the legislature'S determination of an effective date is 
justified." Id. Justice Shepherd, concurring in Assoc. Taxpayers of Idaho, Inc. v. 
Cenarrusa, III Idaho 502, 725 P.2d 526 (1986), stated that "[i]n my view it is 
exceedingly dangerous for ihis Court, or any court, to interfere with the legislative 
process. Within the duties of this Court is the determination of the 
constitutionality of actions of other branches of government but only when the 
time and circumstances are appropriate.)' Assoc. Taxpayers, 111 Idaho at 503, 
725 P.2d at 527 (emphasis in original). In this case the Petitioners are asking the 
Court to interfere with the legislative process, and this Court has held repeatedly 
that it is not proper to do so. 
Gibbons v. Cenarrusa, 140 Idaho 316,320-21,92 PJd 1063, 1067-68 (2002). 
Finally, I.C. § 73-101 provides that ''No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless 
expressly so declared." The Idaho Supreme Court has confirmed that "a statute will be applied 
retroactively where there is a clear legislative intent to that effect." Union Warehouse and 
Supply Co., Inc. v. Illinois R.B. Jones, Inc., 128 Idaho 660, 669, 917 P.2d 1300, 1309 (1996) 
(citing Gailey v. Jerome County, 113 Idaho 430, 745 P.2d 1051 (1987». 
2. The repeal oftC. §72-915 was effective May 6,2009, and the Legislature made it 
retroactive to January 1, 2003, thereby barring Plaintiffs' action. 
In repealing I.C. §72-915, the Idaho Legislature was clear on the effective date, the 
emergency nature of the act, and the intent to make the legislation retroactive. 
Section 3 of the repeal provides: 
An emergency existing therefore, which emergency is hereby declared to exist, 
Section 1 of this act shall be in full force and effect on and after passage and 
approval, and Section 2 of this act shall be in full force and effect retroactively to 
January 1,2003., 
After approval in the state Legislature, the repeal was forwarded to the Governor, who signed the 
repeal on May 6, 2009. (Counsel Aff., Exh. C.) Accordingly, the act - declared an emergency 
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by the Legislature, which emergency was affirmed by the governor when he signed the bill -
went into effect upon signature by the Governor, retroactive to January 1,2003. 
At plaintiffs' counsel's urging, the Legislature provided a limited carve-out to the 
retroactive effect of the repeal, that being for extant litigation (and, in particular, the Farber 
action), which is inapplicable to this litigation: 
(6) it is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this act shall not apply 
to any action filed in a state or federal court of law in. the state of Idaho on or 
before December 31, 2008, and the provisions of this act shall not apply to the 
aforementioned case of Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund as currently 
pending with respect to those policy holders paying annual premiums of not more 
than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500). 
(Counsel Aff., Exh. C.) 
In the present case, the repeal of I.e. § 72-915 forecloses Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs' 
action was filed on December 24,2009, long after the effective date of the repeal, and long after 
the permitted repeal carve-out for existing litigation of December 31, 2008. Further, as this 
litigation is not the Farber litigation involving those policyholders paying not more than $2,500 
in annual premiums, Plaintiffs do not fall within the other carve-out of the repeal. Thus, even 
accepting arguendo the allegation of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint that "this action pertains to 
any dividends distributed after December 24, 2004" (Amended Complaint, ~12), 17 the earliest 
date that Plaintiffs could claim a right to a particular dividend methodology, then, would be 
December 24, 2004, long after the effective date of the repeal (January 1, 2003). 
As such, Plaintiffs' action is foreclosed by the repeal ofl,C. § 72~915, and SIF should be 
granted summary judgment. 
17 Plaintiffs' claim for a 5-year statute oflimitation is based upon their contention that the dividend methodology is a 
contractual right To the contrary, dividends are governed by statute, and thus are subject to a 3-year statute of 
limitation. This question has been defmitively resolved by the Hayden Lake decision and the District Court's ruling 
in the Farber litigation, and will be the subject of a motionto dismiss by SIF. However, for purposes oftbis motion, 
a 5-year statute of limitation is utilized for argument, to illustrate that even under Plaintiffs' demanded statute of 
limitation, Plaintiffs' action is still foreclosed by the repeal ofIdaho Code §72-915. 
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B. The repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is constitutional under both the u.s. and Idaho 
constitutions. 
1. Plaintiffs' arguments and the applicable tests under the Contract Clause. 
Recognizing that the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is fatal to their claims, Plaintiffs attempt, 
instead, to have the repeal declared unconstitutional. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint seeks, in 
relevant part, a declaration: 
That the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 by the 2009 legislature be deemed to be 
unconstitutional, void and of no effect as to all policies issued prior to July 1, 
2009. 
Id. at p. 15. The basis for such is stated to be that 
such attempted repeal is, pursuant to Article I, Section 16 of the Idaho 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution, 
unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect as to contracts of insurance in 
existence prior to the effective date of the repeal. 
Id. atp. 8. 
The United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 10 and the Idaho Constitution, Article 
1, Section 16, both provide that there shall be no "law impairing the obligations of contracts" 
(the "Contract Clause"). The Contract Clause only applies to contractual obligations in existence 
at the time the law is enacted. Lindstrom v. Dist. Bd. of Health Panhandle, 109 Idaho 956, 961, 
712 P.2d 657,662 (1985). 
Whether there is a violation of the Contract Clause requires a three-step analysis: (1) 
"whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual 
relationship[;]" (2) "whether the State ... [has] a significant and legitimate public purpose 
behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic 
problem[;]" and (3) "whether the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of contracting 
parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public 
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purpose justifying the legislation's adoption." RtJI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d 
1137, 1147 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). 
In Los Quatros, Inc. v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 800 P.2d 184 (1990), the Supreme Court 
of New Mexico outlined the modern parameters of the test for whether the legislation violates 
the Contract Clause once it has been established there is indeed a contractual relationship. A 
mortgagor sued for declaratory judgment that a law allowing for early payment applied to its 
mortgage, despite the contract's language to the contrary. The mortgagee relied on Von 
Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 18 L.Ed. 403 (1866), for the proposition that 
states cannot constitutionally reduce a party's existing rights under a contract; however, the 
Quatros court pointed out that "much water has flowed over the dam since Von Hoffman, and so 
we prefer to apply more modern Contract Clause analysis in deciding whether or not to 
invalidate this statute in this case." Quatros, 800 P.2d at 192. The mortgagor relied upon Home 
Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413 (1934), in 
which the Court held that "[The Contract Clause] prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to 
be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula . . .. The economic interests of the 
state may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding 
interference with contracts." 290 U.S. at 428, 437, 54 S.Ct. at 236,239. The Quatros court 
went on to explain that different Contract Clause cases had different factors present, for example 
in Blaisdell there was an emergency and the legislative relief was tailored to that emergency. 
800 P.2d at 192. The Court pointed out that in National R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. 451, 
472, (1985) (see discussion below) "the impairing statute was a federal one, and so judicial 
scrutiny of the legislation was minimal, which doubtless reflects a federal court's concern with 
principles of federalism lacking here." 800 P.2d at 192. The Qualros court found these cases to 
be nevertheless applicable to the case at bar: 
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Perhaps the case providing the best overview of the appropriate methodology is 
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., [459 U.S. 400 
(1983)]. There the Court reviewed a Kansas statute regulating the price of natural 
gas sold intrastate between a producer and a public utility, and held that it was not 
invalid under the Contract Clause. The Court noted, first, that "[tJhe threshold 
inquiry is 'whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment 
of a contractual relationship.'" It went on to say that "[t]he severity of the 
impairment is said to increase the level of scrutiny to which the legislation will be 
subjected," or "the height of the hurdle the state legislation must clear." In 
determining the extent of the impairment, it is relevant that the industry which the 
complaining party has entered has or has not been regulated in the past. 
If the answer to the threshold inquiry is that the state regulation does indeed 
constitute a substantial impairment, the state "must have a significant and 
legitimate public purpose behind the regulation," so that there is some guarantee 
that the state "is exercising its police power, rather than providing a benefit to 
special interests." Finally, once a legitimate public purpose has been identified, 
the reviewing court must determine "whether the adjustment of 'the rights and 
responsibilities of contracting parties [is based]' upon reasonable conditions and 
[is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation'S] 
adoption. ", 
Quatros, 800 P.2d at 192 (citations omitted). The Quatros court allowed the legislation to stand, 
because it did not effect the underlying debt and because the banking industry is highly 
regulated, thus the impairment was slight. Even though the impairment was slight, the court still 
found it necessary to evaluate the public purpose, though it need not be too pressing; the court 
concluded that promoting the alienability of land was a public purpose, and that the legislation 
was appropriately tailored to that end. Id 
Moreover, although plaintiffs have pled violations of both the state and federal 
constitutions, the examination conducted by this Court will be the same. The Idaho Supreme 
Court has held that "we seriously consider federal law in determining the parameters of our own 
constitutional provisions, and we may adopt federal precedent under the state constitution but 
only to the extent that we believe the federal law is not inconsistent with the protections afforded 
by our state constitution." State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,988,842 P.2d 660, 667 (1992). The 
Idaho Supreme Court has clearly not been persuaded that federal law is inconsistent with the 
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protections under the contract clause in the Idaho Constitution. To the contrary, the Idaho 
Supreme Court recently addressed a federal and state constitutional argument with a single, 
dispositive analysis. See State v. Kom, 148 Idaho 413, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). In Kom, the 
defendant argued that a city violated his rights under "the contract clauses found in the Idaho and 
U.S. constitutions." The Korn Court, without making a distinction between the two 
constitutions, engaged in a single analysis, relying on federal law (Allied Structural Steel Co. v. 
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978» to hold that the city's ordinance did not violate his rights 
under either constitution. Id at 483. Cf State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 16 n.6, 696 P.2d 856, 
867 n.6 (1985) (holding that while defendants sued under federal constitution and "did not also 
argue that the due process clause of art. I, § 13 of Idaho's Constitution invalidates the Act in 
question, had they done so, we do not think that the result would have been different, for we are 
convinced that the rules we set down for facial challenges to the constitutionality of a statute, 
although derived from federal sources, are also sound and proper under Idaho's Constitution.") 
Plaintiffs have a tough row to hoe in making the argument that the repeal on.c. § 72-915 
is unconstitutional, in that Idaho law is clear that legislative acts are presumed to be 
constitutional: "[a] legislative act is presumed to be constitutional and all reasonable doubt as to 
its constitutionality must be resolved in favor of its validity." Oneida County Fair Bd. v. Smylie, 
86 Idaho 341, 346, 386 P.2d 374, 376 (1963). As discussed herein, Plaintiffs' argument that the 
repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is unconstitutional fails, as the repeal of LC.§72-915 is constitutionally 
valid under both the U.S. and Idaho constitutions. 
2. The Idaho Legislature has not operated a substantial impairment of a contractual 
relationship. 
In analyzing a claim that the Contract Clause has been violated, "[t]he threshold inquiry 
is 'whether the state has, in fact, operated a substantial impairment of a contractual relationsl;lip." 
RUl One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d at 1147; accQrd Quatros, 800 P.2d at 192 ("[t]he 
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threshold inquiry is 'whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a 
contractual relationship.",)(emphasis added)(quoting Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas 
Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983)). "The threshold inquiry ... itself has three 
components: 'whether there is a contractual relationship, whether a change in law impairs that 
contractual relationship, and whether the impairment is substantial." Id 
As discussed herein, Plaintiffs cannot even prevail on this threshold question. 
a. There is no contractual right to dividends in the SIF workers' 
compensation policies. 
"The first sub-inquiry is not whether any contractual relationship whatsoever exists 
between the parties, but whether there was a 'contractual agreement regarding the specific ... 
terms allegedly at issue." RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d at 1147. In the present 
case, there is no contractual right to a dividend under a SIF workers' compensation policy. 
In National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 
451, 105 S.Ct. 1441 (1985), the U.S. intervened on the side of Amtrak. Congress passed statutes 
relieving railroads of providing rail service to inter-city passengers; then later amended the 
statutes to require railroads to pay Amtrak for transporting its employees. In tum, the railroads 
, 
sued, alleging that the amendment was unconstitutional under the Contract clause. The National 
R.R. Court explained that a presumption exists that it is the primary function of the legislature is 
to make laws that establish the policy of the state and not to make contracts: 
For many decades, this Court has maintained that absent some clear indication 
that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, the presumption is that "a 
law is not intended to create private contractual or vested rights but merely 
declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise." This 
well-established presumption is grounded in the elementary proposition that the 
principal function of a legislature is not to make contracts, but to make laws that 
establish the policy of the state. Policies, unlike contracts, are inherently subject 
to revision and repeal, and to construe laws as contracts when the obligation is not 
clearly and unequivocally expressed would be to limit drastically the essential 
powers ofa legislative body. Indeed, "'[t]he continued existence ofa government 
would be of no great value, if by implications and presumptions, it was disarmed 
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of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation.'" Thus, the party 
asserting the creation of a contract must overcome this well"founded presumption 
and we proceed cautiously both in identifying a contract within the language of a 
regulatory statute and in defining the contours of any contractual obligation. 
National R.R., 470 U.S. at 465-67. The Court went on to provide that it is critical to ascertain 
what gave rise to the contractual obligation being claimed in determining whether retroactive 
application of a statute violates the constitution: 
In detennining whether a particular statute gives rise to a contractual obligation, 
"it is of first importance to examine the language of the statute." "If it provides 
for the execution of a written contract on behalf of the state the case for an 
obligation binding upon the state is clear." But absent "an adequate expression of 
an actual intent" of the State to bind itself, this Court simply will not lightly 
construe that which is undoubtedly a scheme of public regulation to be, III 
addition, a private contract to which the State is a party. 
In this case, SIP is an "independent body corporate politic," and, thus, a quasi-public 
entity that is created by, and exists by, statutory grant of authority. See generally, Idaho Code 
§72-90 1 et seq. See, e.g., Kelso, 134 Idaho at 136 (holding that SIF is not a private insurance 
company). Idaho employers who purchase their worker's compensation insurance from the SIF 
receive a contract of insurance which sets forth the parameters of their coverage. (See Affidavit 
of Donald W. Lojek in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed 
September 22, 2010, at Exh. A.) While plaintiffs will likely argue that "SIF's statutory 
provisions are necessarily part of [the insured's] contract with SIF," Kelso, 134 Idaho at 140, the 
contract of insurance does not provide 'for the payment of a dividend to the policyholders - in 
fact, nowhere does it even address dividends. Further, the governing statutes for the SIF do not 
guarantee payments of dividends to policyholders, nor do they set forth that the policyholders 
have a property interest in the surplus or assets of the SIP. See generally Idaho Code §72-901 et 
seq. In fact, this Court previously concluded the SIF's statutory framework does not create any 
property rights in the SIF's policyholders. Kelso, 134 Idaho at 135. An SIF policyholder has no 
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vested right in the surplus and assets of the SIF; rather, the assets and surplus belong to the SIF 
in order to meet its statutory purpose as provided in I.C. § 72-901 (1). ld. 
Moreover, plaintiffs cannot paint a right to a strict pro rata dividend distribution as some 
variety of expected or vested contractual right that has been disrupted by retroactive application 
because SIF dividends have not previously been paid that way, and, indeed, any change in the 
law created by Farber was promptly remedied by the Idaho legislature even before remittitur 
issued. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, 615 S.W.2d 947, 
956-57 (Texas Civ. App. 1981) ("In determining whether a retroactive statute impairs or destroys 
vested rights, the most important inquiries are (l) whether the public interest is advanced or 
retarded, (2) whether the retroactive provision gives effect to or defeats the bona fide intentions 
or reasonable expectations of affected persons, and (3) whether the statute surprises persons who 
have long relied on a contrary state of the law.,,).18 Courts will look to whether a reasonable 
expectation in a particular 'right' has developed based upon past expectation; where no such 
expectation existed based upon contrary past practices, courts have been loath to fmd a 
reasonable expectation that is then disrupted by a change in the law. 
In Boykin v. Boeing Co., 128 F.3d 1279 (9th Cif. 1997), the 9th Circuit addressed the 
question of disturbing of vested rights in the context of an overtime dispute. In Boykin, the 
Washington State Court of Appeals had held that payment of overtime on an hourly basis 
defeated a claim that an employee was exempt, in a decision named Tift. 128 FJd at 1282. In 
response to Tift, the Washington Legislature passed retroactive, emergency legislation to state 
that "[t]he payment of compensation or provision of compensatory time off in addition to a 
18 Note, too, that Idaho generally precludes insureds from claiming a "reasonable expectation" of some term not 
expressly provided for in their policy of insurance. See generally Ryals v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 134 
Idaho 302,304, 1 P. 3d 803, 805 (2000). 
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salary shall not be a factor in determining whether a person is exempted[.J" Id. Employees 
involved in litigation regarding exempt status argued, in turn, that the legislature's retroactive 
legislation disturbed their vested rights as emanating from Tift. Id. The 9th Circuit rejected this 
argument finding that the retroactive application of the Senate Bill did not defeat any reasonable 
expectation of the plaintiffs in the lawsuit: 
The employees next argue that the retroactive application of Senate Bill 6029 
impairs their vested rights under the Washington Constitution. A vested right is 
"an immediate, fixed right of present or future enjoyment." Gillis v. King County, 
42 Wash.2d 373, 377, 255 P.2d 546 (1953) (quotation omitted). In order for a 
vested right to be entitled to protection from legislation, it "must be something 
more than a mere expectation based upon an anticipated continuance of the 
existing law." Washington v. Hennings, 129 Wash.2d 512, 528, 919 P.2d 580 
(1996) (quotation and citation omitted). The proper inquiry in determining the 
constitutionality of retroactive legislation is "whether a party has changed position 
in reliance upon the previous law or whether the retroactive law defeats the 
reasonable expectations of the parties." Id. at 528-29, 919 P.2d 580. 
The employees have not changed position in reliance upon Tift: As Boeing notes, 
at issue in this case are primarily the 1992-1994 compensation practices at 
Boeing; Tift was not announced until 1995. Further, retroactive application of 
Senate Bill 6029 does not defeat any reasonable expectations of the employees. 
The employees governed by the SPEEA collective bargaining agreement cannot 
claim any expectations from the terms of their contract, as it provides for overtime 
compensation at a rate less than time and one-half. Moreover, none of the 
employees had expectations, under the MWA, to overtime pay at a rate of time 
and one-half prior to Tift. 
Id. at 1283. 
In a Washington appellate case entitled In Re Marriage of Giroux, the court examined 
whether or not a ''vested right" had been disturbed following a change in military pension law. 
See 704 P .2d 160 (Wash. App. 1985). Military retirement pensions were traditionally considered 
community property. However, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 
210 (1981), that federal law prohibited states from dividing military pensions as community 
property. The Girouxes' divorce was decided under McCarty, and Rose Giroux was denied any 
part of her husband's pension. In response, however, Congress passed the Services Former 
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Spouses' Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408, restoring courts' right to divide pensions as 
community property. Rose Giroux sued for relief from her divorce judgment. James Giroux 
argued that upsetting the divorce settlement by retroactive application of the Congress' change in 
the law would disturb his vested rights, an argument rejected by the Washington Court of 
Appeals because Mr. Giroux had no reasonable expectation that his military pension would not 
be treated as community property: 
James Giroux argues that even if Congress intended the Act to be retroactive, 
retroactive application deprives him, without due process of law, of his vested 
right to the pension payments. He claims that his right to the pension vested when 
the amended decree became finaL However, to determine the constitutionality of 
retroactive legislation, the proper inquiry is not whether vested rights have been 
interfered with, but whether "settled expectations honestly arrived at with respect 
to substantial interests" will be defeated. 2 C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 41.05, at 261 (4th ed. 1973). 
An argument similar to James Giroux's was made to this court in In re Santore, 
28 Wash.App. 319, 623 Pold 702 (1981). After the unintentional repeal of a 
statute permitting adoption by written consent of natural parents, the Legislature 
passed former RCW 26.32.916 with provisions for retroactivity. The Santores 
then sought to regain custody after having consented to the adoption of their child. 
They argued that the statute retroactively interfere[d] with their "vested rights," in 
violation of the due process and contract clauses of the federal and state 
constitutions, by making effective Mrs. Santore's consent to adoption, which was 
ineffective under the law existing when the consent was executed . . . . In re 
Santore, supra at 324, 623 Pold 702. The court held: 
The proper test of the constitutionality of retroactive legislation is 
whether a party has changed position in reliance upon the previous law 
or whether the retroactive law defeats the reasonable expectations of the 
parties, not whether the law abrogates a "vested right," which is merely a 
conclusory label. Curative laws, such as RCW 26.32.916, which 
implement the original intentions of affected parties are constitutional 
because there is no injustice in retroactively depriving a person of a right 
that was created contrary to his expectations at the time he entered into 
the transaction from which the right arose. 
(Citations omitted.) In re Santore, supra at 324, 623 Pold 702. 
Applying the test adopted in Santore to the case at bar, it is difficult to see how 
retroactive application of the Act would defeat the reasonable expectations of the 
parties. Throughout their marriage, and until the McCarty decision, the Girouxs 
could reasonably have expected that James Giroux's military pension would be 
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treated as community property by the courts of this state. Only after the McCarty 
decision could the husband have reasonably expected to receive as his separate 
property what was formerly almost all of the couple's community property. 
Retroactive application of the Act cannot be said to be unfair or unreasonable. 
Recognizing the important contribution of the military spouse to our national 
defense, "that frequent change~of-station moves and the special pressures placed 
on the military spouse as a homemaker make it extremely difficult to pursue a 
career affording economic security, job skills and pension protection", Congress 
intended that the "status of the military spouse be acknowledged, supported and 
protected." 1982 U.S.Code Congo and Ad.News, at 1601. 
Id at 162-63. 
In the present case, SIF policyholders have also not changed any position in reliance 
upon an expectation of the payment of a pro rata dividend in every instance the SIF Manager 
declares a dividend. To the contrary, the dividend methodology employed by SIF has been 
employed for many years. (Alcorn Aff., '25.) Prior to the Farber decision, the SIF 
policyholders did not receive a strict pro rata share of the declared dividends. (Alcorn Aff., 
~25.) The Farber decision announced an interpretation ofI.C. § 72:'915 that the Legislature itself 
did not intend for the statute, as borne out by S.B. 1 166a's Statement of Purpose. Indeed, even 
before the Idaho Supreme Court's Order Denying Petition for Rehearing (May 12, 2009) and 
subsequent Remittitur (May 27, 2009), the repeal of Idaho Code §72-915 was put into effect. 
(Counsel, Exhs. C & F.) Thus, even after the Farber decision, no expectation in pro rata 
distribution of declared dividends could reasonably have been contemplated by SIF 
policyholders, given that I.C. § 72-915 was repealed even before the Idaho Supreme Court had 
finished with the Farber appeal. Thus, here, an SIF policyholder could have only reasonably 
expected to receive dividends in pro rata fashion after the Farber decision - and even then, the 
law was immediately changed by the Idaho legislature before the remittitur was ever issued. 
Accordingly, there is no contractual right to dividends, and a legislative change to the 
statute governing the methodology for distribution of dividends does not implicate a term of the 
SIF insurance policy. 
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b. The repeal of I.C. § 72-915 was not a change in law that impaired the 
contractual relationship between SIF and its policyholders. 
A statutory right to a particular dividend methodology, even if found to be "necessarily 
part of [the insured's] contract with SIF/' is expressly limited by the terms of the contract itself. 
The policy expressly provides: 
Terms of this insurance that conflict with the workers compensation law are 
changed by this statement to conform to this law. 
(Alcorn Aff., Exh. A, at p. 2.) Thus, an SIF policyholder is on notice from the commencement 
of coverage that the terms of the policy are governed by statutes, and are subject to amendment 
at any time by a change in the law. Thus, even to the extent a dividend methodology may be a 
term of the contract by virtue of statute, that term expressly emanates from statute, and is subject 
to change at any time by the Legislature, which is expressly outlined in the policy. A repeal of 
I.C. § 72 -915 (or, more specifically, the lack of a statute mandating a particular dividend 
methodology), then, would be automatically incorporated into the policy, and no "impairment" 
would exist. Moreover, as discussed above, there is no expectation being impaired, as SIP 
policyholders had no expectation of a pro rata dividend under I.C. § 72 -915 given it was 
retroactively repealed before the Farber case was remitted to the district court. 
Thus, no impairment to any contractual right is implicated by the change in the law -
rather, only at best a statutory policy term wholly subject to Legislative change. 
c. The SIF policies were not "substantially impaired. " 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the right to a particular dividend methodology is a 
statutory provision that becomes a term of a workers' compensation contract, and that the repeal 
effectuated some kind of impairment, a repeal of the statute governing such methodology would 
not constitute a "substantial" impairment to the SIF policy, a necessary showing under a Contract 
Clause analysis. 
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"The Contracts Clause provides protection against 'substantial' impairments of the 
obligation of contract only. A finding of minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end 
the court's inquiry." 16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 776 (2010). Similarly, 
[lIn determining the extent of the impairment, a reviewing court may also 
consider "whether the industry the complaining party has entered has been 
regulated in the past." ld For, "where a complaining party enters a contractual 
relationship in a heavily regulated industry, expectations of further regulation of 
that industry may lessen the severity of a subsequent impairment of that party's 
contractual rights and obligations." Segura lv. Frank], ... 630 So.2d [714,] 730. 
State v. All Property and Cas. Ins. Carriers Authorized and Licensed To Do Business In State, 
937 So.2d 313 (La. 2006); see also U.S. for Use and Benefit of Midwest Steel & Iron Words Co. 
v. Henly, 117 F. Supp. 928, 930-31 (D. Idaho 1954) (stating that "[a]s has been stated in 
numerous decisions, all contracts are entered into with the understanding that the reserve power 
of the state to pass laws for the general welfare may be invoked at any time and therefore if the 
legislature in the proper exercise of that power is convinced that the public good demands that an 
insurance company unsuccessfully resisting payment should pay attorneys' fees, there is no 
constitutional objection to their doing so."); accord Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim, 829 A.2d 611, 625 
(Md. 2003) (holding that retroactive abolition of child-parent immunity in tort action involving 
motor vehicle such that insurer was required to pay on mother's behalf did not impair insurance 
contract, since both insurance industry and field of tort law are heavily regulated, change was "in 
the wind" for some period of time, and there was no evidence of significant economic impact on 
Allstate or any other insurer); Hawkeye Commodity Promotions, Inc. v. Miller, 432 F.Supp.2d 
822, 846-49 (Iowa 2006) (holding that statute making it illegal for retailers to offer certain 
gaming machines did not violate constitution because although the impairment was substantial, 
i.e., a total wipeout, the state had the right to terminate the contract at any time and the 
impairment was thus foreseeable). 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 29 
In regard to workers' compensation policies issued by SIF, the overriding purpose of 
such policies is not to potentially allow a fractional return on paid premiums, depending on 
whether the SIF Manager, in his statutorily-authorized discretion, declares a dividend. Instead, 
the core, fundamental function and purpose of worker's compensation coverage is to provide 
unlimited coverage for worker injuries (and, under Part 2, additional coverage for employer 
liability in an amount as desired by the policyholder) to its policyholder regardless of the 
premium size. Thus, the SIF policy provides a $300 policyholder, and any policyholder under or 
above that amount with the same amount of upper coverage as a $500,000 policyholder. The 
repeal of I.C. § 72.:.915 does nothing to alter, in any way, the purpose of the workers' 
compensation policy; it merely grants the SIF Manager the discretion to pay declared 
discretionary dividends in a fashion that complies with the statutory directive that SIF be an 
"efficient insurance company, remain[ ... J actuarially sound and maintain[ ... J the public 
purposes for which the state insurance fund was created." I.e. § 72-901(3). Altering the way the 
SIF Manager pays out dividends to particular policyholders, then, does not constitute a 
"substantial" impairment to the parties' contract of insurance. 19 
Moreover, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the repeal effectuated a "substantial 
impairment" on the insurance polices between SIF and the policyholders based upon the 
limitations of their own Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs do not, and cannot, contend that their 
claims in this action are applicable to all policyholders paying in excess of $2,500 in premiums 
for the years at issue. In years where SIF elected to not distribute dividends to those 
policyholders below a certain paid premium level ($2,500, as was the subject of the Farber 
19 Indeed, even the amount declared as dividends, as a percentage of premiums, is not "substantial." For the 6 years 
in which dividends were declared between December 2003 and December 2008, the average dividend was only 
5.8582% of paid premiums, ranging from 3.9191% to 9.0304%. Counsel Aff., at Exbs. D & E. Thus, a pro-rata 
share under Idaho Code §72-915 for the dividend declared in December 2003 for a policyholder paying $10,000.00 
in annual premiums would have been $391.91. 
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action), the dividends declared were, instead, redirected to policyholders of more than $2,500 in 
premiums - thus, certain of those larger policyholders received dividends that were larger than 
what their pro rata share would have been under Idaho Code §72-915. In fact, Plaintiffs' own 
complaint even seeks to exclude those same certain policyholders from this action: 
For some or all of the Dividend Periods falling within the Class Period, the 
Plaintiffs and the members of the Class purchased a worker's compensation 
insurance policy from the Fund, were billed annual premiums which were in 
excess of $2,500.00, retained each such policy for at least 6 months, and for each 
such Dividend Period, did not receive an amount which was equal to or greater 
than a pro rata share of the dividend distributed by the Fund. 
The Class shall include, for each of the Dividend Periods during the Class Period 
as to which a dividend was or may be distributed, all Idaho employers who: ... 
(d) did not or may not, with respect to the Dividend Period in which the policy 
was acquired, receive a dividend' which was at least equal to a pro rata share of 
the total amount of dividend being distributed[.] 
Amended Complaint at ,,13 & 15. 
Plaintiffs' efforts to nullify the repeal of I.C. § 72-915, then, is not predicated on the 
claim that all policyholders' rights were "impaired" by the repeal, but only that certain 
policyholders were. In fact, a nullification of the repeal - whether its retroactive application, its 
prospective application, or both - would actually adversely impact dividend payments to certain 
policyholders, by either poten~ally creating a right in SIF for recoupment of dividend 
overpayments, or by restricting their ability to secure a larger dividend as the SIF Manager may, 
in his discretion, determine is appropriate for those policyholders based upon premium level and 
other factors, including individual policyholders' losses. 
As such, given that the repeal ofLC. § 72-915 does not impact the purpose of the SIF's 
workers' compensation policies in the slightest, and given that plaintiffs cannot even contend 
that all policyholders are impacted by the change in the law (which some policyholders will, in 
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fact, benefit from), Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the repeal "substantially impaired" their 
contracts of insurance with SIF . 
. 3. The State has a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the repeal ofLC. 
§ 72-915. 
Even if the threshold showing - a substantial impairment of contractual relationship - is 
met, the Court must then inquire "whether 'the State, in justification, [has J a significant and 
legitimate public purpose behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general 
social or economic problem,' to guarantee that 'the State is exercising its police power, rather 
than providing a benefit to special interests.'" RUI, 371 F.3d at 1147. Thus, Plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that there lacked a legitimate public purpose behind the repeal ofl.C. § 72-915. 
Of course, the legitimate public purpose behind the repeal of 1. C. § 72-915 is borne out 
by the Legislature'S Statement of Purpose and Fiscal Note to S.B. 1166, as amended. (Counsel 
Aff., Exh. C.) There, the Legislature stated: 
Repeal of Idaho Code Section 72-915 will serve to offset an adverse decision of 
the Idaho Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of Idaho Code Section 72-
915 which could subject the State Insurance Fund to pay dividends on policies 
that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the Fund's ability to reduce 
premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders. The proposed repeal of 
Idaho Code 72-9 15 will clarify the law regarding the payment of dividends by the 
State Insurance Fund by making it clear that in passing House Bill 774aa in 1998, 
it was the intent of the legislature to have the State Insurance Fund operate like an 
efficient insurance company subject to regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, 
including the dividend provision set forth in Title 41, Chapter 28, Idaho Code. 
Repeal of the law effective April 3, 1998 is necessary because on that date laws 
were enacted which subjected the State Insurance Fund to regulation under the 
Insurance Code, Title 41 of the Idaho Code. This legislation will allow the State 
Insurance Fund to issue dividends in the same manner as other insurance 
companies operating within the State of Idaho. 
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Id. 20 In turn, the repeal's Fiscal Note emphasized the financial uncertainly faced by SIF in light 
of the Court's ruling: 
Id. 
The State of Idaho and public entities, which are insured by the State Insurance 
Fund, face losing all or part of their future dividends and deviations as a result of 
uncertainties as to the effect of a recent Supreme Court decision. Based on 
dividends and rate reduction deviations provided by the State Insurance Fund over 
the past two years, that number could exceed $5,000,000 annually. Private 
businesses may also, due to the same uncertainties, experience the loss of future 
dividends and deviations since, according to the Court's decision, the Fund has no 
option when distributing dividends, other than to use a pro rata formula. 
The public purpose of the SIF is well-established. The SIF is a "creature of statute, ... 
limited to the power and authority granted to it by the legislature." Kelso, 134 Idaho at 135. In 
particular, the SIF was created "for the purpose of insuring employers against liability for 
compensation under this worker's compensation law. .. and of securing to the persons entitled 
thereto the compensation provided by said laws." I.e. § 72-901(1). In structuring the SIF, the 
Legislature determined it should be "created as an independent body corporate politic" and 
derive its financial well-being from "premiums and penalties received," "property and securities 
acquired," and "of interest earned" thereon. I.C. § 72-901(1). The Board of the SIF21 is 
instructed to "direct the policies and operations of the state insurance fund to assure that [it] is 
run as an efficient insurance company, remains actuarially sound and maintains the public 
purposes for which [it} was created." I.C. § 72-901(3) (emphasis added). The money 
generated is deposited with the state treasurer, who acts as custodian for the SIF; however, "[t]he 
20 Of course, even in the absence of such a legislative statement as to a particular decision by the Idaho Supreme 
Court: "[s Jtatutes are construed under the assumption that the legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal 
precedn[tJ at the time the statute was passed." State, ex reI. Wasden v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, -----' 224 P.3d 
1109, 1118 (Idaho 201O)(quoting Druffel v. State, Dep't ofTransp., 136 Idaho 853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002); accord 
Smith v. Washington County, _ Idaho -' _ P.3d ----' 2010 WL 3895341 (Idaho, October 6, 2010)("We 
presume that when it amended §I2-117(l), the Legislature was aware of the prevailing judicial interpretation of that 
statute and specifically chose to change that interpretation."). 
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money in the fund does not belong to the state ... [the money is held by the treasurer] ... for the 
contributing employers and the beneficiaries of the compensation law, and for the payment of the 
costs of the operation of the fund." State ex reI. Williams v. Musgrave, 84 Idaho at 84. 
Additionally, I.C. § 72-913 directs that premiums be set "at the lowest possible rate 
consistent with the maintenance of a solvent state insurance fund and the creation of a reasonable 
surplus and reserve." Public corporations are required to first attempt to insure through the SIF, 
unless declined as a matter of risk or if they opt to self-insure. I.C. § 72-928(a); City of Boise v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 129 Idaho 906, 935 P.2d 169 (1997). SIF's own stated underwriting policy 
requires that "It is the policy of the Idaho State Insurance Fund (ISIF) to offer insurance 
coverage to all Idaho employers who are required, by Idaho Code, to obtain workers 
compensation insurance on their Idaho employees and who are willing to comply with 
reasonable business terms and conditions," subject to limited circumstances where an employer 
may be cancelled, non-renewed, or refused to quote. (Alcorn Aff., Exh. A.)( emphasis added). 
Further, the SIF is also statutorily required to administer workers' compensation claims 
for the Idaho National Guard, but is forbidden from collecting premiums or otherwise charging 
for such administration - in effect, serving as the Idaho National Guard's third-party 
administrator for free. I.C. § 72-928(b). Thus, it is clear that the SIF "serves a 'public 
purpose.'" State ex reI. Williams v. Musgrave, 84 Idaho at 85; accord Board of County Com'rs 
of Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Facilities Authority, 96 Idaho 498,502,531 P.2d 588, 592 
(1974)("Thus, no entity created by the state can engage in activities that do not have primarily a 
public, rather than a private purpose, nor can it finance or aid any such activity."). 
21 Note, again, that the SIF Board is comprised of individuals appointed by the Governor, two of whom are required 
to be sitting legislators. I.C. § 72-901(2). 
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Moreover, the very requirement of workers' compensation is, itself, an express exercise 
of the police power of the State: 
DECLARATION OF POLICE POWER. The common law system governing the 
remedy of workmen against employers for injuries received and occupational 
diseases contracted in industrial and public work is inconsistent with modem 
industrial conditions. The welfare of the state depends upon its industries and 
even more upon the welfare of its wageworkers. The state of Idaho, therefore, 
exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of the 
premises are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for 
injured workmen and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless 
of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or 
compensation, except as is otherwise provided in this act, and to that end all civil 
actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of 
the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished, except as is in this 
law provided. 
I.e. § 72-201. 
Accordingly, given the Legislature's inherent control over an entity which is purely a 
creature of statute and which serves a public purpose, as well as its inherent police power to 
involve itself in matters of workers' compensation coverage, the Legislature's exercise of 
legislative control over statutes governing such constitutes a legitimate public purpose. 
Particular as to the repeal of I.C. § 72-915, the reasons were clear: the Farber ruling, which 
conflicted with years of dividend practices by the SIF and the "intent of the legislature to have 
the State Insurance Fund operate like an efficient insurance company subject to regulation under 
Title 41, Idaho Code, including the dividend provision set forth in Title 41, Chapter 28, Idaho 
Code," "could subject the State Insurance Fund to pay dividends on policies that are not 
financially profitable, thereby restricting the Fund's ability to reduce premiums and pay 
dividends to profitable policyholders." (Counsel Aff., Exh. C, Statement of Purpose.) Note, 
again, in that this is especially critical in light of the absence of the "safety net" for policyholders 
afforded by the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association, which SIF is forbidden from being a 
member thereof. (Alcorn Aff., 1115; I.C. §72-901(4»). 
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Further, another financial risk in not correcting the interpretation of the Idaho Supreme 
Court was direct financial impact to public coffers: "[t]he State of Idaho and public entities, 
which are insured by the State Insurance Fund, face losing all or part of their future dividends 
and deviations as a result of uncertainties as to the effect of a recent Supreme Court decision. 
Based on dividends and rate reduction deviations provided by the State Insurance Fund over the 
past two years, that number could exceed $5,000,000 annually." (ld., Fiscal Note.) In doing so, 
the Legislature made clear that its intent was to allow the SIF - the largest workers' 
compensation carrier in the State of Idaho - to compete with private insurers that were not under 
the constraints of dividend requirements defined by the Farber court in analyzing LC. § 72-915 -
"This legislation will allow the State Insurance Fund to issue dividends in the same manner as 
other insurance companies operating within the State ofIdaho.,,22 
Thus, even if the repeal ofl.C. § 72-915 constituted a substantial impairment on the SIF 
policy with its policyholder, the Legislature had a legitimate public purpose behind the repeal, as 
demonstrated by its Statement of Purpose, Fiscal Note, its statutory authority over the SIP, and 
. its exercise of police power in the realm of workers' compensation insurance. 
4. The adjustment of the rights and re§ponsibilities of SIP and its policyholders, if 
any, is based upon reasonable conditions and is a character appropriate to the 
public purpose justifying the repeal ofLC. § 72-915. 
Again assuming arguendo that the Legislature caused a substantial impairment of a 
contractual right, not only are Plaintiffs unable to show that the Legislature lacked a significant 
public purpose in repealing I.C. § 72-915, they are unable to show that any adjustment of the 
22 Certainly, in 1998, the Idaho Legislature intended to place the SIF on equal footing with private insurers: "Finally, 
in the 1998 amendments to the SIF's statutes, I.C. §72-901(4} was added to make it clear the SIF is subject to, and 
must comply with, the provisions of the Idaho insurance code. That provision also states '[f]OT purposes of 
regulation, the state insurance fund shall be deemed to be a mutual insurer.'" Kelso, 134 Idaho at 134. 
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rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties is not based upon reasonable conditions and 
is not of a character appropriate to the public purpose. 
The repeal ofLC. § 72-915 is a narrow repeal, only impacting a discretionary dividend 
that is merely incidental to the core function of Plaintiffs' policies. In addition, the repeal has no 
impact on the express tenns of the policies, and the right to a dividend has not been abolished 
altogether. The law has merely been changed to confonn with the methodology for calculating 
dividends that the Manager has used for years. 
Finally, any adjustment is of a character appropriate to the public purpose behind the 
repeaL As noted by the Legislature's Fiscal Note, the cost of reading the repeal as 
unconstitutional could drain upwards of $5,000,000 from the public coffers. By contrast, the 
Manager's current method of calculating dividends results in the SIF remaining competitive and 
efficient and able to offer workers' compensation coverage to Idaho employers at the lowest 
premium rate. In short, Plaintiffs' cannot show that any adjustment to the rights of the parties is 
not based upon reasonable conditions or inappropriate to the character of the public purpose 
behind the repeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the repeal of Idaho Code §72-915 forecloses 
Plaintiffs' claims, and the Court should grant summary judgment in favor of SIF. 
4-.... 
DATED this U day of October, 2010. 
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
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COME NOW THE PLAINTIFFS, by and through undersigned counsel, and provide the 
Court with a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs have filed this case on behalf of two policyholders of the Defendant Idaho State 
Insurance Fund (hereafter "the Fund") and its Manager. The gravamen of this action, which is 
styled as a class action, is the by now incontrovertible notion that for all the years in question, 
which include at least 4years and arguably 6 years, the Fund breached its contracts with its 
policyholders. Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 208 P.3d 289 (2009).1 In 
that matter, the Court ruled that the I.C. § 72-915 was a part of the contract between the Fund and 
its insureds, that it was clear and unambiguous, and that it required the Fund to distribute a 
declared dividend among all time-qualified policyholders pro rata, based on the amount of their 
premiums during the applicable period. 
The proposed class in this action consists of policyholders who, for one or more of the 
years in the class period were billed more than $2,500 in premiums but received less than, or 
none of, a pro rata share of the dividend distributed by the Fund in each such year. Thus, as this 
case comes to the Court, if Idaho Code § 72-915 applies, there can be no doubt that the Fund has 
breached its contracts with the Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class; that the Fund 
has caused millions of dollars of damage by the breach and that the damages due to each class 
member are mathematically determinable. 
I. The Court originally issued its opinion on March 5"', 2009. Thereafter the Defendants filed a Petition for 
Rehearing. The Court's substitute opinion was issued on May yh, 2009, and it was followed shortly thereafter by an 
Order denying the Petition for Rehearing. 
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II. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
The Fund was created by the Legislature in 1917, and has, since its inception, been 
governed by a set of laws now codified in Chapter 9 of Title 72. From the creation of the Fund, 
the sole authority it possessed to pay dividends derived from one and only one statute, namely 
I.C. § 72-915. Prior to its repeal in 2009, this enactment has only been amended to change the 
language regarding the person or entity which has the discretion to declare a dividend and the last 
time this occurred was in 1941. See, Idaho Code, Bound Volume of Titles 68-73,2006 Edition. 
After the Idaho Supreme COUl1 initially ruled in Farber that the Fund must allocate 
dividends on a pro rata basis, the Fund evidenced its dissatisfaction with this decision (issued on 
March 5th , 2009) by filing a Petition for Rehearing. The Petition advanced claims in support of 
its arguments against and criticisms of the Court's decision. Despite the fact that all of these 
claims were rejected, they now appear in a transmuted form in the Fund's Memorandum and 
other pleadings in this cause. Instead of giving any relevance to these claims, the Supreme Court 
suggested that, ifthe Fund believed it was necessary to change the wording of the dividend 
statute in order that it might thereafter distribute dividends in a manner other than required by the 
unambiguous wording of I.C. § 72-915, the correct course of action would be to "approach the 
Legislature to change the law" Id. at 313. However, this suggestion cannot be read as an 
invitation to pass legislation which retroactively relieved the Fund of its established and 
generally vested obligations in derogation of the "contracts clause" of the Idaho Constitution. 
The day after the Supreme Court ofIdaho issued its substitute opinion in Farber, the 
Governor signed Senate Bill 1166 as amended (hereinafter SB 1166), by which the Idaho 
Legislature repealed I.C. §72-915. As a consequence, all contracts of insurance entered into by 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 3 
the Fund after the effective date of the bill will no longer include, as one of their terms, the 
statutory provision regarding dividends. SB 1166 also includes the provision that the repeal is to 
be retroactive to January 1,2003. This aspect of SB 1166 is at issue in this action which seeks to 
recover dividend shares owed to class members based on dividends distributed between 
December 2004 and January 2010. 
On September 22,2010, Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
asking the Court to find and declare that the repeal ofLe. § 72-915 is unconstitutional insofar as 
it is applied retroactively in order to terminate the contractual right of the Fund's already 
existing policyholders to be paid dividends (a right which in most instances was fully vested) 
according to the method mandated by their contract of insurance with the Fund, as it was 
construed by the Farber Court. Plaintiffs' Motion is based solely upon the prohibition against 
the impairment of contractual rights as stated in Article 1, Section 16 of the Constitution ofIdaho 
(Idaho Contracts Clause) as that prohibition has been interpreted and applied in Idaho decisional 
law. Idaho Courts, when considering legislative action which works to retroactively impair 
citizens' rights under contracts with entities created by the Idaho Legislature, have consistently 
found such statutes to be unconstitutional. 
On or about October 26, 2010, the Fund filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Fund's Motion rests upon the premise that the analytical methodology used by Federal Courts in 
applying the prohibition against State action which impairs contracts set out in Article 1 Section 
10 of the United States Constitution (Federal Contracts Clause) must be used by Idaho courts in 
evaluating a claimed violation of the Idaho Contracts Clause. This methodology requires a COUli 
to make several determinations which are not salient to the determination of the protection 
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provided to Idaho citizens by the Idaho Contracts Clause. 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In framing its claim that methodology employed in Federal decisional law for testing a 
statute against the Federal Contracts Clause should be applied for testing that statute against the 
State Contracts Clause, the Fund has totally ignored the entire body ofldaho Appellate cases 
interpreting the Idaho Contracts Clause. The Fund preITlises its claim upon several Federal 
Court decisions, decisions from other states and upon what is easily demonstrated to be a 
fallacious notion, which is unsupported by any cited Idaho case, that this Court should apply 
Federal methodology because in one decision an Idaho Court determined that a statute was not 
unconstitutional "without making a distinction between the two constitutions." Memorandum In 
Support Of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 21 (hereinafter Def. SJ Memo). In 
suppOli of this tortured logic the Fund cites State v. Korn, _ Idaho _,224 P. 3d 480 (2009). 
However, the Fund's reliance upon Korn is not supported by a reasoned reading of the case and it 
is belied by the fact that when the Idaho Supreme Court was afforded an opportunity to apply 
Federal law interpreting the Federal Contracts Clause to resolve a challenge to an enactment 
based on the Idaho Contracts Clause, the Court declined the invitation and held instead that based 
on the Idaho Constitution the Legislature does not have the power to retroactively modify a 
contract. 
Even if the Idaho Appellate Courts were to countenance applying Federal decisional law 
as the standard for interpreting the Idaho Contracts Clause, the case that the Fund relies upon has 
no application to the issues in this case. Moreover, even if Federal law required in the factual 
circumstances of the instant action that the Court, after finding that an impairment has occurred, 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 5 
evaluates the public purpose behind and the reasonableness of the legislative action causing that 
impairment, that evaluation must be based entirely upon the legislative record (hence Plaintiffs 
have filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of James M Alcorn and Selected Exhibits Attached to 
the Affidavit of Counsel, Both of Which Were Filed in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment). However, if this established principle were found not to be controlling, 
and the Court concluded it could look to facts beyond the findings made by the Legislature, then 
it would be manifestly unfair to proceed to rule on the Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment 
given that Plaintiffs have been precluded from conducting discovery (hence Plaintiffs have filed 
Plaintiffs' Motion Pursuant to Rule 56(/), to Vacate Defendants' Motionfor Summary Judgment 
and to Continue that Motion Pending Discovery by Plaintiffs). 
The Fund rests its characterization ofthe applicable Federal law primarily upon RUI One 
Corp. V City of Berke ley, 371 F. 3d 1137 (9th Cir.2004). RUI, however, is oflittle avail to the 
Fund, as it does not involve a retroactive change to a term of the contract at issue and, in 
addition, it is decided on one of the threshold determinations not at issue in this matter. 
Moreover, the majority opinion features very little analysis of the various inquiries and sub-
inquiries that comprise a detailed Federal Contracts Clause analysis. 
In response to the Fund's characterization of the Federal law as controlling, Plaintiffs 
will demonstrate that when the Federal methodology is correctly applied to the relevant facts of 
this case, SB 1166 is unconstitutional. 
First, the retroactive repeal ofLC. § 72-915, even standing alone, operates as a substantial 
impairment of the contractual relationship between the Fund and the Plaintiff class by abrogating 
the established and, in most instances, fully vested contractual rights of the class members. In 
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this regard, it must be acknowledged that the Fund is a state managed insurance fund, which was 
created by statute and that, as a consequence, an impairment of a public contract is deemed 
substantial if it deprives a private party of an important right thwarts performance of an essential 
term, defeats the expectations of the parties, or alters a financial term. In this case we need look 
no further than the words of the Fund's manager (in the Affidavit he filed in the Farber action) to 
find confirnlation of the fact that the dividend statute defines a financial provision important to 
many policyholders. See Affidavit of Philip Gordon re:Defendants Motion/or Summary 
Judgment., Doc No. 000127 ~~ 31,32. 
Second, Plaintiffs will demonstrate that when the Court directs its attention to the 
findings expressed by the Legislature, as it must do, it will be clear that the Fund has failed to 
and cannot identifY a legitimate and substantial public interest which is served by impairing the 
existing and largely fully vested contract rights of the Plaintiffs and the class members. In 
assessing whether a statute which impairs obligations, the United States Supreme Court has 
distinguished between, on the one hand, generally applicable laws that remedy broad, widespread 
economic and social problems, and, on the other, those enactments with an extremely narrow 
aim, designed to benefit only a single entity. The Supreme Court employs closer scrutiny where 
the statute at issue has a narrow focus, and it has recognized that a retroactive statute lacks a 
legitimate purpose when it has a "very narrow focus" and is "aimed at specific" parties. 
Third, even if the Court could discern some underlying legitimate and substantial public 
purpose, looking again solely at the findings expressed by the Legislature, it will be clear that the 
Flmd cannot demonstrate that, in the circumstances present in this case, the impairment generated 
by the retroactive application of SB 1166 represents a reasonable means for or is of a character 
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appropriate to the furtherance of that public interest. In making this inquiry, because the Fund is 
a public entity which is seeking to benefit from legislative action which removes an established 
and largely vested financial obligation from its contracts, the Court must apply strict scrutiny to 
the legislative findings and is not permitted to defer to those findings or to permit the Legislature 
to put an impairment of contract on a par with other policy alternatives. 
IV. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Plaintiffs agree in principle with the Fund's formulation of the standard for the granting 
of summary judgment, namely summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, 
depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. " see, De! SJ Memo p. quoting IRCP Rule 56 (c). This rule cannot, however, be read as a 
justification for injecting into the record and then asking the Court to review and give weight to a 
good deal of irrelevant information. These concerns and the consequences of allowing irrelevant 
information into the record are addressed in Plaintiffs' motion to strike and motion for Rule S6ef) 
relief. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. The Standard applied to declaring a statute unconstitutional 
Plaintiffs agree that they shoulder the initial burden of convincing this Court that the 
challenged enactment is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the 
unconstitutionality of making the repeal of the dividend statute retroactive is clear and obvious, 
see Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motionfor Partial Summary Judgment (incorporated 
herein). It is enough that SB 1166 is unconstitutional under the protection afforded to Idaho 
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citizens by the Idaho Contracts Clause. However, if the Court deems it necessary to apply any of 
the methodology developed by Federal Courts for determining if State action violates the limits 
imposed upon the States by the Federal Contracts Clause, then the Court should be aware that, in 
the event that State action retroactively terminates the contract rights of a citizen who is a party 
to a contract with a public entity, then the burden shifts to the State or public entity to 
demonstrate the existence of a legitimate and significant public purpose and an impairment 
which is a reasonable means for and of a character appropriate to the furtherance of that public 
interest. S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889(9th Cir. Cal 2003). 
B. The Idaho Supreme Court has never employed Federal law and Federal standards 
in analyzing a claim that an Idaho statute violates Article 1, Section 16 of the 
Idaho Constitution 
The Fund's entire argument that SB 1166 can withstand a challenge brought under Idaho 
Contracts Clause rests upon the threshold proposition that the matter should be determined by 
application of Federal decisional law. To get to this proposition the Fund points out that 
"plaintiffs have pled violations of both the state and federal constitutions" De! SJ Memo, p. 20 
and then, in misplaced reliance upon State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 224 P.3d 480(2009), the Fund 
concludes that "the examination conducted by this Court will be the same" in both instances. 
De! SJ Memo, pp. 20-21. 
The linkage suggested by the Fund is faulty. First, there is no authority for the 
proposition that Plaintiffs must prove that SB 1166 violates the prohibition established by both 
contract clauses. Second, the Fund has not, and cannot so far as Plaintiffs are able to discern, 
cited a single Idaho case which either employs Federal methodology in determining if State 
action violates the Idaho Contracts Clause or holds that Federal methodology should be applied 
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to determine if State action violates the Idaho Contracts Clause. 
The best that the Fund can do is to point out that in State v. Korn a criminal defendant 
argued a violation of his rights under the State Contracts Clause and the Federal Contracts Clause 
and that in that case the Court proceeded to rule against this assertion without distinguishing 
between the two clauses or the jurisprudence surrounding them. However, when Korn is 
examined and when relevant Idaho cases are reviewed, it is apparent that, Idaho courts have: 1.) 
consistently resolved challenges to acts of the Legislature which are based on the Idaho Contracts 
Clause through application of Idaho law and Idaho constitutional principles; 2.) consistently 
applied a zero tolerance standard to Legislative attempts to retroactively impair existing 
contractual rights and obligations; and 3.) declined, when considering whether a statute could be 
applied retroactively without violating the Idaho Contracts Clause, to apply the Federal 
methodology even though only ten months earlier a United States District Judge for the District 
of Idaho had found that the very same statute could be retroactively applied without violating the 
Federal Contracts Clause. 
On these bases, this State Court should look to the extensive body of state decisional law 
interpreting the state constitutional provision, the entirety of which was apparently deemed 
unworthy of mention by the Fund. 
1. State v. Korn is altogether inapposite and provides no support for this 
Court to equate the jurisprudence interpreting the state and federal 
contract clause provisions. 
To the extent that the Fund is intending to suggest that State v. Korn can be taken as 
authority for the proposition that Idaho courts should apply Federal methodology in determining 
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if State action violates the Idaho Contracts Clause, the Fund is totally distorting the meaning and 
import of the decision in Korn. Nowhere in its opinion does our Supreme Court engage in any 
substantive analysis of whether or not the ordinance Korn challenged violated either the State or 
Federal Contracts Clause. Nor does the Court ever state or imply that if it were to engage in 
such an analysis it would- utilize the same case law, the same standards or the same analytical 
methodology to assess whether or not the law in question violated the two different constitutional 
provisions. Instead, our Supreme Court, faced with Korn's claim that a County ordinance 
violated his rights under both the State Contracts Clause and the Federal Contracts Clause found 
that: 
Both the magistrate and district courts assumed that contracts existed between 
Korn and his mother and Korn and DDR at the time the County passed the 
ordinance. There is, however, no substantial, competent evidence that Korn had a 
contract with either his mother or DDR at the time the ordinance took effect. 224 
P. 3d 480, 482. (E.A.) 
Following on its conclusion -reached without any citation to either federal case law or 
federal rules of evidence- that there was no contract to impair when the ordinance passed, the 
Court then concluded as follows: 
This is significant because "[t]he ... contracts clause protects only those contractual 
obligations already in [483] existence at the time the disputed law is enacted." 
Allied Structural Steel Co. V Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241, 98 S. Ct. 2716, 57 
L.Ed. 2d 727 (1978).224 P. 3d 480,482-3. 
In other words, having found as a matter of evidentiary -as opposed to constitutional- law 
that the necessary condition precedent for invocation of any "contracts clause" claim -i.e. the 
antecedent existence of a contract creating rights which can be impaired- had not been met, our 
Court never conducted any analysis relative to either the Federal Contracts Clause or the State 
Contract Clause and consequently never considered what analytical methodology should be 
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applied. 
To suggest that tIlls case lends any support to the notion that this Court should ignore all 
Idaho decisional precedent and resolve the State constitutional issue presented in this case based 
entirely on federal law finds is unjustifiable. The fact that the Idaho Court cited a federal 
decision in this very limited and specific context can easily be accounted for. Both Constitutions 
forbid impairing "the obligations of contracts." By definition, the prior existence of a contract 
with rights and obligations is, under any analysis, a condition precedent to the either 
Constitutions' prohibition upon the enactment a law or ordinance which could impair that 
contract. Korn thus cannot be read as holding or even suggesting that Idaho Courts should apply 
Federal methodology to determine whether legislative action which works to retroactively impair 
citizens' rights under contracts with entities created by the Idaho Legislature violates the Idaho 
Contracts Clause. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court was provided with a perfect opportunity to 
employ federal law to resolve a contracts clause challenge under the 
state constitution, and it did not. 
On January 4th, 1954, United States District Judge Chase Clark issued his opinion in the 
case of Us. for Use and Benefit of Midwest Steel & Iron Works Co. v. Henley, 117 F. Supp. 928 
(D. Idaho I954)(cited by the Fund, DefSJ Memo p. 29). That was an action brought under a 
federal statute known as the "Miller Act" to recover from a Defendant and its surety. The 
contract and the bond which were the subject of the suit were entered into on November 15th, 
1950.117 F. Supp. 928, 931. In the 1951 session the Idaho Legislature passed a statute providing 
that insurance companies which fail to pay amounts justly due under their contracts or policies of 
insurance, and which are thereafter sued "in any court in this state for recovery under the terms of 
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such policy ... " shall "pay such further amount as the cOUli shall adjudge reasonable as attorneys's 
fees in such action." Id. 117 F Supp. 928, 929. 
After having been found to have improperly denied a claim and having had attorneys fees 
assessed against it pursuant to the 1951 law, the Defendant and its surety challenged the 
application of the statute to this pre-existing contractual relationship. The challenge was based 
solely upon Federal Contracts Clause. Judge Clark, resolved the challenge by using the 
methodology established by Federal decisional law, primarily Supreme Ruling o/the Fraternal 
Mystic Circle v. Synder, 227 U.S. 497. After conducting this analysis, Judge Clark ruled that no 
violation of the Federal Contracts Clause had occurred. 
A few months later, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether in a case with a similar 
fact pattern, the same statute violated the Idaho Contracts Clause. In Penrose v. Commercial 
Travelers Insurance Company, 75 Idaho 524, 275 P.2d 969 (1954) the 1951 Idaho attorneys fees 
law was applied against an insurance company which was found to have wrongfully denied the 
Plaintiff's claim for disability benefits as provided for in a contract of insurance which was 
antedated the passage of the statue. After citing to Judge Clark's opinion, our Court found that 
the application of the statute to contracts formed prior to the passage of the statute violated the 
Idaho Contracts Clause. 
The Penrose decision is structurally unusual. It features a lead opinion authored by 
Justice Thomas, which observes that: 
There are two decisive questions submitted before this court on appeal: First, 
whether or not respondent comes within the provisions of Part D, section 1 of the 
policy with reference to the convalescence clause thereof; secondly, whether 
under the terms of the insurance policy respondent, to whom the court allowed 
attorneys' fees in the sum of$500, is entitled to any attorneys' fees under Chapter 
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289, Session Laws of 1951. 
Id. at 528. 
Justice Thomas was joined in the lead opinion by three other members of the Court in 
concluding that respondent was disabled within the meaning of the policy in question, hence 
entitled to recovery under its disability provision. The contracts clause issue divided the five 
member Court in a different fashion: only one other Justice joined Justice Thomas in concluding 
that Idaho Contracts Clause was not violated by application of the newly passed attorneys' fees 
statute to a contract which was formed prior to the passage of that statute. Justice Thomas's lead 
opinion acknowledged the preceding decision by Judge Clark in Henley and he discussed the 
decisions of several sister State Courts. Ultimately Judge Thomas stated a conclusion which 
demonstrated a strong inclination to apply what is current Federal methodology. 
Judge Thomas's extensive discussion in support ofthe minority view, even with the 
support of Judge Clark's opinion from Henley failed to persuade the majority of the Idaho Court 
that application of the attorneys' fees statute to contracts fOlmed prior to its enactment was 
constitutional under the Idaho Contracts Clause? Justice Givens speaking for the majority on the 
attorneys fees question, stated quite simply his belief that: 
"to apply the statute enacted after the insurance policy was written impairs the 
obligation of contract. Authorities supporting this proposition are cited in the 
majority opinion and it is unnecessary to add thereto, although there are others to 
like effect." 75 Idaho 524, 540. 
ld. 75 Idaho at 540. Justices Porter and Keeton concurred with him, with the former observing 
2 It should be noted that an attorney's fee statute is so close to the very fringe of an enactment that could impair a 
contract that it could be seen as and tolerated as merely a change in remedy and not a change in any substantive term 
of the contract and, despite being relatively innocuous the majority Idaho Court refused to allow it to be retroactively 
applied. 
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that: 
Jd. 
"To hold that Ch. 289, 1951 S.L. would apply to contracts of insurance written prior to 
its enactment, would create a new liability and impose a burden not covered by the terms 
of the insurance policy." 
Penrose standing alone conclusively demonstrates that the Idaho Supreme Court does not 
apply federal standards, federal analyses or federal precedent to challenges to state laws, based on 
the State Contracts Cause. This conclusion makes sense given that the Federal Contracts Clause 
seeks to limit what the State can do to its citizens while still being sensitive to "States rights." 
Conversely, the Idaho Contracts Clause appears in the section of the Idaho Constitution which 
sets out the protected rights of the citizens and therefore deals with the limits that the citizens 
have imposed upon their State government. However, it is not necessary for the Court to rely 
solely upon Penrose and the arguments set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motionfor Partial Summary Judgment in order to decline the Fund's invitation for the COUli to 
join them in disregarding the entire body ofIdaho appellate decisions interpreting and applying 
the Idaho Contracts Clause. Additional compelling support can be drawn from the strong and 
highly salient language contained in Straus v. Ketchen, 54 Idaho 56, 83 (1933), which counsel 
only located after submitting that Memorandum. 
Straus involved circumstances strikingly similar to those involve in this matter. Drainage 
Districts had been formed by legislative action and they were authorized by statute to issue bonds 
for development purposes. Provisions were made in the statute creating the Drainage Districts 
relative to how the bonds would be secured and repaid and those provisions were in place at the 
time the bonds (the contracts at issue in the decision) were issued by the Drainage District and 
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purchased by members of the public. Later the Legislature changed the law and allowed for a 
different manner of securing and repaying the bonds. If applied retroactively to the bonds at 
issue in the decision, the new system would have allowed some of the real property securing the 
extant bonds to be released from the liens, before all of the bonds were paid in full. The Plaintiff 
contended that this would unduly compromise the security ofthe bond holders.ld., 54 Idaho at 
59-63. 
The Court refused to allow the change in the statute to be applied retroactively to bonds 
purchased before the passage of the statute at issue. Specifically the Court stated: 
The legislature cannot, under such constitutional prohibitions, authorize under the 
police power of the state the creation of a contracting agency and permit the 
contracting of obligations, and by the same power destroy its contracts and abolish 
its obligations. To permit the legislature to do so would destroy the very essence 
of the constitutional prohibitions. Clearly such was never the intention of the 
framers of the Constitution. Were it otherwise no person would ever be safe to 
enter into a contract with public or quasi-public corporations, creatures of the law. 
Id. at 83 (Idaho 1933). 
Clearly, Idaho !:ourts are expected to apply the Idaho Contracts Clause to prevent the 
Legislature from passing legislation which retroactively impairs citizen's rights under pre-
existing contracts with entities created by the Idaho Legislature. 
C. Were this Court to consider Federal law for any reason, it would readily become 
apparent that making the repeal of 1. C. § 72-915 retroactive violates the United 
States Constitution as well. 
If the Court should determine that it is appropriate to utilize Federal decisional law as the 
basis for interpreting the Idaho Contracts Clause, or that the case must be resolved under the 
Federal Contracts Clause, Plaintiffs contend that the retroactivity application of SB 1166 also 
violates the Federal Contracts Clause. Plaintiffs' engage in the following discussion of Federal 
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analytical methodology with great reluctance because Idaho's jurisprudence relative to the Idaho 
Contract Clause is dispositive of the unconstitutionality of the retroactive application ofSB 1166. 
Article 1, § 1 0 clause 1 of the United States Constitution reads, in pertinent pmi, as 
follows: 
No state shall ..... pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts .... 
1. Under Federal law, determination of whether a regulation violates 
Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution 
involves a three-step inquiry which begins with an inquiry into 
whether State action has caused a substantial impairment of a 
contractual relationship. 
Federal Courts employ a three step inquiry when called upon to decide whether or not a 
State legislative act "impairs the obligations of contracts" in contravention of the United States 
Constitution. RUI One Corp. v. City a/Berkeley, 371 F. 3d 1137, 1147 (9th Cir. 2004). They 
define as the initial or threshold inquiry the question of whether or not the state law has acted as a 
substantial impairment of a contractual relationship. Id. 
In R UI One, which is much relied on by the Flmd, the Ninth Circuit, taking its cue from 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gen. Motors Corp. V Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186, 
defined this threshold question as, itself consisting of three components: "whether there is a 
contractual relationship, whether a change in law impairs that contractual relationship, and 
whether the impairment is substantiaL" 371 F. 3d 1137, 1147.3 
3 The Ninth Circuit posited a controlling "sub-inquiry" to this initial question: 
The first sub-inquiry is not whether any contractual relationship whatsoever exists between the 
parties, but whether there was a "contractual agreement regarding the specific ... tenns allegedly 
at issue." (Citation omitted)ld 
Because the panel concluded that "It is at this initial phase ofthe analysis that RUI's claim ... fails."Id., it never 
actually conducted any extensive analysis either of the two otheraspects of the threshold question of whether or not 
a contractual relationship existed. Thus, RUI One is readily distinguishable from the case at bar. 
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a. A Contractual Relationship Exists 
Here, any dispute as to whether or not there is a contractual agreement regarding the 
payment of dividends is foreclosed by two decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court. 
In Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130; 997 P. 2d 591(2000) The 
Supreme Court held: 
It is undisputed that Kelso has a contract for worker's compensation insurance with the 
SIF. Any violation of the provisions of that contract would constitute a breach of contract 
by the SIF. Additionally, the contract necessarily incorporates the statutory 
framework which both created the SIF and governs the actions that can be taken by 
the SIF with regard to the SIF's funds. When Kelso contracted with the SIF it was 
entitled to rely on the statutes creating and regulating the SIF .... Consequently, any act 
taken by the SIF beyond its statutory authority would also be a breach of the SIF's 
contract with Kelso. 
Id. 134 Idaho at 138, 997 P. 2d at 599. (emphasis added). 
Five years later, in Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho, 388, 111 
P. 3d 73 (2005), the Court reiterated the incorporation doctrine of Kelso, and specifically 
extended it to the statute governing the declaring and distribution of dividends: 
In Kelso this Court held that the SIF's governing statutes were incorporated in its 
contracts with its policyholders. [citation omitted]. Kelso also held that 
policyholders "had a right to rely on the statutes creating and regulating the SIF, 
and the limits those statutes place on how the SIF can invest its policyholders" 
premiums. [ citation omitted] This covenant reaches to the SIF's statutory 
obligations that are incorporated into its contracts. The SIF has duties to its 
policyholders regarding surplus and dividends by virtue of the fact that the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing extends the statutes that are 
incorporated in the policyholders' contracts. 
Id. 141 Idaho at 399; 111 P. 3d at 84. (emphasis added) 
Kelso and Hayden Lake both clearly establish the existence of a contractual agreement 
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between the Fund and its policyholders regarding the specific term before this Court.4 
b. State law impairs a specific obligation ofthe Contract. 
That the retroactivity application of the SB 1166 impairs the very right acknowledged in 
Farber cannot seriously be questioned. Indeed, the very fact that the Fund is asking this Court to 
grant them summary judgment based on the fact that the statute was repealed is in and of itself 
proof that, if SB 1166 can be applied retroactively, it would impair the very rights recognized by 
Farber and established by the Fund's contracts with its policyholders. If the Fund is correct, then 
Plaintiffs' contractual rights will be rendered nugatory by their inability to enforce them. This is 
not only an "impairment;" it is a destruction of the contractual right to receive a portion of the 
dividend corpus. 
c. Retroactive application SB 1166 generates a substantial change of 
the Fund's contracts with its policyholders. 
The Fund suggests, that the amounts involved in this cause are something other than 
"substantial." De! SJ Memo at p.30 note 19. It points out that the dividend a policyholder with 
a $10,000.00 premium would have received in January, 2004, would only have been $391.91.5 
The suggestion that a loss of$391.51 is not substantial is both pointless and a distortion of the 
situation. 
4 The Fund suggests that "there is no contractual right to a dividend under a SIF workers' compensation policy."De! 
SJ Memo p.22, Plaintiffs are not claiming in the case at bar, just as they never claimed inF arber, that they have an 
absolute "contractual right to a dividend". What Plaintiffs have always contended is that, once the manager decides 
to pay a dividend, they, like every other policyholder, have a right to share in that dividend,pro rata, based entirely 
on the size of their premium. The Farber Court unanimously agreed. 
5 In making this point the Fund has used the lowest effective dividend rate from several identified years and as a 
consequence is not pointing out that in some years the amount at issue for a policyholder who was billed $10,000 
would be just shy if 10% of the premium. 
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An argument over just exactly how high a percentage or how many dollars oflost 
dividends must be shown to make an impairment "substantial", is actually unnecessary for, as the 
District Court for the Central District of California observed: 
An impairment of a public contract is substantial if it deprives a private party of an 
important right, thwarts performance of an essential term" defeats the expectations of the 
parties, or alters a financial term [citations omitted, e.a]. 
Southern California Gas Company v. City of Santa Ana, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1133 (2002), 
adopted in its entirety S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City afSanta Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 886 (9th Cir. Cal. 
2003). Moreover, when assessing substantial impairment, Courts "need not resolve the 
'question of valuation' in tenTIS of dollars if an important financial provision is impaired .... " 
(Citations omitted) S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885,890. "Even adjustments 
in implicit financial terms can constitute substantial impairment." Id. 
The right at issue here is at the heart of the insurance contract. It bears directly upon the 
cost of that contract or the consideration for the issuance of the policy. The dividend is a return of 
the portion of the premium that was in excess of the true cost of the insurance agreement. Farber 
holds that the contract requires that this repayment must be made on a pro rata basis to all time 
qualified policyholders. SB 1166, if applied retroactively, creates so obvious an impairment to a 
financial term of the contract that the Fund's argument about the amount involved is incredibly 
misguided. 
Even if the Court could evaluate the amount at stake when it is clear that a financial term 
of the contract has been altered, there is a good deal more at stake here than $391.91. To suggest 
that each policyholder's individual claim for one year is in the hundreds or even the thousands of 
dollars misses the point. This is a class action and the damages are an aggregate of the individual 
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damages, which in this case are expected to be in excess of one million dollars. This action 
involves thousands of policyholders and years worth of policies. That is why the Fund is 
defending it vigorously. The "impairment" completely destroys the right of several thousand 
policyholders to apro rata share of the dividend corpuses that were distributed over several 
years. In terms of dollars the class members are being deprived of a sum of money which no one 
can argue is, in aggregate, de minimus or insubstantial. 
SB 1166 would t.mquestionably operate to "alter a financial term" of the contract of 
insurance between the Plaintiffs and the members of the class on the one hand, and the Fund on 
the other and the impairment is substantial. 
2. Where, as here, State action has caused a substantial impairment of a 
contractual relationship, the Court must next determine if the 
impairment furthers some significant and legitimate public purpose. 
Where State action generates a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship the 
Court must look to determine if the impairment was intended to further some significant and 
legitimate public purpose. RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, supra., at 1147 (9th Cir. 2004). 
This inquiry turns upon the text of the ordinance, not the alleged motives behind it. Id. at 1146, 
note 7. 
a. When the State itself, or public entities are the contracting parties, 
strict scrutiny of any legislative measure is required and deference 
is not to be accorded to the declared intent of the Legislature and 
the State entity has the burden of proof 
The Federal courts apply different standards to situations where the enactment impairs 
only contractual relationships between competing private actors and situations in which the State 
itself, a state agency or a public body such as the Fund is a party. Where the State acts to impair 
its own existing contracts, the far stricter scrutiny set forth in us. Trust Co. V New Jersey, 431 
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us. 1 (1977) supplies the controlling standard. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. V Kansas 
Power & Light Co., 459 Us. 400 at 412 n.14 ("the stricter standard of United States Trust Co. " 
applies where state alters its own contracts); and So. Cal Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F. 3d 
885 at 894 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Energy Reserves approves Us. Trust's holding and reasoning when 
state entities interfere with their own obligations."). 
The law in the Ninth Circuit is clear and unambiguous: the public entity always carries 
the burden of proof when the legislation in question impairs a State's own contracts. S. Cal. Gas 
Co. v. City of Santa Ana, supra. 336 F.3d 890, Univ. of Hawaii Prof Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 
F. 3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir.21999. Laws that work an "impairment of a state's own contracts ... 
face more stringent examination under the contract clause than [do] laws regulating contractual 
relationships between private parties .... " Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 
234,244 n. 15, 98 S. Ct. 2716 (1978). There is a good reason for this. Parties enter into 
contracts to "order their personal and business affairs according to their particular needs and 
interests. Once arranged, those rights and obligations are binding under the~law and the parties 
are entitled to rely on them." Id. at 45. When the state is a party, there is an additional risk that it 
will employ its sovereign powers to alter the terms of the contract. States should resist the 
temptation as previously arranged by contract. In this instance, the Legislature has apparently 
employed its sovereign power to eliminate contractual terms which the Supreme Court of Idaho 
has stated are binding on the Idaho State Insurance Fund. That action requires strict scrutiny. 
b. The Fund is a state managed legislatively created insurance fund. 
As such its character is much more public than private. 
In the pivotal case of Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insurance Fund, supra., our Supreme 
Court was compelled. first to ascertain the nature of the Fund. After making an in-depth 
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examination of the statutory framework applicable to the Fund, the Court rejected Kelso's core 
contention that, in creating the Fund, the Idaho Legislature intended to create a mutual insurance 
company. Instead, after comparing the statutory attributes of mutual insurance carriers to those 
of the Fund, the Court concluded that: 
The statutory comparison referenced by the Court focused to a great extent on those 
provisions of Title 72, Chapter 9 which tend to impart to the Fund a governmental or public 
character, such as the fact that it "is administered and managed by people appointed by the 
Governor" in contradistinction to a private mutual insurance company, which "is managed by 
people elected by the policyholders." Id. 134 Idaho 135. 
Again, in Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn supra. our Court stated 
categorically that "[t]he SIF is not a private corporation." 141 Idaho 388, at 401, III P.3d 73 at 
86. The Hayden Lake decision aclmowledged the existence of a further aspect of the law 
governing the Fund which helps impart to it a public character, namely that the official actions of 
the Fund, like those of State agencies, are entitled to a presumption of regularity: 
The district court held that the presumption of regularity applied to the actions 
taken by the SIF and the State in the real estate transactions challenged by HLFPD, 
citing ... , which stated that "there is in Idaho, as in most states, a presumption of 
regularity in the perfonnance of official duties by public officers." This conclusion 
was proper. (citations omitted). 
Id. 141 Idaho at 403. 
In sum, while the Fund has some attributes of a private corporation, and is required to 
conduct itself as an insurance company, it is: 
"an agency of the state created for the purpose of can-ying on and effectuating a 
proprietary function as distinguished from a governmental function. It serves a "public 
purpose" but not a "governmental purpose." 
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State ex rel. Williams v. Musgrave, 84 Idaho 77,85,370 P.2d 778, 782 (Idaho 1962). 
c. The Fund cannot identifY a legitimate and significant public purpose 
which is furthered by the retroactive application of SB 1166 
In order for an enactment to be deemed as having a significant and legitimate public 
purpose, it must be aimed at remedying a broad and public purpose. RUI, supra, at 1147. This is a 
requirement meant to guarantee that "the State is exercising its police power, rather than 
providing a benefit to special interests. Id. at 1147. SB. 1166 has neither a broad nor a public 
purpose, but is very narrow and specific and only designed to benefit a single entity by 
retroactively legitimizing its disregard of a law governing and circumscribing its conduct. Even, 
tmder a deferential standard of review, the Supreme Court has recognized that a statute may lack a 
legitimate purpose when it has a "very narrow focus" and is "aimed at specific" parties. Energy 
Reserves, supra, 459 Us. at 412, n. 13. This case does not merit a deferential standard of review 
because, as demonstrated above the challenged State action benefits a legislatively created entity 
and strict scrutiny is mandated. Us. Trust, 431 U.S. at 25-26 
The importance of an underlying broad concern is demonstrated in Allied Structural Steel, 
Co, v. Spann us, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). At issue was a law that impaired existing pension plan 
contracts. The Minnesota Legislature had become aware that a large employer was planning to 
terminate its pension plan, thereby depriving more than 1,000 employees of certain benefits. Id. at 
247-248 & n. 20. To protect those employees, the Legislature quickly enacted a generally 
applicable law that became effective several weeks before the termination could occur. Id. When 
another employer challenged the pension law, the Supreme Court struck it down because it "was 
not even purportedly enacted to deal with a broad, generalized economic or social problem." Id. 
at 250. 
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The facts here are even more extreme than in Allied Structural Steel, in that SB 1166 is not 
only meant to undo a decision of the highest Court of this State, but to reward the Fund for having 
ignored the clear and unambiguous language of a law which has governed its actions since its 
creation in 1917. The very text of both the original SB 1166 and SB 1166 as amended display 
that the legislative response was motivated almost entirely by the holding and, more importantly, 
the implications of Farber. See, Affidavit of Philip Gordon, In Support of Plaintiffs' Motionfor 
Partial Summary Judgment, Documents 000100 and 000119. 
Looking at the Statement of Purpose and Fiscal Note to SB1166, as amended, we see from 
the first sentence that the Legislature was not pleased with the adverse decision of the Idaho 
Supreme Court regarding the correct interpretation ofLC. § 72-915 because it "could" subject the 
Fund to pay dividends on policies that are not financially profitable. Thus, there is some 
speculation here ("could") with respect to existing policies that may not be "financially 
profitable." The consequence of that speculative statement is that the Fund might have its ability 
restricted to reduce premiums and to pay dividends to profitable policyholders. These are not 
findings, they are statements of possibilities and they are all concerned with future contingency. 
The policies involved in this class action are year-to-year contracts which are completed. 
The Statement of Purpose goes on to state that the legislation "will allow' the Fund "to 
issue dividends in the same manner as other insurance companies operating within the State of 
Idaho." Taking that statement at face value and assuming that there is a public purpose expressed, 
the focus is clearly prospective. 
The prospectivity of what the Legislature has done is confirmed by the Fiscal Note. That 
Note is clearly prospective and speaks to the possibility or contingency that the insured public 
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entities may lose all or part of their future dividends and deviations as a result of "uncertainties" 
as to the effect of a recent Supreme Court decision. It is stated in the Note that number "could" 
exceed $5,000,000 annually. A further prospective contingency is included with reference to 
provide businesses which "may" experience the loss future dividends and deviations. 
What is not stated in the Statement of Purpose and/or the Fiscal Note is any emergency, 
any specific indication that the Fund will become insolvent, any prediction that the Fund will not 
be able to meet future obligations, or any indication that the Fund will not be able to meet its 
statutory function as provided in Chapter 9 of Title 72. There is nothing in the Statement of 
Purpose or Fiscal Note that indicates that the Fund cannot act efficiently on a prospective basis. 
There is nothing in the Statement of Purpose or Fiscal Note that indicates that the payment of any 
monies owed to the Members of the Class will keep the Fund from discharging its primary 
purpose of underwriting worker's compensation policies. 
The Fund states that "the legislature had a legitimate public purpose behind their repeal." 
Del SJ Memo p. 36. Even if that is true for prospective operation of the repeal, it is not,enough. 
There must be both a "significant" and a "legitimate" public purpose for retroactive effect and no 
such effect is not supported by the Statement of Purpose or Fiscal Note. But that is all the Court 
may properly rely upon. Statements by Mr. Alcorn, whether under oath or not, or affidavits from 
undoubtedly well-meaning counsel for the State Insurance Fund are irrelevant to the Court's 
inquiry as to this test. 
Behind all of this Legislative speculation is the fact that, in the course of conducting pre-
trial discovery and motion practice in Farber, Counsel for the Plaintiffs had learned, through not 
only the Alcorn Affidavit but a host of other means, that the Fund was not only failing to pay any 
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dividends to the named Plaintiffs and the members of the class in Farber, but was also violating 
the dividend statute by employing a sliding scale percentage scale in distributing the dividends, 
where the larger the policyholder's premium was, the larger the percentage of the premium that 
was returned to them as dividend. Thus, when the Farber decision issued, it had to be apparent 
to the Fund (and its Manager, Directors and Counsel) that another class of policyholders, i.e. those 
who were paid some, but less than a pro rata share of dividends (hereafter referred to as the 
"second class"), might soon be seeking redress. Senator Goedde's bill was accordingly an 
attempt both to undo the Farber ruling and thereby deny justice to the class of policyholders who 
had been totally denied their rightful dividends, and also to foreclose any avenue of redress for the 
second class of policyholders, consisting of the Plaintiffs herein, and the class they seek to 
represent.6 Thus it is apparent that the Legislation is clearly narrowly aimed at specific persons 
and businesses and is impermissible. See Allied Structural Steel, supra., and Energy Reserves, 
supra. 
Because SB 1166 is, in essence, nothing more than an amnesty provision for the illegal 
conduct of the Fund; because it only targets past wrongdoing; and because Plaintiffs do not 
suggest that the Legislature could not repeal the dividend statute prospectively, the Court should 
conclude that, under the applicable strict level of scrutiny, SB 1166 was clearly not enacted to deal 
with a "broad generalized economic or social problem" as required by Allied Structural Steel 
supra. This measure would never be found constitutional in the Federal Courts given its total 
6. Because they have been balTed, by a Protective Order, from conducting discovery, Plaintiffs are unable to specify 
with any precision, the number of employers in the class. The Court will recall, however, that, at the hearing on 
Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, counsel for the Fund estimated the size of the class at between forty and 
fifty thousand. Given that the size of the class in Farber was approximately 43,600, counsel's estimate appears 
reasonable. 
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lack of a significant and legitimate public purpose. 
3. Even if it could be shown in this case that there was a legitimate and 
significant public purpose to justify State action which has caused a 
substantial impairment of a contractual relationship, the Court must next 
determine if the impairment is a reasonable means for or is of a character 
appropriate to the furtherance of that public purpose. 
Where State action generates a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship which 
furthers some substantial and legitimate public purpose, the Court must next look to determine if 
the impairment is a reasonable means for or is of a character appropriate to the furtherance of that 
public purpose. RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, supra., at 1147 (9th Cir. 2004). As before, the 
burden is upon the State or its legislatively created entity to demonstrate that a retroactive 
impairment of a contract is a reasonable means for accomplishing the public purpose. Univ. of 
Hawaii Prof Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F 3d at 1106. Moreover, legislative declarations and 
findings are not entitled to deference and the Court is expected to scrutinize the means employed 
to determine if they are reasonable and appropriate to the public purpose., RUI at 1137 and the 
legislature is never" free to consider substantial contractual impairments on a par with other 
policy alternatives." State of Nevada Employees Ass 'n, Inc. 903 F. 3d 1223 1228 (9th Cir. 1990). 
The State or the legislatively created entity has the burden of proving that the impairment 
reasonable and appropriate to the public purpose. So. Cal Gas 336 F 3d 885 at 894; Univ. of 
Hawaii Prof Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F 3d at 1107. 
The task presented to the Court is to to examine the availability of alternative measures 
which the legislature could have taken which would have addressed its legitimate concerns 
without producing a concomitant impairment of the Fund's contractual obligations to the 
Plaintiffs and the members of the class. This inquiry must be conducted within the analytical 
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framework of the duty to balance the claimed public purpose with the extent of the impairment. 
In making this inquiry, the Court must initially determine "if the problem sought to be 
resolved by an impairment of the contract existed at the time the contractual obligation was 
incurred", Cayetano, supra, 183 F 3d at 1107. Changed circumstances and important 
government goals do not make an impairment reasonable if the changes circumstances are "of 
degree and not kind." US, Trust, supra, 431 Us. at 32. 
Here, the "problem" was the existence of a legislative enactment, which had never been 
materially altered and which as the Idaho Supreme Court held in Kelso, supra, constituted a term 
of all contracts entered into by the Fund. Thus, to the extent that the Legislature was free to 
consider a statute which it originally enacted when the Fund was created in 1917, and which it left 
alone for 92 years as constituting a "problem", there can be no doubt that the "problem" not only 
existed at the time the Plaintiffs and each and every member of the class purchased insurance 
from the Fund, but also was a term of each and every contract of insurance purchased from the 
Flmd ,up until the effective date of the repeal. Judicial scrutiny which is stricter ~till is therefore 
required because of the dividend statute's antiquity, and its inclusion in every policy of insurance 
written up to the date of its repeal. In this regard the "problem" has existed for years and under 
these circumstances an impairment which seeks to address a problem that existed at the time the 
contractual obligation was incurred as been held to be manifestly unreasonable." Univ. of Hawaii 
Profl Assembly, 183 F 3d at 1107. 
Moreover, the retroactivity application of SB 1166 is a disproportionate response to a 
single decision of the Idaho Supreme Court. Careful examination of both the original and 
amended version of SB 1166 shows that its only intended retroactive effect was to respond to the 
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Farber decision, by taking away rights that had existed pursuant to the Fund's contracts since 
1917. As noted in the dissenting opinion in R UI: 
The United States Supreme Court has often expressed its suspicion of retroactive laws 
because they are "generally unjust" Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 
533(O'Connor, J., plurality)(citation omitted), and "deprive citizens oflegitimate 
expectations and upset settled transactions." (Citation omitted) 
Id at 1167. Clearly retroactive application is a harsh remedy which should be sparingly used and 
which is difficult to justify. 
It is not difficult to anticipate that the Fund will attempt to rely on the language of the 
repealer statute which declared the existence of an emergency. \Vhile neither the statute itself nor 
the legislative history defines the nature of this emergency, the only type of emergency imaginable 
would be one of a financial nature. To the extent that the Fund contends that broad application of 
Farber to existing contracts would impact the Fund financially, there is, in view of the Fund's 
$197,000,000 surplus coupled with Mr. Alcorn's testimony that Farber could cost the Fund 24 
million (this was before it resolved about 8 million dollars worth of claims in Farber) no 
legitimate basis for that the situation was so grave as to necessitate drastic action of voiding 
existing and largely vested contract provisions retroactively. See the Affidavit of Philip Gordon In 
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgement, Doc. Nos. 000117-000118.7 
Nothing about these key indices of the Fund's solvency suggests any sort of emergency financial 
situation whatsoever. The very fact that the Fund was able to pay such a hefty sum as a dividend 
and still witness the simultaneous growth of its net assets and surplus should end any suggestion 
7 Net Admitted Assets of the Fund grew by approximately $2.5 million dollars during 2009 (000117 line 26, 
columns 2/4); the Unallocated Surplus of the Fund ["Unassigned funds (surplus)(OOOII, line 33)] grew by more than 
seven million dollars from that on hand (000118, line 11.2) at the end of the prior year, and the Fund declared 
dividends to policyholders in excess of fourteen million dollars to be distributed in January, 2010 
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that the Fund was confronting an emergency in 2009 or as result of the claims being made in 
Farber or being made in this case. 
In this matter, the only conceivable public purpose behind the passage of SB 1166 is to 
help the Fund be more competitive in the future. However, there is nothing about this purpose or 
the legislative findings which lend any justification to a retroactive repeal of the I .C. §72-915. 
Under these circumstances the Fund cannot met its burden to demonstrate retroactive application 
of SB 1166 is a reasonable means for or of an character appropriate to the furtherance of any 
identified legitimate and substantial public purpose. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The provision of Section 1 of S.1. 2009, chapter 294 (which is the number assigned to the 
enacted law repealing Idaho Code §72-915 retroactively) clearly violates the Idaho Contract 
Clause. 
Should, however, the Court examine the Federal precedent for any reason, which it is 
decidedly not required to do, it will become re,adily apparent that the attempt to make the repeal 
of I.e. §72-915 retroactive falls far short of surviving the strict scrutiny reserved for situations 
where a state or public entity is one of the contracting partners; the very strict scrutiny applied 
when the "problem" is one which was in existence when the contractual obligations were 
incurred; the extremely strict scrutiny reserved for enactments as narrow and specific in character 
as the one herein challenged; and the special judicial disfavor reserved for statutes which apply 
retroactively when they could be applied be applied prospectively. 
While not required to do so in order to deny the Fund's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the Court could, should it wish to render an advisory opinion, find and rule that, if the attempt to 
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i , 
£ 
retroactively impair Idaho citizen's rights under contracts an entities created by the Idaho 
Legislature herein challenged were to be scrutinized under the Federal contracts clause, using 
Federal law, it would also be found in violation of the United States Constitution. 
F or all of the reasons stated herein and in the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, this Court is respectfully requested to deny the Fund's 
Motion For Summary Judgment, and enter an order declaring that the repeal ofIdaho Code §72-
915 is unconstitutional insofar as it is declared to be retroactive to any date prior to the effective 
date of the repeal for the simple reason that, in contravention of Article 1, § 16 it impairs the 
Fund's obligation to honor the vested rights of the Plaintiffs and the members of the class. 
Dated thiS"Z2~~ovember, 2010. 
"'\ 
) 
Donald W. Lojek 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD mDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CDA DAIRY QUEEN, INC., and 




THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, in his 
official capacity as its Manager, and 
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
GERALD GEDDES, JOHN GOEDDE, 
ELAINE MARTIN, MARK 
SNODGRASS, RODNEY A. HIGGINS, 
TERRY GESTRIN and MAX BLACK and 
STEVE LANDON, in their capacity as 
members of the Board of Directors of the 
State Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 09-13607-C 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COME NOW the defendants, The Idaho State Insurance Fund, James M. Alcorn in his 
official capacity as its Manager, and William Deal, Wayne Meyer, Gerald Geddes, John Goedde, 
Elaine Martin, Mark Snodgrass, Rodney A. Higgins, Terry Gestrin, Max Black, and Steve 
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Landon in their capacity as members of the Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund 
(collectively, "SIF"), by and through their counsel of record Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, 
P.A., and hereby submit their opposition to plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
("plaintiffs'Motion"). For the reasons stated herein, plaintiffs' Motion should be denied. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs have moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a ruling from the Court that 
the retroactive portion of the Legislature's repeal ofIdaho Code § 72-915 is unconstitutional per 
the Contract Clause of the Idaho Constitution.! However, as discussed herein, plaintiffs' Motion 
should be denied. 
Plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the repeal is unconstitutional, and the test of 
whether the repeal violates the Contract Clause is a demanding one plaintiffs cannot meet in this 
case. Per RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137, 1147 (9th Cir. 2004), in order to 
prevail on their claim that the repeal violates the Contract Clause, plaintiffs must show that: 
• the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual 
relationship; 
• the State does not have a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the 
regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic 
problem; and 
• the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties is not based 
upon reasonable conditions and is not of a character appropriate to the public 
purpose justifying the legislation's adoption. 
I Although the plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial references both the 
U.S. and Idaho Constitution, plaintiffs' Motion apparently only addresses the Idaho Constitution. See First 
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, at 11 11. Plaintiffs also apparently seek to further piecemeal the 
questions of the repeal's constitutionality and efficacy by not addressing other arguments at this time: "If the 
emergency driven retroactive appeal ofLC. 72-915 is not effective the Court will be later called upon to detennine if 
the repeal is wholly ineffective, if the repeal is effective but that the effective date is July 1,2009, or if the repeal is 
effective when the Governor signed the Bill on May 6,2009. These questions are not, however relevant, to the 
issues raised in this motion." Plaintiffs' Memo at nA. To avoid a steady stream of piecemealed motions by 
plaintiffs, defendants have requested the ruling ofthe Court on all such issues of the repeal's constitutionality and 
efficacy in their own Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 26, 2010. 
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Asa matter of law, plaintiffs are unable to meet their burden under this test. 
First, the Idaho Legislature has not operated a substantial impairment of a contractual 
relationship because there is no contractual right to dividends in the SIF workers' compensation 
policies. In addition, even assuming a right of contract existed, the repeal cannot be considered 
to have substantially impaired it. The purpose behind the Legislature's creation of SIF was to 
ensure the well-being of the public's wage-earners through insurance for employers who may 
have to pay workers' compensation, and this core function of the policies held by plaintiffs 
remains unchanged by application of the repeal. What is more, reading the repeal as 
unconstitutional would enhance, rather than impair, the rights of some policyholders. 
Second, the SIF and the workers' compensation coverage it provides are creatures of 
statute and, when the Legislature created them, it did not prevent itself from using its police 
powers to shepherd the SIF, a quasi-public entity, and run it efficiently. 
Third, the repeal merely conforms 'to the law to the way the Manager has paid dividends 
for years. Therefore, the only expectations the policyholders may have had for dividends to be 
paid otherwise would have been attributable to the Farber litigation and would have been 
uncertain and quickly quashed by the Legislature's repeaL 
Fourth, the Legislature, recognizing the vitality of the SIF is necessary to the vitality of 
the public welfare, repealed I.C. § 72-915 so the Manager would have the authority to make the 
decisions necessary to the economic health and competitiveness of the entity in today's market. 
Fifth, the repeal is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to 
the public purpose justifying the action. 
Finally, plaintiffs' cited authority provides little to the determination of this action. 
Plaintiffs' cited caselaw either fails to reflect the modem, refined interpretation of the Contract 
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-, 
Clause and its three-step analysis, or otherwise illustrates 'easy' Contract Clause cases (that is, 
very substantial impairments of contracts with no justified public purpose). 
Thus, for these reasons, plaintiffs' Motion should be denied. 
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL-FACTS 
Plaintiffs provide a lengthy discussion of prior legislative history, the Farber decision, 
and the underlying dispute between the parties regarding the payment of dividends, but plaintiffs 
fail to identify the actual salient material facts to the determination of this motion for partial 
summary judgment. 
The undisputed material facts this Court must consider in light of the question posed (to 
wit, the constitutionality of the repeal of Idaho Code § 72-915) are comparatively few in number. 
These facts are not - and cannot - be disputed by plaintiffs. While SIF certainly provides its 
own background discussion of the State Insurance Fund, and the prior Farber litigation, below 
are the undisputed material facts relevant to plaintiffs' Motion: 
1) Plaintiffs' claim is predicated on Idaho Code § 72-915. Plaintiffs' suit makes 
claim for distribution of dividends pursuant to a pro rata distribution. However, the workers' 
compensation policy itself does not provide for the payment of a dividend to the policyholders.2 
Instead, the distribution methodology is set forth in the now-repealed Idaho Code § 72-915, thus 
making the' sole baSis for plaintiffs' claim that statute. Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Amended Complainf') states as follows: 
10. 
As of June 30, 2009, Idaho Code § 72-915 provided as follows: 
2 Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed September 23, 
2010 ("Lojek Aff."), at Exhibit A (State Insurance Fund Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance 
Policy). 
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At the end of every year, and at such other times as the manager in his 
discretion may determine, a readjustment of the rate shall be made for 
each of the several classes of employments or industries. If at any time 
there is an aggregate balance remaining to the credit of any class of 
employment or industry which the manager deems may be safely and 
properly divided, he may in his discretion, credit to each individual 
member of such class who shall have been a subscriber to the state 
. insurance fund for a period of six (6) months or more, prior to the time of 
such readjustment, such proportion of such balance as he is properly 
entitled to, having regard to his prior paid premiums since the last 
readjustment of rates. 
This term of contract between the parties requires that any dividend which the 
Fund elects to distribute must be distributed among all "Qualified Policyholders" 
(those who had entered into a contract for a policy during the period covered by 
any dividend being distributed and who held that policy in effect for at least six 
months). The term of the contract requires that total amount of the dividend be 
allocated into shares based upon the ratio between the amount of annual 
premiums billed to each Qualified Policyholder during the Dividend Period and 
the total annual premiums billed to all Qualified Policyholders during the same 
period. Neither this term of the contract nor any other term of the contract or any 
applicable law provides the Manager any authority whatsoever to distribute the 
dividend based upon any other allocation formula. 
ld at p. 6. This statutory basis for plaintiffs' claim is further confirmed in plaintiffs' Amended 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs' 
Memo"): "A breach by the Fund of its duty to distribute the dividend corpus according to the 
statutory method set forth in Idaho Code § 72-915 thus constituted a breach of the contracts of 
insurance which the Fund entered into with the Plaintiffs and the members of the Class." Id at 
11. Thus, it is an undisputed material fact that plaintiffs' claim is based on Idaho Code § 72-915. 
2) Idaho Code §72-915 was repealed mi May 6, 2009. While the Farber litigation 
was still pending before the Idaho Supreme Court, the Idaho Legislature voted to repeal I.C. § 
72-915. (Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
October 26, 2010 ("Counsel Aff."), at Exh. C.) The repeal specifically provided that: "An 
emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby declared to exist, Section 1 of this act 
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" 
shall be in full force and effect on and after passage and approval, and Section 2 of this act shall 
be in full force and effect retroactively to January 1, 2003." (Jd. at § 3,) The repeal was 
approved in the Legislature, and advanced to the Governor, who signed it on May 6,2009. fd. 
The Idaho Supreme Court then denied Respondent's Petition for Rehearing on May 12, 
2009, and issued its Remittitur to the District Court on May 27,2009. (Counsel Aff., Exh. F.) 
3) Idaho Code §72-915 was repealed to a retroactive date of January 1, 2003. When 
Idaho Code §72·915 was repealed, it was retroactively repealed to January 1,2003: 
An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby declared to exist, 
Section 1 of this act shall be in full force and effect on or after passage and 
approval, and Section 2 of this act shall be in full force and effect retroactively 
to January 1,2003. 
Counsel Aff., at Exh. C (emphasis added). Plaintiffs do not dispute that the repeal was expressly 
retroactive to January 1, 2003.3 See Plaintiffs' Memo at 12 (stating that: "The very wording of 
the Bill repealing Idaho Code § 72-915 permits no doubt that the Idaho Legislature intended the 
repeal to have retroactive effect and be applied retroactively so that certain of the Fund's 
contractual obligations would be impaired."). Thus, it is an undisput~d material fact that Idaho 
Code § 72-915 was repealed retroactively to January 1,2003. 
4) Plaintiffs' claims all relate to dividend distributions after January 1, 2003. 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint expressly states that "this action pertains to any dividends 
distributed after December 24, 2004." (Amended Complaint, 1 12).4 Thus, it is an undisputed 
material fact that plaintiffs' claims all related to dividend distributions after January 1,2003. 
3 Idaho law reflects the Legislature's authority to pass retroactive legislation, but requires that retroactive laws be 
expressly declared retroactive. See Idaho Code §73-10 1. Here, there is no dispute that the repeal is expressly 
declared to be retroactive in confonnity with this requirement 
4 SIF disputes plaintiffs' use of a 5-year statute of limitations. Rather, as plaintiffs' action is based in statute, a 3-
year statute of limitation should apply. However, for purposes of opposing plaintiffs' Motion, SIF references 
plaintiffs' claimed 5-year period to demonstrate that, even under plaintiffs' broadest theory, there is no dispute that 
the retroactive repeal ofIdaho Code § 72-915 forecloses plaintiffs' action. 
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5) Plaintiffs' action was not filed until December 24, 201 O. Plaintiffs' initial 
complaint in this action was filed on December 24,2009, as reflected on ISTARS. 
6) Plaintiffs' claim is foreclosed if the repeal is upheld. The Legislature only 
provided a limited carve-out to the retroactive effect of the repeal of Idaho Code § 72-915, that 
being for extant litigation (and, in partiCUlar, the Farber action): 
(6) it is the intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this act shall not apply 
to any action filed in a state or federal court of law in the state of Idaho on or 
before December 31, 2008, and the provisions of this act shall not apply to the 
aforementioned case of Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund as currently 
pending with respect to those policy holders paying annual premiums of not more 
than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500). 
(Counsel Aff., Exh. C.) As outlined above, as plaintiffs' action was filed on December 24,2009, 
and relates to dividend distributions from December 24, 2004 going forward, if the repeal is 
upheld, plaintiffs' action is fully foreclosed, a point plaintiffs do not appear to dispute. See 
Plaintiffs' Memo at 22 ("[A]bsent the retroactivity provision of the legislation, the Fund would 
have been obligated to pay to the Plaintiffs and the members of the Class such sums as would 
result in their receiving their pro rata share of the total dividends paid.")(emphasis added). 
7) The purpose of the SIF is to provide Worker's Compensation coverage to Idaho 
employees. In 1917, the Idaho legislature enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme, now 
codified as I. C. §§ 72-901 et seq., creating the SIF "for the purpose of insuring employers 
against liability for compensation under this worker's compensation law ... and of securing to 
the persons entitled thereto the compensation provided by said laws." LC. § 72-901(1). Since its 
enactment, the SIF has fulftlled its public purpose by providing worker's compensation coverage 
to thousands ofIdaho employers who have relied on such service being available.5 
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BACKGROUND 
Although the undisputed materials facts as identified above are the necessary facts in 
deciding plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, it is helpful to review the background 
of the State Insurance Fund, the Farber litigation, and the related Idaho Supreme Court decision 
giving rise to the legislative repeal of Idaho Code § 72-915. In an effort to reduce duplication, 
however, SIF instead references and incorporates as if fully set forth herein its "Background" 
section outlined in its own Memorandum In Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed October 26,2010, at pp. 4-13. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. The Summary Judgment Standard. 
Motions for summary judgment should be granted only when no genuine issues of 
material fact exist after the pleadings, deposition, admission and affidavits have been construed 
most favorably to the non-moving party and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter oflaw. LR.C.P. 56(c); Johnson v. Studley-Preston, 119 Idaho 1055, 1057,812 P.2d 1216, 
1218 (1991). Additionally, the court must construe the record liberally in favor of the non-
moving party and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of such party. Bear Lake West 
Homeowner's Assoc. v. Bear Lake County, 118 Idaho 343, 346, 796 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1990). 
Furthermore, all doubts are to be resolved against the moving party and the motion must be 
denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom, and if 
reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Parker v. Koko!. 117 Idaho 963, 966, 793 
P.2d 195, 198 (1990). 
5 See Affidavit of Jim Alcorn in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 26, 2010, at 1 
13 ("Alcorn Aff. "). 
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B. The Standard Applicable to Declaring a Statute Unconstitutional. 
Idaho law is clear that legislative acts are presumed to be constitutional: "[a] legislative 
act is presumed to be constitutional and an reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality must be 
resolved in favor of its validity." Oneida County Fair Bd. v. Smylie, 86 Idaho 341, 346, 386 
P.2d 374, 376 (1963). The burden of proving that a legislative act rests squarely on the 
challenger: 
There is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of the challenged statute or 
regulation, and the burden of establishing that the statute or regulation is 
unconstitutional rests upon the challengers. An appellate court is obligated to 
seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds it [sic] constitutionality. The 
judicial power to dec1are legislative action unconstitutional should be exercised 
only in clear cases. 
Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, _, 232 P.3d 813, 818 (2010) (quoting Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. 
No.2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 154 P.3d 443 (2007»)(emphasis added). 
ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiffs' arguments and the applicable tests under the Contract Clause. 
Recognizing that the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is fatal to their claims, plaintiffs attempt to 
have the repeal declared unconstitutional. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint seeks, in relevant part, 
a declaration: 
That the repeal of I.e. § 72-915 by the 2009 legislature be deemed to be 
unconstitutional, void and of no effect as to all policies issued prior to July 1, 
2009. 
ld. at p. 15. The basis for such is stated to be that: 
such attempted repeal is, pursuant to Article I, Section 16 of the Idaho 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution, 
unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect as to contracts of insurance in 
existence prior to the effective date of the repeaL 
ld atp. 8. 
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1. Federal law is applicable in interpreting Idaho's Constitution both generally and 
in this case. 
Notably, while plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges that the repeal ofldaho Code § 72-
915 violates both the state and federal constitutions, plaintiffs' Motion apparently only addresses 
the Idaho Constitution. Plaintiffs do not make any contention that the Idaho Constitution's 
Contract Clause differs from the U.S. Constitution, or that it is otherwise interpreted differently. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "we seriously consider federal law in determining 
the parameters of our own constitutional provisions, and we may adopt federal precedent under 
the state constitution but only to the extent that we believe the federal law is not inconsistent 
with the protections afforded by our state constitution." State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,988, 
842 P.2d 660, 667 (1992). The Idaho Supreme Court has clearly not been persuaded that federal 
law is inconsistent with the protections under the contract clause in the Idaho Constitution; to the 
contrary, the Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed a federal and state constitutional argument 
with a single, dispositive analysis. See State v. Kom, 148 Idaho 413, 224 P.3d 480,482 (2009). 
In Kom, the defendant argued that a city violated his rights under "the contract clauses 
found in the Idaho and U.S. constitutions." The Kom Court, without making a distinction 
between the two constitutions, engaged in a single analysis, relying on federal law (Allied 
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978» to hold that the city's ordinance did 
not violate his rights under either constitution. Id. at 483; cf State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 16 
n.6, 696 P.2d 856, 867 n.6 (1985) (holding that while defendants sued under federal constitution 
and "did not also argue that the due process clause of art. 1, § I3 of Idaho's Constitution 
invalidates the Act in question, had they done so, we do not think that the result would have been 
different, for we are convinced that the rules we set down for facial challenges to the 
constitutionality of a statute, although derived from federal sources, are also sound and proper 
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under Idaho's Constitution.") Thus, whether analyzed under the Idaho Constitution or the U.S. 
Constitution~ the analysis is the same, and the Idaho Supreme Court has not indicated it has (or 
will) differentiate its analysis of Idaho's Contract Clause versus that of the federal constitution. 
2. The Idaho and United State's Constitutions contract clauses are not to be read 
literally and, therefore, a three-step analysis must be evaluated to determine 
whether there has been a violation of the contract clause. 
The United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 10 and the Idaho Constitution, Article 
1, Section 16, both provide that there shall be no "law impairing the obligations of contracts" 
(the "Contract Clause"). "The constitutional impairment of contracts clause protects only those 
contractual obligations already in existence at the time the disputed law is enacted." Lindstrom 
v. Disc Bd. of Health Panhandle, 109 Idaho 956,961, 712 P.2d 657, 662 (1985). 
Plaintiffs' Motion presents a bare contention that the Idaho Constitution's Contracts 
Clause is a "model of categorical brevity." (Plaintiffs' Memo at 10.) Contrary to the suggestion 
by plaintiffs that minimal analysis of the Contract Clause is needed based upon its "categorical 
brevity," whether there is a violation of the Contract Clause actually requires a three-step 
analysis: (1) "whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a 
contractual relationship[;]" (2) ''whether the State ... [has] a significant and legitimate public 
purpose behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and geneml social or economic 
problem[;]" and (3) "whether the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of contracting 
parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public 
purpose justifying the legislation's adoption." RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d 
1137, 1147 (9th CiT. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). 
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that the Contract Clause prohibition is 
not absolute:, 
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[The Contract Clause] prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be read with 
literal exactness like a mathematical formula. 
The economic interests of the state may justify the exercise of its continuing and 
dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. 
Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,428 & 437,54 S.Ct. 231, 236 & 
239 (1934). Such position was reaffirmed in 1987 by the United States Supreme Court. 
[lIt is well settled that the prohibition against impairing the obligation of 
contracts is not to be read literally. 
[I]ts primary focus was upon legislation that was designed to repudiate or adjust 
pre-existing debtor-creditor relationships that obligors were unable to satisfy. 
Even in s:uch cases, the Court has refused to give the Clause a literal reading. 
Thus, in the landmark case of Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, the Court 
upheld Minnesota's statutory moratorium against home _ foreclosures, in part, 
because the legislation was addressed to the "legitimate endH of protecting "a 
basic interest of society ," and not just for the advantage of some favored group. 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 503, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1251 
(1987) (emphasIs added). 
A strong analysis of the modem test for whether legislation violates the Contract Clause 
is found in Los Quatros v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 800 P.2d 184 (N.M. 1990), wherein the New 
Mexico Supreme Court applied the modem Contract Clause analysis to a claim made under the 
New Mexico state constitution's own Contract Clause. In Los Quatros, a mortgagor sued for 
declaratory judgment that a law allowing for early payment applied to its mortgage~ despite the 
contract's language to the contrary. The mortgagee relied on Von Hoffinan v. City of Quincy, 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 18 L.Ed. 403 (1866), for the proposition that states cannot constitutionally 
reduce a party's existing rights under a contract; however, the Quatros court pointed out that 
"much water has flowed over the dam since Von Hoffman, and so we prefer to apply more 
modem Contract Clause analysis in deciding whether or not to invalidate this statute in this 
case." Quatros, 800 P .2d at 192. The mortgagor relied upon Home Building & Loan 
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Association v. Blaisdell, supra, in which the Court held that "[The Contract Clause] prohibition 
is not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical fonnula ... 
. The economic interests of the state may justifY the exercise of its continuing and dominant 
protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts." 290 U.S. at 42&, 437, 54 S.Ct. at 
236, 239. The Quatros court went on to explain that different Contract Clause cases had 
different factors present; for example, in Blaisdell, there was an emergency and the legislative 
relief was tailored to that emergency. 800 P.2d at 192. The Court also pointed out that in 
National RR Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. 451, 472 (1985), "the impairing statute was a federal 
one, and so judicial scrutiny of the legislation was minimal, which doubtless reflects a federal 
court's concern with principles of federalism lacking here." 800 P.2d at 192. The Quatros court 
found these cases to be nevertheless applicable: 
Perhaps the case providing the best overview of the appropriate methodology is 
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., [459 U.S. 400 
(1983)]. There the Court reviewed a Kansas statute regulating the price of natural 
gas sold intrastate between a producer and a public utility, and held that it was not 
invalid under the Contract Clause. The Court noted, first, that "[t]he threshold 
inquiry is 'whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment 
of a contractual relationship. '" It went on to say that "[tJhe severity of the 
impairment is said to increase the level of scrutiny to which the legislation will be 
subjected," or "the height of the hurdle the state legislation must clear." In 
detennining the extent of the impainnent, it is relevant that the industry which the 
complaining party has entered has or has not been regulated in the past. 
If the answer to the threshold inquiry is that the state regulation does indeed 
constitute a substantial impairment, the state "must have a significant and 
legitimate public purpose behind the regulation," so that there is some guarantee 
that the state "is exercising its police power, rather than providing a benefit. to 
special interests." Finally, once a legitimate public purpose has been identified, 
the reviewing court must determine "whether the adjustment of 'the rights and 
responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon reasonable conditions and 
[is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifYing [the legislation'S] 
adoption. '" 
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Quatros, 800 P.2d at 192 (citations omitted). The Quatros court allowed the legislation to stand, 
because it did not effect the underlying debt and because the banking industry is highly 
regulated, thus the impainnent was slight. Even though the impainnent was slight, the court still 
found it necessary to evaluate the public purpose, though it need not be too pressing; the court 
conc1udedthat promoting the alienability of land was a public purpose, and that the legislation 
was appropriately tailored to that end. Id 
Thus, the RUI and Quatros decisions illuminate how the modern Contract Clause is to be 
applied, both with respect to analyzing the U.S. Constitution's Contract Clause and a parallel 
state constitutional provision. This modern analysis should also be employed in this matter. 
B. The repeal of Idaho Code § 72-915 was constitutional under both the Idaho and U.S. 
Constitutions. 
1. The Idaho Legislature has not operated a substantial impainnent of a contractual 
relationship. 
In analy~ng a claim that the Contract Clause has been violated, "[t]he threshold inquiry 
is 'whether the state has, in fact, operated a substantial impainnent of a contractual 
relationship.'" RUI One Corp.v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d at 1147; accord, Quatros, 800 P.2d 
at 192 ("[t]he threshold inquiry is 'whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial 
impainnent of a contractual relationship. ",) (emphasis added) (quoting Energy Reserves Group, 
Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co .. 459 U.S. 400 (1983)). "The threshold inquiry ... itselfhas 
three components: 'whether there is a contractual relationship, whether a change in law impairs 
that contractual relationship, and whether the impainnent is substantial." Id 
As discussed herein, plaintiffs cannot meet any of these mandatory elements. . 
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a. There is no contractual right to dividends in the SIF workers' 
compensation policies and, therefore, plaintiffs are unable to establish 
the Contract Clause was violated. 
"The first sub-inquiry is not whether any contractual relationship whatsoever exists 
between the parties, but whether there was a 'contractual agreement regarding the specific ... 
terms allegedly at issue.m RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d at 1147 (emphasis 
added). In the present case, there is no contractual right to a dividend under a SIF workers' 
compensation policy. Critical to this evaluation is the fact that here, plaintiffs' dividend claim is 
not an express tenn of the insurance policy, but instead emanates from a statute written by the 
Legislature in exercising its authority to create a workers' compensation scheme and the SIF. 
In this case, Idaho employers who purchase their worker's compensation insurance from 
the SIF receive a contract of insurance which sets forth the parameters of their coverage. (See 
Lojek Aff., at Exh. A.) The contract of insurance does not provide for the payment of a dividend 
to the policyholders in fact nowhere does it even address dividends. In an attempt to get 
around the inescapable fact that dividends are not mentioned in any way, shape or form in each 
SIF policyholder's contract for insurance with the SIP, plaintiffs instead point to Kelso's 
statement that "the contract necessarily incorporates the statutory framework with both created 
the SIF and governs the actions that can be taken by the SIF with regard to the SIF's funds." 
Kelso, 134 Idaho at 138. This argument fails for several key reasons. 
First, Idaho has expressly rejected the "reasonable expectations doctrine" as a means for 
interpreting insurance policies. See Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 138 Idaho 443, 450, 65 
P.3d 184, 191 (2003) (citing Ryals v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 134 Idaho 302, 1 P.3d 803 
(2000)); Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 600 P.2d 1387 (1979). The "reasonable 
expectations doctrine" is an insurance policy interpretation tool that allows for consideration of 
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the "reasonable expectations" of an insured as to what coverage an insurance policy affords. See 
generally Corgatelli v. Globe Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 616,619-20,533 P.2d 737 (1975). 
However, as explained by the Ryals Court in rejecting the reasonable expectations doctrine: 
Ryals invites this Court to overrule precedent and adopt the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations. This result would preclude any further contract analysis as Ryals 
certainly expected to be covered while driving in New York. We decline the 
invitation. We have previously rejected the reasonable expectations doctrine in 
favor of traditional rules of contract construction. Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 
100 Idaho 505, 508-09, 600 P.2d 1387, 1390-91 (1979). The traditional rules of 
contract construction avoid the danger of a court creating a new contract between 
the parties by relying on the notion of reasonable expectations. Casey, 100 Idaho 
at 509, 600 P.2d at 1391. We find no reason to revisit that holding. 
Ryals, 134 Idaho at 304. 
In addition, even if the policyholders' expectations are considered, which they should not 
be given the state of Idaho law, the governing statutes for the SIF do not guarantee payments of 
dividends to policyholders, nor do they set forth that the policyholders have a property interest in 
the surplus or assets of the SIF. See generally Idaho Code § 72-901 et seq. In fact, the Idaho 
Supreme Court previously concluded the SIF's statutory framework does not create any property 
rights in the SIPs policyholders and no right to a dividend. Kelso, 134 Idaho at 135 
("Consequently, Kelso does not have [a] vested property interest in the assets of the SIF simply 
because the SIF operates much like a private mutual insurance company."). 
Moreover, plaintiffs cannot paint a right to a strict pro rata dividend distribution as some 
variety of expected or vested contractual right that has been disrupted by retroactive application 
because SIF dividends have not previously been paid pro rata. Second, any change in the law 
created by Farber was promptly remedied by the Idaho legislature even before any remittitur in 
Farber issued. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utility Commission of Texas, 615 
S.W.2d 947, 956-57 (Texas Civ. App. 1981) ("In determining whether a retroactive statute 
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impairs or destroys vested rights, the most important inquiries are (1) whether the public interest 
is advanced or retarded, (2) whether the retroactive provision gives effect to or defeats the bona 
fide intentions or reasonable expectations of affected persons, and (3) whether the statute 
surprises persons who have long relied on a contrary state of the law."). 
Courts will look to whether a reasonable expectation in a particular 'right' has developed 
based upon past expectation; where no such expectation existed based upon contrary past 
practices, courts have been loath to find a reasonable expectation that is then disrupted by a 
change in the law. This critical legal principle is well described in the Boykin v. Boeing Co. 128 
F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 1997) and In Re Marriage of Giroux, 704 P.2d 160 (Wash.App. 1984), 
discussed below. 
In Boykin v. Boeing Co., supra, the 9th Circuit addressed the question of disturbing 
vested rights in the context of an overtime dispute. In Boykin, the Washington State Court of 
Appeals had held that payment of overtime on an hourly basis defeated a claim that an employee 
was exempt, in a decision named Tift. 128 F.3d at 1282. In response to Tift, the Washington 
Legislature passed retroactive, emergency legislation to state that "[t]he payment of 
compensation or provision of compensatory time off in addition to a salary shall not be a factor 
in determining whether a person is exempted[.)" ld. Employees involved in litigation regarding 
exempt status argued, in turn, that the legislature's retroactive legislation disturbed their vested 
rights as emanating from Tift. Id. The 9th Circuit rejected this argument finding that the 
retroactive application of the Senate Bill did not defeat any reasonabI~ expectation of the 
plaintiffs in the lawsuit: 
The employees next argue that the retroactive application of Senate Bill 6029 
impairs their vested rights under the Washington Constitution. A vested right is 
"an immediate, fixed right of present or future enjoyment." Gillis v. King County, 
42 Wash.2d 373, 377, 255 P.2d 546 (1953) (quotation omitted). In order for a 
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vested right to be entitled to protection from legislation, it "must be something 
more than a mere expectation based upon an anticipated continuance of the 
existing law." Washington v. Hennings, 129 Wash.2d 512, 528, 919 P.2d 580 
(1996) (quotation and citation omitted). The proper inquiry in determining the 
constitutionality of retroactive legislation is "whether a party has changed position 
in reliance upon the previous law or whether the retroactive law defeats the 
reasonable expectations of the parties." ld. at 528-29, 919 P.2d 580. 
The employees have not changed position in reliance upon Tift: As Boeing notes, 
at issue in this case are primarily the 1992-1994 compensation practices at 
Boeing; Tift was not announced until 1995. Further, retroactive application of 
Senate Bill 6029 does not defeat any reasonable expectations of the employees. 
The employees governed by the SPEEA collective bargaining agreement cannot 
claim any expectations from the terms of their contract, as it provides for overtime 
compensation at a rate less than time and one-half. Moreover, none of the 
employees had expectations, under the MW A, to overtime pay at a rate of time 
and one-half prior to Tift. 
ld. at 1283. 
In a Washington appellate case entitled In Re Marriage of Giroux, supra, the court 
examined whether or not a "vested right" had been disturbed following a change in military 
pension law. Military retirement pensions were traditionally considered community property. 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), that 
federal law prohibited states from dividing military pensions as community property. The 
Girouxes' divorce was decided under McCarty, and Rose Giroux was denied any part of her 
husband's pension. In response, however, Congress passed the Services Former Spouses' 
Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408, restoring courts' right to divide pensions as community 
property. Rose Giroux sued for relief from her divorce judgment. James Giroux argued that 
upsetting the divorce settlement by retroactive application of the Congress' change in the law 
would disturb his vested rights, an argument rejected by the Washington Court of Appeals 
because Mr. Giroux had no reasonable expectation that his military pension would not be treated 
as community property: 
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James Giroux argues that even if Congress intended the Act to be retroactive, 
retroactive application deprives him, without due process of law, of his vested 
right to the pension payments. He claims that his right to the pension vested when 
the amended decree became final. However, to determine the constitutionality of 
retroactive legislation, the proper inquiry is not whether vested rights have been 
interfered with, but whether "settled expectations honestly arrived at with respect 
to substantial interests" will be defeated. 2 C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 41.05, at 261 (4th ed. 1973). 
An argument similar to James Giroux's was made to this court in In re Santore, 
28 Wash. App. 319, 623 P.2d 702 (1981). After the unintentional repeal of a 
statute permitting adoption by written consent of natural parents, the Legislature 
passed former RCW 26.32.916 with provisions for retroactivity. The Santores 
then sought to regain custody after having consented to the adoption of their child. 
They argued that the statute retroactively interfere[dJ with their "vested rights/' in 
violation of the due process and contract clauses of the federal and state 
constitutions, by making effective Mrs. Santore's consent to adoption, which was 
ineffective under the law existing when the consent was executed . . . . In re 
Santore, supra at 324, 623 P.2d 702. The court held: 
The proper test of the constitutionality of retroactive legislation is 
whether a party has changed position in reliance upon the previous law 
or whether the retroactive law defeats the reasonable expectations of the 
parties, not whether the law abrogates a "vested right," which is merely a 
conclusory label. Curative laws, such as RCW 26.32.916, which 
implement the original intentions of affected parties are constitutional 
because there is no injustice in retroactively depriving a person of a right 
that was created contrary to his expectations at the time he entered into 
the transaction from which the right arose. 
(Citations omitted.) In re Santore, supra at 324,623 P.2d 702. 
Applying the test adopted in Santore to the case at bar, it is difficult to see how 
retroactive application of the Act would defeat the reasonable expectations of the 
parties. Throughout their marriage, and until the McCarty decision, the Girouxs 
could reasonably have expected that James Giroux's military pension would be 
treated as community property by the courts of this state. Only after the McCarty 
decision could the husband have reasonably expected to receive as his separate 
property what was formerly almost all of the couple's community property. 
Retroactive application of the Act cannot be said to be unfair or unreasonable. 
Recognizing the important contribution of the military spouse to our national 
defense, "that frequent change-of-station moves and the special pressures placed 
on the military spouse as a homemaker make it extremely difficult to pursue a 
career affording economic security, job skills and pension protection", Congress 
intended that the "status of the military spouse be acknowledged, supported and 
protected." 1982 U.S. Code Congo and Ad. News, at 1601. 
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Id. at 162-63. 
In the present case, the SIP policyholders could not have had a reasonable expectation 
that dividends would be paid on a pro rata basis because the dividend methodology - not one 
based on a pro rata basis - employed by the· SIF has been employed for many years. (Alcorn 
Aff., ~ 25.) Prior to the Farber decision, the SIF policyholders did not receive a strict pro rata 
share of the declared dividends. (Alcorn Afl, ~ 25.) The Farber decision announced an 
interpretation ofl.C. § 72-915 that the Legislature itself did not intend for the statute, as borne 
out by S.B. 1 166a's Statement of purpose.6 Indeed, even before the Idaho Supreme Court's 
Order Denying Petition for Rehearing (May 12, 2009) and subsequent Remittitur (May 27, 
2009), the repeal of Idaho Code § 72-915 was put into effect. (Counsel Aff., Exhs. C & F.) 
Thus, even after the Farber decision, no expectation in pro rata distribution of declared dividends 
could reasonably have been contemplated by SIF policyholders, given that I.C. § 72-915 was 
repealed even before the Idaho Supreme Court had finished with the Farber appeal. Thus, here, 
an SIF policyholder could have only reasonably expected to receive dividends in pro rata fashion 
after the Farber decision - and even then, the law was immediately changed by the Idaho 
legislature before the remittitur was ever issued. 
Accordingly, there is no contractual right to dividends, and a legislative change to the 
statute governing the methodology for distribution of dividends does not implicate a tenn of the 
SIF insurance policy. 
6 It is also significant to point out that since the significant statutory amendments of 1998, the SIF has been squarely 
under the regulatory authority of the Department of Insurance, and is deemed, for the purposes of regulation, a 
mutual insurer. See I.C. §72-90J. Since 1998, however, the SIF has never been subject to any regulatory action by 
the Department of Insurance as a result of its dividend practices, further demonstrating that the Farber decision 
offered a view of Idaho Code §72-915 that was not even shared by the State of Idaho's own insurance regulatory 
authority. 
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b. The repeal 0/ L C. § 72-915 was not a change in law that impaired the 
contractual relationship between SIF and its policyholders. 
Even were the Court to determine that SIF's statutory provisions are necessarily part of 
each policyholders' contract for insurance with the SIF - which it should not given the above 
analysis - the policy expressly puts the policyholder on notice that the policy will conform with 
the law. The policy expressly provides: 
Terms of this insurance that conflict with the workers compensation law are 
changed by this statement to conform to this law. 
(Lojek Aff., Exh. A, at p. 2.) Thus, an SIF policyholder is on notice from the commencement of 
coverage that the terms of the policy are governed by statutes, and are subject to amendment at 
any time by a .change in the law. As such, even were the court to determine a dividend 
methodology may be a term of the contract by virtue of statute, that term expressly emanates 
from statute, and is subject to change at any time by the Legislature, which is expressly outlined 
in the policy. Accord, National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 
470 U.S. 451, 466, 105 S.Ct. 1441, 1451 (l985)("Policies, unlike contracts, are inherently 
subject to revision and repeal, and to construe laws as contracts when the obligation is not clearly 
and unequivocally expressed would be to limit drastically the essential powers of a legislative 
body."). A repeal of I.C. § 72w915 (or, more specifically, the lack of a statute mandating a . 
particular dividend methodology), then, would be automatically incorporated into the policy, and 
no "impairment" would exist. Moreover, as discussed above, there is no expectation being 
impaired, as SIF policyholders had no expectation of a pro rata dividend under I.C. § 72-915 
given it was retroactively repealed before the Farber case was remitted to the district court. 
Thus, no impairment to any contra~tual right is implicated by the change in the law -
rather, only at best a statutory policy term wholly subject to Legislative change. 
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c. The SIF policies were not "substantially impaired. " 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the right to a particular dividend methodology is a 
statutory provision that becomes a term of a workers' compensation contract, and that the repeal 
effectuated some kind of impairment, a repeal of the statute governing such methodology would 
not constitute a "substantial" impairment to the SIF policy, a necessary showing under a Contract 
Clause analysis. 
"The Contracts Clause provides protection against 'substantial' impairments of the 
obligation of contract only. A finding of minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end 
the court's inquiry." 16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 776 (2010). Similarly, 
[I]n determining the extent of the impairment, a reviewing court may also 
consider "whether the" industry the complaining party has entered has been 
regulated in the pase' Id For, "where a complaining party enters a contractual 
relationship in a heavily regulated industry, expectations of further regulation of 
that industry may lessen the severity of a subsequent impainnent of that party's 
contractual rights and obligations." Segura [v. Frank], ... 630 So.2d [714,] 730. 
State v. All Property and Cas. Ins. Carriers Authorized and Licensed To Do Business In State, 
937 So.2d 313 (La. 2006); see also U.S. for Use and Benefit of Midwest Steel & Iron Words Co. 
v. Henly, 117 F. Supp. 928, 930-31 (D. Idaho 1954) (stating that "[a)s has been stated in 
numerous decisions, all contracts are entered into with the understanding that the reserve power 
of the state to pass laws for the general welfare may be invoked at any time and therefore if the 
legislature in the proper exercise of that power is convinced that the public good demands that an 
insurance company unsuccessfully resisting payment should pay attorneys' fees, there is no 
constitutional objection to their doing so."); accord Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim, 829 A.2d 611, 625 
(Md. 2003) (holding that retroactive abolition of child-parent immunity in tort action involving 
motor vehicle such that insurer was required to pay on mother's behalf did not impair insurance 
contract, since both insurance industry and field of tort law are heavily regulated, change was "in 
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the wind" for some period of time, and there was no evidence of significant economic impact on 
Allstate or any other insurer); Hawkeye Commodity Promotions, Inc. v. Miller, 432 F.Supp.2d 
822, 846-49 (Iowa 2006) (holding that statute making it illegal for retailers to offer certain 
gaming machines did not violate constitution because although the impairment was substantial, 
i.e., a total wipeout, the state had the right to terminate the contract at any time and the 
impairment was thus foreseeable). 
In regard to workers' compensation policies issued by the SIF, the overarching purpose 
of such policies is not to potentially allow a fractional return on paid premiums, depending on 
whether the SIF Manager, in his statutorily-authorized discretion, declares a dividend. Instead, 
the core, fundamental function and purpose of worker's compensation coverage (which is 
required by Idaho law, see generally I.C. §§72-201 et seq.) is to provide coverage for covered 
worker injuries (and, under Part 2, additional $100,000 in coverage for employer liability, or in a 
greater amount as may be desired by the policyholder) to its policyholder regardless of the 
premium size. Thus, assuming there is a covered loss, the SIF policy provides a $300 
policyholder (and any policyholder under or above that amount) with the same amount of upper 
, 
coverage as a $500,000 policyholder. The repeal of I.C. § 72-915 does nothing to alter, in any 
way, the purpose of the workers' compensation policy; it merely grants the SIF Manager the 
discretion to pay declared discretionary dividends in a fashion that complies with the statutory 
directive that SIF be an "efficient insurance company, remain[ ... J actuarially sound and 
maintain[ ... J the public purposes for which the state insurance fund was created." I.C. § 72-
901(3). Altering the way the SIF Manager pays out dividends to particular policyholders, then, 
does not constitute a "substantial" impairment to the parties' contract ofinsurance.7 
1 Indeed, even the amount declared as dividends, as a percentage of premiums, is not "substantial." For the 6 years 
in which dividends were declared between December 2003 and December 2008, the average dividend was only 
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Moreover, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the repeal effectuated a "substantial 
impairment" on the insurance polices between SIF and the policyholders based upon the 
limitations of their own Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs do not, and cannot, contend that their 
claims in this action are applicable to all policyholders paying in excess of $2,500 in premiums 
for the years at issue. In years where SIP elected to not distribute dividends to those 
policyholders below a certain paid premium level ($2,500, as was the subject of the Farber 
action), the dividends declared were, instead, redirected to policyholders of more than $2,500 in 
premiums - thus, certain of those larger policyholders received dividends that were larger than 
what their pro rata share would have been under Idaho Code § 72-915. In fact, plaintiffs' own 
complaint even seeks to exclude those same certain policyholders from this action: 
For some or all of the Dividend Periods falling within the Class Period, the 
Plaintiffs and the members of the Class purchased a worker's compensation 
insurance policy from the Fund, were billed annual premiums which were in 
excess of $2,500.00, retained each such policy for at least 6 months, and for each 
such Dividend Period, did not receive an amount which was equal to or greater 
than a pro rata share of the dividend distributed by the Fund. 
The Class shall include, for each of the Dividend Periods during the Class Period 
as to which a dividend was or may be distributed. all Idaho employers who: ... 
(d) did not or may not, with respect to the Dividend Period in which the policy 
was acquired, receive a dividend which was at least equal to a pro rata share of 
the total amount of dividend being distributed[.] 
Amended Complaint at" 13 & 15. 
Plaintiffs' efforts to nullify the repeal of I.C. § 72-915, then, is not predicated on the 
claim that all policyholders' rights were "impaired" by the repeal, but only that certain 
policyholders were. In fact, a nullification of the repeal - whether its retroactive application, its 
5.8582% of paid premiums, ranging from 3.9191% to 9.0304%. Counsel Aff., at Exh. E, pp. 7-8. Thus, a pro-rata 
share under Idaho Code § 72-9 I 5 for the dividend declared in December 2003 for a policyholder paying $10,000.00 
in annual premiums would have been $391.91. 
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prospective application, or both - would actually adversely impact dividend payments to certain 
policyholders, by either potentially creating a right in SIF for recoupment of dividend 
overpayments, or by restricting their ability to secure a larger dividend as the SIF Manager may, 
in his discretion, determine is appropriate for those policyholders based upon premium level and 
other factors, including individual policyholders' losses. 
As such, given that the repeal ofLC. § 72-915 does not impact the purpose of the SIP's 
workers' compensation policies in the slightest, and given that plaintiffs cannot even contend 
that all policyholders are impacted by the change in the law (which some policyholders will, in 
fact, benefit from), plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the repeal "substantially impaired" their 
contracts of insurance with SIF. 
2. The State has a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the repeal of I.C. 
§ 72-915. 
Even if the threshold showing - a substantial impairment of contractual relationship IS 
met, the Court must then inquire "whether 'the State, in justification, [has] a significant and 
legitimate public purpose behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general 
social or economic problem,' to guarantee that 'the State is exercising its police power, rather 
than providing a benefit to special interests.'" RUt 371 F.3d at 1147. Thus, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that there lacked a legitimate public purpose behind the repeal ofI.C. § 72-915. 
Of ~ourse, the legitimate public purpose behind the repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is bome out 
by the Legislature's Statement of Purpose and Fiscal Note to S.B. 1166, as amended. (Counsel 
Aff., Exh. C.) There, the Legislature stated: 
Repeal of Idaho Code Section 72-915 will serve to offset an adverse decision of 
the Idaho Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of Idaho Code Section 72-
915 which could subject the State Insurance Fund to pay dividends on policies 
that are not financially profitable, thereby restricting the Fund's ability to reduce 
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premiums and pay dividends to profitable policyholders. The proposed repeal of 
Idaho Code 72-915 will clarify the law regarding the payment of dividends by the 
State Insurance Fund by making it clear that in passing House Bill 774aa in 1998, 
it was the intent of the legislature to have the State Insurance Fund operate like an 
efficient insurance company subject to regulation under Title 41, Idaho Code, 
including the dividend provision set forth in Title 41, Chapter 28, Idaho Code. 
Repeal of the law effective April 3, 1998 is necessary because on that date laws 
were enacted which subjected the State Insurance Fund to regulation under the 
Insurance Code, Title 41 of the Idaho Code. This legislation will allow the State 
Insurance Fund to issue dividends in the same manner as other insurance 
companies operating within the State ofIdaho. 
Id. 8 In turn, the repeal's Fiscal Note emphasized the financial uncertainly faced by SIF in light 
of the Court's ruling: 
fd. 
- The State of Idaho and public entities, which are insured by the State Insurance 
Fund, face losing all or part of their future dividends and deviations as a result of 
uncertainties as to the effect of a recent Supreme Court decision. Based on 
dividends and rate reduction deviations provided by the State Insurance Fund over 
the past two years, that number could exceed $5,000,000 annually. Private 
businesses may also, due to the same uncertainties, experience the loss of future 
dividends and deviations since, according to the Court's decision, the Fund has no 
option when distributing dividends, other than to use a pro rata formula. 
The public purpose of the SIF is well-established. The SIF is a "creature of statute, ... 
limited to the power and authority granted to it by the legislature." Kelso, 134 Idaho at 135. In 
particular, the SIF was created "for the purpose of insuring employers against liability for 
compensation under this worker's compensation law . .. and of securing to the persons entitled 
thereto the compensation provided by said laws." I.C. § 72-901(1). In structuring the SIF, the 
Legislature determined it should be "created as an independent body corporate politic" and 
derive its financial well-being from "premiums and penalties received," "property and securities 
8 Of course, even in the absence of such a legislative statement as to a particular decision by the Idaho Supreme 
Court: "[s]tatutes are construed under the assumption that the legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal 
preceden[t] at the time the statute was passed." State. ex reI. Wasden v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, --' 224 P.3d 
1109, 1118 (Idaho 2010)(quoting Druffel v. State, Dep't of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002»); accord 
Smith v. Washington County, _ Idaho -----.J _ P.3d --' 2010 WL 3895341 (Idaho, October 6,2010) ("We 
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acquired," and "of interest earned" thereon. I.C. § 72-901(1). The Board of the SIF9 is 
instructed to "direct the policies and operations of the state insurance fund to assure that [it] is 
run as an efficient insurance company, remains actuarially sound and maintains the public 
purposes for which (it] was created." I.e. § 72-901(3) (emphasis added). The money 
generated is deposited with the state treasurer, who acts as custodian for the SIF; however, "[t]he 
money in the fund does not belong to the state ... [the money is held by the treasurer] ... for the 
contributing employers and the beneficiaries of the compensation law, and for the payment of the 
costs of the operation of the fund." State ex reI. Williams v. Musgrave, 84 Idaho at 84. 
Additionally, I.e. § 72-913 directs that premiums be set "at the lowest possible rate 
consistent with the maintenance of a solvent state insurance fund and the creation of a reasonable 
surplus and reserve." Public corporations are required to first attempt to insure through the SIF, 
unless declined as a matter of risk or if they opt to self-insure. I.C. § 72-928(a); City of Boise v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 129 Idaho 906, 935 P.2d 169 (1997). SIF's own stated underwriting policy 
requires that "It is the policy of the Idaho State Insurance Fund (ISIF) to offer insurance 
coverage to all Idaho employers who are required, by Idaho Code, to obtain workers 
compensation insurance on their Idaho employees and who are willing to comply with 
reasonable business tenns and conditions," subject to limited circumstances where an employer 
may be cancelled, non-renewed, or refused to quote. (Alcorn Aff., Exh. A.)(emphasis added). 
Further, the SIF is also statutorily required to administer workers' compensation claims 
for the Idaho National Guard, but is forbidden from collecting premiums or otherwise charging 
for such administration - in effect, serving as the Idaho National Guard's third-party 
presume that when it amended § 12-117(1), the Legislature was aware of the prevailing judicial interpretation of that 
statute and specifically chose to change that interpretation."). 
9 Note, again, that the SIF Board is comprised of individuals appointed by the Governor, two of whom are required 
to be sitting legislators. I.e. § 72-901(2). 
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administrator for free. I.e. § 72~928(b). Thus, it is clear that the SIF "serves a 'public 
purpose.'" State ex reI. Williams v. Musgrave, 84 Idaho at 85; accord Board of County Com'rs 
of Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Facilities Authority, 96 Idaho 498, 502, 531 P.2d 588, 592 
(1974) ("Thus, no entity created by the state can engage in activities that do not have primarily a 
public, rather than a private purpose, nor can it finance or aid any such activity."). 
Moreover, the very requirement of workers' compensation is, itself, an express exercise 
of the police power of the State: 
DECLARATION OF POLICE POWER. The common law system governing the 
remedy of workmen against employers for injuries received and occupational 
diseases contracted in industrial and public work is inconsistent with modem 
industrial conditions. The welfare of the state depends upon its industries and 
even more upon the welfare of its wageworkers. The state of Idaho, therefore, 
exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of the 
premises are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for 
injured workmen and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless 
of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or 
compensation, except hs is otherwise provided in this act, and to that end all civil 
actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of 
the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished, except as is in this 
law provided. 
LC. § 72-201. 
Accordingly, given the Legislature's inherent control over an entity which is purely a 
creature of statute and which serves a public purpose, as well as its inherent police power to 
involve itself in matters of workers' compensation coverage, the Legislature's exercise of 
legislative control over statutes governing such constitutes a legitimate public purpose. 
Particular as to the repeal of I.C. § 72-915, the reasons were clear: the Farber ruling, which 
conflicted with years of dividend practices by the SIF and the "intent of the legislature to have 
the State Insurance Fund operate like an efficient insurance company subject to regulation under 
Title 41, Idaho Code, including the dividend provision set forth in Title 41, Chapter 28, Idaho 
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Code," "could subject the State Insurance Fund to pay dividends on policies that are not 
financially profitable, thereby restricting the Fund's ability to reduce premiums and pay 
dividends to profitable policyholders." (Counsel Aff., Exh. C, Statement of Purpose.) Note, 
again, in that this is especially critical in light of the absence of the "safety net" for policyholders 
afforded by the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association, which SIF is forbidden from being a 
member thereof. (Alcorn Aff., ~15; I.C. § 72-901(4». 
Further, another financial risk in not correcting the interpretation of the Idaho Supreme 
Court was direct financial impact to public coffers: "[t]he State of Idaho and public entities, 
which are insured by the State Insurance Fund, face losing all or part of their future dividends 
and deviations as a result of uncertainties as to the effect of a recent Supreme Court decision. 
Based on dividends and rate reduction deviations provided by the State Insurance Fund over the 
past two years, that number could exceed $5,000,000 annually." (Id, Fiscal Note.) In doing so, 
the Legislature made clear that its intent was to allow the SIF - the largest workers' 
compensation carrier in the State of Idaho - to compete with private insurers that were not under 
the constraints of dividend requirements defined by the Farber court in analyzingl.C. § 72-915 -
"This legislation win allow the State Insurance Fund to issue dividends in the same manner as 
other insurance companies operating within the State ofIdaho."IO 
Thus, even if the repeal ofI.C. § 72-915 constituted a substantial impairment on the SIF 
policy with its policyholder, the Legislature had a legitimate public purpose behind the repeal, as 
demonstrated by its Statement of Purpose, Fiscal Note, its statutory authority over the SIF, and 
its exercise of police power in the realm of workers' compensation insurance. 
10 Certainly, in 1998, the Idaho Legislature intended to place the SIF on equal footing with private insurers: "Finally, 
in the 1998 amendments to the SIF's statutes, I.C. §72-901(4) was added to make it clear the SIF is subject to, and 
must comply with, the provisions of the Idaho insurance code. That provision also states '[f]or purposes of 
regulation, the state insurance fund shall be deemed to be a mutual insurer.'" Kelso. ) 34 Idaho at 134. 
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3. The adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of SIF and its policyholders, if 
any, is based upon reasonable. conditions and is of a character appropriate to the 
public purpose justifying the repeal ofI.C. § 72~915. 
Again assuming arguendo that the Legislature caused a substantial impairment of a 
contractual right, not only are plaintiffs unable to show that the Legislature lacked a significant 
public purpose in repealing I.C. § 72-915, they are unable to show that any adjustment of the 
rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties is not based upon reasonable conditions and 
is not of a character appropriate to the public purpose. 
The repeal of I.C. § 72-915 is a narrow repeal, only impacting a discretionary dividend 
that is merely incidental to the core function of plaintiffs' policies. In addition, the repeal has no 
impact on the express terms of the policies, and the right to a dividend has not been abolished 
altogether. The law has merely been changed to conform with the methodology for calculating 
dividends that the Manager has used for years. 
Finally, any adjustment is of a character appropriate to the public purpose behind the 
. 
repeal. As noted by the Legislature'S Fiscal Note, the cost of reading the repeal as 
unconstitutional could drain upwards of $5,000,000 from the public coffers. By contrast, the 
Manager's current method of calculating dividends results in the SIF remaining competitive and 
efficient and able to offer workers' compensation coverage to Idaho employers at the lowest 
premium rate. In short, plaintiffs cannot show that any adjustment to the rights of the parties is 
not based upon reasonable conditions or inappropriate to the character of the public purpose 
behind the repeal. 
c. Plaintiffs' cited authority is unavailing. 
In support of plaintiffs' Motion, plaintiffs cite a handful ofIdaho cases in support of their 
contention that the repeal of Idaho Code § 72-915 was unconstitutional under the Idaho 
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Constitution. Plaintiffs ultimately fail to make discussion of how these cases interact with the 
correct test under the Contract Clause, or that Idaho courts employ a Contract Clause analy,sis 
different from that employed by the federal courts regarding the U.S. Constitution's Contract 
Clause. See, e.g., State v. Korn, 148 Idaho at 413 (claim made under Contract Clause of both 
U.S. and state constitutions; no indication that separate tests apply). Further, the issues in the 
cited authority have little bearing on the issue currently before the Court. 
In In re Fidelity State Bank of Orofino, 35 Idaho 797, 209 P. 449 (1922), the Legislature 
passed a law providing that unless a district's deposit is made as a special deposit, the district has 
only the same priority as other depositors, changing banks' prior status as beneficiaries with 
vested rights. Id at 451-52. Thus, the change in the legal landscape in Fidelity completely 
altered the material relationship of the parties, from being bailor and bailee to being creditor and 
debtor. Id In other words, the ultimate material condition of the contract, the relationship of the 
parties, would have been wholly altered. By contrast, the repeal in this case has no affect 
whatsoever on the contractual relationship of the parties. The parties were, prior to the repeal, 
insured and insurer. After the repeal, they remain so. Fidelity is thus inapt. I1 
Penrose v. Commercial Travelers Ins. Co., 75 Idaho 524,275 P.2d 969 (1954) is a murky 
decision, wherein the lead decision contains discussion of why a new statute creating attorneys' 
fees rights in insureds was constitutional, with three subsequent concurrences then asserting that 
the statute impaired existing contracts. However, the Penrose decision has been reeled in by 
later decisions, clarifying that retroactive legislation, even as applied to existing contracts, is not 
II Plaintiffs, in discussing Fidelity, point to language in Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy. 71 U.S. 535, 1866 WL 
9440 (l866), which is cited in Fidelity. However, as the Los Quatros court explained, the 1866 Von Hoffman 
decision is not "the last word on the subject": "[M]uch water has flowed over the dam since Von Hoffman, and so 
we prefer to apply more modem Contract Clause analysis in deciding whether or not to invalidate this statute in this 
case." 800 P2d at 191. The Court went on to cite and discuss more recent refmements by the U.S. Supreme Court 
on Contract Clause analysis. Id. at 191-192 & n.lO. 
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per se unconstitutional. In Eriksen v. Blue Cross ofIdaho Health Services, Inc., the Idaho Court 
of Appeals clarified that "[b ]ecause the statute shifted the balance of power between contracting 
parties, by identifying a favored party in the event of litigation, the Supreme Court barred its 
application to pre-existing contracts." 116 Idaho 693, 696, 778 P.2d 815, 818 (Ct. App.1989). 
Thus, the Eriksen Court narrowed Penrose to scenarios where a statutory change would "affected 
bargaining relationships by designating favored parties," characterizing the Penrose decision as 
resting upon a "policy rationale." ld This explanation by the Idaho Court of Appeals was later 
confirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Authority, 122 Idaho 471, 
835 P.2d 1282 (1992). As discussed above, however, the repeal ofIdaho Code § 72-915 did not 
impact the "bargaining relationships" between the parties, but rather maintained the status quo of 
dividend practices in accord with the Idaho Legislature's intent. Further, the policy needs of the 
repeal of Idaho Code § 72-915, outlined above, were not at issue in Penrose and, applied here, 
demonstrate that the repeal complies with the Contract Clause. Tellingly, this later discussion of 
Penrose by the Idaho appellate courts is not cited by plaintiffs. 
Agricultural Products Corp. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 98 Idaho 23, 557 P.2d 617 
(1976) is another decision cited by plaintiffs, but for which actually supports SIF's position. In 
that case, the Court held that: 
Contracts of any sort are protected by the Idaho Constitution, which provides in Article 
I, s 16 that no 'law impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed.' Any 
contract is thus assured some measure of protection from governmental interference. In 
determining the status of public utility contracts, and the ability of the Public Utilities 
Commission to alter the terms of such contracts, it is important to remember the special 
protected status given any contract by the constitution. 
On the other hand, the state has a well established right to regulate public utilities. 
This court held in Sandpoint Water and Light Co., Ltd., v. City of Sandpoint, 31 Idaho 
498, 173 P. 972 (1918): 
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'It is held uniformly and universally that the power to supervise and regulate rates 
or charges for services rendered by public utilities is an inherent function of 
government, and occupies a large place within the domain of the police powers of 
the state.' 31 Idaho 498, 501, 173 P. 972, 973. 
Pursuant to that power, it has been settled that the state may fix rates for a public 
utility service which will supersede rates previously fixed by private contract. 
Interference with private contracts by the state regulation of rates is a valid exercise of 
the police power, and such regulation is not a violation of the constitutional prohibition 
against impairment of contractual obligations. A Public Utility Commission may thus 
annul or supersede contract rates between utilities and their customers. Private 
contracts with utilities are regarded as entered into subject to reserved authority 
of the state to modify the contract in the public interest. 
ld at 29, 557 P.2d at 622~623 (citations omitted)(emphases added). Again, the Legislature's 
judgment that the repeal was necessary to the vitality of ISIF is conclusive in this matter, and 
given the significant and important public realm that the workers' compensation scheme and 
State Insurance Fund operate within (as discussed above), plaintiffs' absolutist view of the 
Contract Clause is simply not borne out. 
Similar to the question posed in Agricultural Products, the Idaho Court of Appeals mulled 
the question of whether ordinances could impose fees upon existing franchises in the later 
decision of City of Hayden v. Washington Water Power Co., 108 Idaho 467, 700 P.2d 89 (Cl 
App. 1985). There, while rejecting the particular fees at issue, the Court took pains to indicate 
that the State had the authority to act pursuant to its police power, even if it impacted existing 
contracts: "We do not suggest, of course, that a municipality never may impose new burdens 
upon an existing franchise grantee. A city has the inherent right to enact valid police power 
regulations, even if contracts are thereby affected." ld at 469. Thus, the police power exception 
to the constitutional proscription against impairing contracts could be considered to those acts 
"promoting the health, comfort, safety and general welfare of society." ld. In the present case, 
as discussed above, the Statement of Purpose in the repeal of Idaho Code § 72-915 emphasized 
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that the repeal was need to accurately reflect the "intent of the legislature to have the State 
Insurance Fund operate like an efficient insurance company" in fulfilling its public purpose 
under Idaho's workers' compensation scheme (itself a creature of an exercise of the state's police 
power). 
The decision in Steward v. Nelson. 54 Idaho 437,32 P.2d 843 (1934) can be categorized 
as an "easy" Contract Clause case. In that case, the Idaho legislature passed two statutes which 
attempted to limit the amount of time in which a mortgage could be foreclosed, irrespective of 
the life of the debt that the mortgage was securing. The effect, then, was to deprive the plaintiff 
mortgage-holders of the right to foreclose on the mortgages after a certain period of time. The 
Court readily found that the law effectively obliterated the intent of the mortgages. 32 P.2d at 
845 & 847. Thus, the crux of the case really turns on the question of whether a 'substantial' 
impairment of the contracts occurred - which, as explained by the Steward court, can be safely 
answered in the affirmative. In the present case, however, as discussed above, there has been no 
'substantial' impairment by virtue of the repeal ofIdaho Code § 72-915. 
Tanner v. Shearmire, 115 Idaho 1060, 772 P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1989) and Curtis v. Firth, 
123 Idaho 598, 850 P.2d 749 (1993), both related to the rights of beneficiaries seeking to sue a 
grantor/successor on a trust deed. The Tanner and· Curtis decisions, like Steward, present 
comparatively 'easy' Contract Clause questions. In both cases, the Court considered the 
remedies available to note-holders at the time they entered into a note: that remedy would, as the 
law stood, naturally include the right to sue on the note. The effect of the amendment, however, 
was to effectively strip the right to act on the note, requiring note-holders to seek foreclosure as a 
primary recovery mechanism instead. Such a change would obviously be a 'substantial' 
impairment of the note, as the note-holders would largely be left with a right without a remedy 
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(or, at least, a heavily-impaired remedy). Further, Tanne~ and Curtis lack any discussion of the 
remaining two parts of the consideration governing an alleged Contract Clause, as did Steward. 
Thus, these string of cases - Steward, Tanner, and Curtis - represent 'easy' Contract Clause cases 
where the Legislature attempted to impair existing notes and mortgages between private parties 
by stripping down the remedies to act on such. This scenario is wholly inapposite to the present 
case, where the impairment (if any at all) is not substantial, and otherwise is a narrowly-tailored 
change for a "significant and legitimate public purpose." 
Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993), actually involves administrative 
action, rather than legislative action. In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the 
authority of the Idaho Industrial Commission to cap attorneys fees at 25% via a "letter of 
understanding." The Court's primary basis for rejection was the lIC's failure to abide by the 
APA. ld at 691. However, the Court did not take the absolutist view that because the 'letter of 
understanding' impaired fee agreements, it was per se unconstitutional; rather, the Court focused 
on the lIC's lack of procedure in promUlgating the 'letter of understanding': "In order to 
justifiably modity attorney fee agreements in the interest of public welfare, the Commission 
must afford due process to the contracting parties, i.e., notice and an opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time." ld. (emphasis added). Thus, the Court's gripe was ultimately not with the 
right to modify the agreements, but the procedure in which it was done. Thus, Curr's focus on 
an improper administrative action offers no guidance in this matter. 12 
12 In the present case, of course, the repeal proceeded through the Legislature and was passed as a public law. 
Indeed, during the course of drafting the legislation, the bill was taken up at hearing in the Senate Commerce and 
Human Resources Committee on April 7 and April 14, 2009. See Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibits A and B. Notably, at the April 7, 2009 hearing on the bill, 
plaintiffs' counsel in this action - Mr. Gordon and Mr. Lojek - specificany provided testimony in opposition to the 
bill. fd. at Exh. A, at pp. 3-4. 
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Accordingly, the case law offered by plaintiffs in support of their motion for summary 
judgment either fails to reflect the modem, refined interpretation of the Contract Clause and its 
three~step analysis, or otherwise illustrates 'easy' Contract Clause cases (that is, very substantial 
impairments of contracts with no justified public purpose). However, as discussed in sections 
above, application of the three-part test to the case at bar more than amply demonstrates that the 




For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be 
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COME NOW THE PLAINTIFFS, by and through undersigned counsel, and hereby move 
this Court for its Order, granting the Motion to Strike the Affidavit of James M Alcorn and 
Selected Exhibits Attached to the Affidavit of Counsel Both of Which Were Filed in Support of 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. This Motion is made on the grounds and for the 
reasons that as more fully set forth in the Memorandum In Support Motion to Strike the Affidavit 
of James M Alcorn and Selected Exhibits Attached to the Affidavit of Counsel Both of Which 
Were Filed in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed herewith: 
1. Exhibits A, B, D, E as attached to the Affidavit of Counsel are not admissible either or 
both because they are irrelevant to the resolution of the issues identified in the 
proceedings before the Court or they are testimonial in nature and the declarant is not 
properly sworn. Being inadmissible, they have, pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 56(e) no role in 
this summary judgment proceeding. 
2. The Affidavit of James M. Alcorn contains no information as individual or aggregated 
paragraphs which is relevant to the resolution of the issues identified in the proceedings 
before the Court and is therefor inadmissible and not pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 56(e) a 
properly filed affidavit in this summary judgment proceeding. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED this 17th day of November, 2010 
Bruce S. Bistline 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the I1h day of November, 2010, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing instrument was served on the following by the method indicated below, and 
addressed as follows: 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely Duke 
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton 
702 W. Idaho St. Ste. 700 
PO Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
[] Hand Delivery 
[] U.S. Mail, postage paid 
[] Overnight Express Mail 
[X] Facsimile Copy: 395-8585 
Bruce S. Bistline 
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